// For flags

CVE-2023-52608

firmware: arm_scmi: Check mailbox/SMT channel for consistency

Severity Score

5.5
*CVSS v3

Exploit Likelihood

*EPSS

Affected Versions

*CPE

Public Exploits

0
*Multiple Sources

Exploited in Wild

-
*KEV

Decision

Track
*SSVC
Descriptions

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_scmi: Check mailbox/SMT channel for consistency On reception of a completion interrupt the shared memory area is accessed
to retrieve the message header at first and then, if the message sequence
number identifies a transaction which is still pending, the related
payload is fetched too. When an SCMI command times out the channel ownership remains with the
platform until eventually a late reply is received and, as a consequence,
any further transmission attempt remains pending, waiting for the channel
to be relinquished by the platform. Once that late reply is received the channel ownership is given back
to the agent and any pending request is then allowed to proceed and
overwrite the SMT area of the just delivered late reply; then the wait
for the reply to the new request starts. It has been observed that the spurious IRQ related to the late reply can
be wrongly associated with the freshly enqueued request: when that happens
the SCMI stack in-flight lookup procedure is fooled by the fact that the
message header now present in the SMT area is related to the new pending
transaction, even though the real reply has still to arrive. This race-condition on the A2P channel can be detected by looking at the
channel status bits: a genuine reply from the platform will have set the
channel free bit before triggering the completion IRQ. Add a consistency check to validate such condition in the A2P ISR.

En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: firmware: arm_scmi: comprueba la coherencia del buzón/canal SMT Al recibir una interrupción de finalización, se accede al área de memoria compartida para recuperar el encabezado del mensaje al principio y luego, si el número de secuencia del mensaje identifica una transacción que aún está pendiente, el payload relacionado también se recupera. Cuando se agota el tiempo de espera de un comando SCMI, la propiedad del canal permanece en la plataforma hasta que finalmente se recibe una respuesta tardía y, como consecuencia, cualquier intento de transmisión adicional permanece pendiente, esperando que la plataforma abandone el canal. Una vez que se recibe esa respuesta tardía, la propiedad del canal se devuelve al agente y cualquier solicitud pendiente puede continuar y sobrescribir el área SMT de la respuesta tardía recién entregada; luego comienza la espera de la respuesta a la nueva solicitud. Se ha observado que la IRQ espuria relacionada con la respuesta tardía puede asociarse erróneamente con la solicitud recién puesta en cola: cuando eso sucede, el procedimiento de búsqueda en curso de la pila SCMI se ve engañado por el hecho de que el encabezado del mensaje ahora presente en el área SMT es relacionado con la nueva transacción pendiente, aunque la respuesta real aún no ha llegado. Esta condición de ejecución en el canal A2P se puede detectar observando los bits de estado del canal: una respuesta genuina de la plataforma habrá configurado el bit libre del canal antes de activar la IRQ de finalización. Agregue una verificación de coherencia para validar dicha condición en el ISR A2P.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_scmi: Check mailbox/SMT channel for consistency On reception of a completion interrupt the shared memory area is accessed to retrieve the message header at first and then, if the message sequence number identifies a transaction which is still pending, the related payload is fetched too. When an SCMI command times out the channel ownership remains with the platform until eventually a late reply is received and, as a consequence, any further transmission attempt remains pending, waiting for the channel to be relinquished by the platform. Once that late reply is received the channel ownership is given back to the agent and any pending request is then allowed to proceed and overwrite the SMT area of the just delivered late reply; then the wait for the reply to the new request starts. It has been observed that the spurious IRQ related to the late reply can be wrongly associated with the freshly enqueued request: when that happens the SCMI stack in-flight lookup procedure is fooled by the fact that the message header now present in the SMT area is related to the new pending transaction, even though the real reply has still to arrive. This race-condition on the A2P channel can be detected by looking at the channel status bits: a genuine reply from the platform will have set the channel free bit before triggering the completion IRQ. Add a consistency check to validate such condition in the A2P ISR.

Alon Zahavi discovered that the NVMe-oF/TCP subsystem in the Linux kernel did not properly validate H2C PDU data, leading to a null pointer dereference vulnerability. A remote attacker could use this to cause a denial of service. Sander Wiebing, Alvise de Faveri Tron, Herbert Bos, and Cristiano Giuffrida discovered that the Linux kernel mitigations for the initial Branch History Injection vulnerability were insufficient for Intel processors. A local attacker could potentially use this to expose sensitive information.

*Credits: N/A
CVSS Scores
Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High
Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Authentication
Single
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
Complete
* Common Vulnerability Scoring System
SSVC
  • Decision:Track
Exploitation
None
Automatable
No
Tech. Impact
Partial
* Organization's Worst-case Scenario
Timeline
  • 2024-03-02 CVE Reserved
  • 2024-03-13 CVE Published
  • 2025-05-04 CVE Updated
  • 2025-07-02 EPSS Updated
  • ---------- Exploited in Wild
  • ---------- KEV Due Date
  • ---------- First Exploit
CWE
CAPEC
Affected Vendors, Products, and Versions
Vendor Product Version Other Status
Vendor Product Version Other Status <-- --> Vendor Product Version Other Status
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 5.7 < 5.15.149
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 5.7 < 5.15.149"
en
Affected
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 5.7 < 6.1.76
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 5.7 < 6.1.76"
en
Affected
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 5.7 < 6.6.15
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 5.7 < 6.6.15"
en
Affected
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 5.7 < 6.7.3
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 5.7 < 6.7.3"
en
Affected
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 5.7 < 6.8
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 5.7 < 6.8"
en
Affected