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CVSS: 8.8EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 1

On some Samsung phones and tablets running Android through 7.1.1, it is possible for an attacker-controlled Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) device to pair silently with a vulnerable target device, without any user interaction, when the target device's Bluetooth is on, and it is running an app that offers a connectable BLE advertisement. An example of such an app could be a Bluetooth-based contact tracing app, such as Australia's COVIDSafe app, Singapore's TraceTogether app, or France's TousAntiCovid (formerly StopCovid). As part of the pairing process, two pieces (among others) of personally identifiable information are exchanged: the Identity Address of the Bluetooth adapter of the target device, and its associated Identity Resolving Key (IRK). Either one of these identifiers can be used to perform re-identification of the target device for long term tracking. The list of affected devices includes (but is not limited to): Galaxy Note 5, Galaxy S6 Edge, Galaxy A3, Tab A (2017), J2 Pro (2018), Galaxy Note 4, and Galaxy S5. • https://github.com/alwentiu/contact-tracing-research/blob/main/samsung.pdf •

CVSS: 9.8EPSS: 0%CPEs: 12EXPL: 0

An issue was discovered on Samsung mobile devices with software through 2016-04-05 (incorporating the Samsung Professional Audio SDK). The Jack audio service doesn't implement access control for shared memory, leading to arbitrary code execution or privilege escalation. The Samsung ID is SVE-2016-5953 (July 2016). Se detectó un problema en dispositivos móviles Samsung con versiones de software hasta el 05-04-2019 (incorporando el Samsung Professional Audio SDK). El servicio de audio Jack no implementa el control de acceso para la memoria compartida, conllevando a una ejecución de código arbitraria o una escalada de privilegios. • https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb • CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer •