// For flags

CVE-2014-9293

ntp: automatic generation of weak default key in config_auth()

Severity Score

5.9
*CVSS v3

Exploit Likelihood

*EPSS

Affected Versions

*CPE

Public Exploits

1
*Multiple Sources

Exploited in Wild

-
*KEV

Decision

-
*SSVC
Descriptions

The config_auth function in ntpd in NTP before 4.2.7p11, when an auth key is not configured, improperly generates a key, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms via a brute-force attack.

La función config_auth en ntpd en NTP anterior a 4.2.7p11, cuando no se configura una clave de autenticación, incorréctamente genera una clave, esto hace que atacantes remotos puedan romper los mecanismos de protección fácilmente mediante un ataque de fuerza bruta.

It was found that ntpd automatically generated weak keys for its internal use if no ntpdc request authentication key was specified in the ntp.conf configuration file. A remote attacker able to match the configured IP restrictions could guess the generated key, and possibly use it to send ntpdc query or configuration requests.

If no authentication key is defined in the ntp.conf file, a cryptographically-weak default key is generated. ntp-keygen before 4.2.7p230 uses a non-cryptographic random number generator with a weak seed to generate symmetric keys. A remote unauthenticated attacker may craft special packets that trigger buffer overflows in the ntpd functions crypto_recv() (when using autokey authentication), ctl_putdata(), and configure(). The resulting buffer overflows may be exploited to allow arbitrary malicious code to be executed with the privilege of the ntpd process. A section of code in ntpd handling a rare error is missing a return statement, therefore processing did not stop when the error was encountered. This situation may be exploitable by an attacker. Stephen Roettger of the Google Security Team, Sebastian Krahmer of the SUSE Security Team and Harlan Stenn of Network Time Foundation discovered that the length value in extension fields is not properly validated in several code paths in ntp_crypto.c, which could lead to information leakage or denial of service. Stephen Roettger of the Google Security Team reported that ACLs based on IPv6 ::1 addresses can be bypassed. The ntp package has been patched to fix these issues.

*Credits: N/A
CVSS Scores
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
Partial
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
High
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
None
* Common Vulnerability Scoring System
SSVC
  • Decision:-
Exploitation
-
Automatable
-
Tech. Impact
-
* Organization's Worst-case Scenario
Timeline
  • 2014-12-05 CVE Reserved
  • 2014-12-20 CVE Published
  • 2024-08-06 CVE Updated
  • 2024-08-06 First Exploit
  • 2025-03-30 EPSS Updated
  • ---------- Exploited in Wild
  • ---------- KEV Due Date
CWE
  • CWE-338: Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
CAPEC
References (23)
URL Date SRC
Affected Vendors, Products, and Versions
Vendor Product Version Other Status
Vendor Product Version Other Status <-- --> Vendor Product Version Other Status
Ntp
Search vendor "Ntp"
Ntp
Search vendor "Ntp" for product "Ntp"
<= 4.2.7
Search vendor "Ntp" for product "Ntp" and version " <= 4.2.7"
-
Affected