// For flags

CVE-2024-45337

Misuse of connection.serverAuthenticate may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto

Severity Score

9.1
*CVSS v3.1

Exploit Likelihood

*EPSS

Affected Versions

*CPE

Public Exploits

3
*Multiple Sources

Exploited in Wild

-
*KEV

Decision

Attend
*SSVC
Descriptions

Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass.

Applications and libraries which misuse connection.serverAuthenticate (via callback field ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback) may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance.

A flaw was found in the x/crypto/ssh go library. Applications and libraries that misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B and authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B, for which the attacker does not control the private key. The misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause an authorization bypass.

Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance.

Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2.12.2 General Availability release images, which provide enhancements, bug fixes, security updates, and updated container images. Issues addressed include a bypass vulnerability.

*Credits: Damien Tournoud (Platform.sh / Upsun), Patrick Dawkins (Platform.sh / Upsun), Vince Parker (Platform.sh / Upsun), Jules Duvivier (Platform.sh / Upsun)
CVSS Scores
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Medium
Authentication
Single
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
None
* Common Vulnerability Scoring System
SSVC
  • Decision:Attend
Exploitation
None
Automatable
Yes
Tech. Impact
Total
* Organization's Worst-case Scenario
Timeline
  • 2024-08-27 CVE Reserved
  • 2024-12-11 CVE Published
  • 2024-12-17 First Exploit
  • 2025-02-18 CVE Updated
  • 2025-03-30 EPSS Updated
  • ---------- Exploited in Wild
  • ---------- KEV Due Date
CWE
  • CWE-285: Improper Authorization
CAPEC
Affected Vendors, Products, and Versions
Vendor Product Version Other Status
Vendor Product Version Other Status <-- --> Vendor Product Version Other Status
Golang.org/x/crypto
Search vendor "Golang.org/x/crypto"
Golang.org/x/crypto/ssh
Search vendor "Golang.org/x/crypto" for product "Golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
< 0.31.0
Search vendor "Golang.org/x/crypto" for product "Golang.org/x/crypto/ssh" and version " < 0.31.0"
en
Affected