CVSS: 10.0EPSS: 0%CPEs: 1EXPL: 1CVE-2023-39967 – Full read and controlled SSRF through URL parameter when testing a request inside wiremock-studio
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-39967
WireMock is a tool for mocking HTTP services. When certain request URLs like “@127.0.0.1:1234" are used in WireMock Studio configuration fields, the request might be forwarded to an arbitrary service reachable from WireMock’s instance. There are 3 identified potential attack vectors: via “TestRequester” functionality, webhooks and the proxy mode. As we can control HTTP Method, HTTP Headers, HTTP Data, it allows sending requests with the default level of credentials for the WireMock instance. The vendor has discontinued the affected Wiremock studio product and there will be no fix. • https://github.com/wiremock/wiremock/security/advisories/GHSA-676j-xrv3-73vc • CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) •
CVSS: 5.4EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0CVE-2023-41327 – Controlled SSRF through URL in the WireMock
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-41327
WireMock is a tool for mocking HTTP services. WireMock can be configured to only permit proxying (and therefore recording) to certain addresses. This is achieved via a list of allowed address rules and a list of denied address rules, where the allowed list is evaluated first. Until WireMock Webhooks Extension 3.0.0-beta-15, the filtering of target addresses from the proxy mode DID NOT work for Webhooks, so the users were potentially vulnerable regardless of the `limitProxyTargets` settings. Via the WireMock webhooks configuration, POST requests from a webhook might be forwarded to an arbitrary service reachable from WireMock’s instance. For example, If someone is running the WireMock docker Container inside a private cluster, they can trigger internal POST requests against unsecured APIs or even against secure ones by passing a token, discovered using another exploit, via authentication headers. • https://github.com/wiremock/wiremock/releases/tag/3.0.0-beta-15 https://github.com/wiremock/wiremock/security/advisories/GHSA-hq8w-9w8w-pmx7 https://wiremock.org/docs/configuration/#preventing-proxying-to-and-recording-from-specific-target-addresses • CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) •
CVSS: 6.6EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2023-41329 – Domain restrictions bypass via DNS Rebinding in WireMock and WireMock Studio
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-41329
WireMock is a tool for mocking HTTP services. The proxy mode of WireMock, can be protected by the network restrictions configuration, as documented in Preventing proxying to and recording from specific target addresses. These restrictions can be configured using the domain names, and in such a case the configuration is vulnerable to the DNS rebinding attacks. A similar patch was applied in WireMock 3.0.0-beta-15 for the WireMock Webhook Extensions. The root cause of the attack is a defect in the logic which allows for a race condition triggered by a DNS server whose address expires in between the initial validation and the outbound network request that might go to a domain that was supposed to be prohibited. • https://github.com/wiremock/wiremock/security/advisories/GHSA-pmxq-pj47-j8j4 https://wiremock.org/docs/configuration/#preventing-proxying-to-and-recording-from-specific-target-addresses • CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing •
CVSS: 7.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0CVE-2023-31444
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-31444
In Talend Studio before 7.3.1-R2022-10 and 8.x before 8.0.1-R2022-09, microservices allow unauthenticated access to the Jolokia endpoint of the microservice. This allows for remote access to the JVM via the Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge. • https://talend.com https://www.talend.com/security/incident-response/#CVE-2023-31444 •
CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 1EXPL: 0CVE-2018-7472
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2018-7472
INVT Studio 1.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service during import operations. INVT Studio 1.2 permite que atacantes remotos provoquen una denegación de servicio (DoS) durante las operaciones de importación. • http://www.cnvd.org.cn/flaw/show/1205913 •