CVE-2024-49998
net: dsa: improve shutdown sequence
Severity Score
Exploit Likelihood
Affected Versions
Public Exploits
0Exploited in Wild
-Decision
Descriptions
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: dsa: improve shutdown sequence Alexander Sverdlin presents 2 problems during shutdown with the
lan9303 driver. One is specific to lan9303 and the other just happens
to reproduce there. The first problem is that lan9303 is unique among DSA drivers in that it
calls dev_get_drvdata() at "arbitrary runtime" (not probe, not shutdown,
not remove): phy_state_machine()
-> ... -> dsa_user_phy_read() -> ds->ops->phy_read() -> lan9303_phy_read() -> chip->ops->phy_read() -> lan9303_mdio_phy_read() -> dev_get_drvdata() But we never stop the phy_state_machine(), so it may continue to run
after dsa_switch_shutdown(). Our common pattern in all DSA drivers is
to set drvdata to NULL to suppress the remove() method that may come
afterwards. But in this case it will result in an NPD. The second problem is that the way in which we set
dp->conduit->dsa_ptr = NULL; is concurrent with receive packet
processing. dsa_switch_rcv() checks once whether dev->dsa_ptr is NULL,
but afterwards, rather than continuing to use that non-NULL value,
dev->dsa_ptr is dereferenced again and again without NULL checks:
dsa_conduit_find_user() and many other places. In between dereferences,
there is no locking to ensure that what was valid once continues to be
valid. Both problems have the common aspect that closing the conduit interface
solves them. In the first case, dev_close(conduit) triggers the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN
event in dsa_user_netdevice_event() which closes user ports as well.
dsa_port_disable_rt() calls phylink_stop(), which synchronously stops
the phylink state machine, and ds->ops->phy_read() will thus no longer
call into the driver after this point. In the second case, dev_close(conduit) should do this, as per
Documentation/networking/driver.rst: | Quiescence
| ----------
|
| After the ndo_stop routine has been called, the hardware must
| not receive or transmit any data. All in flight packets must
| be aborted. If necessary, poll or wait for completion of
| any reset commands. So it should be sufficient to ensure that later, when we zeroize
conduit->dsa_ptr, there will be no concurrent dsa_switch_rcv() call
on this conduit. The addition of the netif_device_detach() function is to ensure that
ioctls, rtnetlinks and ethtool requests on the user ports no longer
propagate down to the driver - we're no longer prepared to handle them. The race condition actually did not exist when commit 0650bf52b31f
("net: dsa: be compatible with masters which unregister on shutdown")
first introduced dsa_switch_shutdown(). It was created later, when we
stopped unregistering the user interfaces from a bad spot, and we just
replaced that sequence with a racy zeroization of conduit->dsa_ptr
(one which doesn't ensure that the interfaces aren't up).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: dsa: improve shutdown sequence Alexander Sverdlin presents 2 problems during shutdown with the lan9303 driver. One is specific to lan9303 and the other just happens to reproduce there. The first problem is that lan9303 is unique among DSA drivers in that it calls dev_get_drvdata() at "arbitrary runtime" (not probe, not shutdown, not remove): phy_state_machine() -> ... -> dsa_user_phy_read() -> ds->ops->phy_read() -> lan9303_phy_read() -> chip->ops->phy_read() -> lan9303_mdio_phy_read() -> dev_get_drvdata() But we never stop the phy_state_machine(), so it may continue to run after dsa_switch_shutdown(). Our common pattern in all DSA drivers is to set drvdata to NULL to suppress the remove() method that may come afterwards. But in this case it will result in an NPD. The second problem is that the way in which we set dp->conduit->dsa_ptr = NULL; is concurrent with receive packet processing. dsa_switch_rcv() checks once whether dev->dsa_ptr is NULL, but afterwards, rather than continuing to use that non-NULL value, dev->dsa_ptr is dereferenced again and again without NULL checks: dsa_conduit_find_user() and many other places. In between dereferences, there is no locking to ensure that what was valid once continues to be valid. Both problems have the common aspect that closing the conduit interface solves them. In the first case, dev_close(conduit) triggers the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN event in dsa_user_netdevice_event() which closes user ports as well. dsa_port_disable_rt() calls phylink_stop(), which synchronously stops the phylink state machine, and ds->ops->phy_read() will thus no longer call into the driver after this point. In the second case, dev_close(conduit) should do this, as per Documentation/networking/driver.rst: | Quiescence | ---------- | | After the ndo_stop routine has been called, the hardware must | not receive or transmit any data. All in flight packets must | be aborted. If necessary, poll or wait for completion of | any reset commands. So it should be sufficient to ensure that later, when we zeroize conduit->dsa_ptr, there will be no concurrent dsa_switch_rcv() call on this conduit. The addition of the netif_device_detach() function is to ensure that ioctls, rtnetlinks and ethtool requests on the user ports no longer propagate down to the driver - we're no longer prepared to handle them. The race condition actually did not exist when commit 0650bf52b31f ("net: dsa: be compatible with masters which unregister on shutdown") first introduced dsa_switch_shutdown(). It was created later, when we stopped unregistering the user interfaces from a bad spot, and we just replaced that sequence with a racy zeroization of conduit->dsa_ptr (one which doesn't ensure that the interfaces aren't up).
Attila Szász discovered that the HFS+ file system implementation in the Linux Kernel contained a heap overflow vulnerability. An attacker could use a specially crafted file system image that, when mounted, could cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code. Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel. An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system.
CVSS Scores
SSVC
- Decision:Track
Timeline
- 2024-10-21 CVE Reserved
- 2024-10-21 CVE Published
- 2025-01-09 CVE Updated
- 2025-03-20 EPSS Updated
- ---------- Exploited in Wild
- ---------- KEV Due Date
- ---------- First Exploit
CWE
CAPEC
References (7)
URL | Tag | Source |
---|---|---|
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff45899e732e57088985e3a497b1d9100571c0f5 | Vuln. Introduced | |
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee534378f00561207656663d93907583958339ae | Vuln. Introduced | |
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89b60402d43cdab4387dbbf24afebda5cf092ae7 | Vuln. Introduced |
URL | Date | SRC |
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URL | Date | SRC |
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Affected Vendors, Products, and Versions
Vendor | Product | Version | Other | Status | ||||||
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Vendor | Product | Version | Other | Status | <-- --> | Vendor | Product | Version | Other | Status |
Linux Search vendor "Linux" | Linux Kernel Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" | >= 5.15.155 < 5.15.176 Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 5.15.155 < 5.15.176" | en |
Affected
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Linux Search vendor "Linux" | Linux Kernel Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" | >= 5.17 < 6.10.14 Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 5.17 < 6.10.14" | en |
Affected
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Linux Search vendor "Linux" | Linux Kernel Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" | >= 5.17 < 6.11.3 Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 5.17 < 6.11.3" | en |
Affected
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Linux Search vendor "Linux" | Linux Kernel Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" | >= 5.17 < 6.12 Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 5.17 < 6.12" | en |
Affected
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Linux Search vendor "Linux" | Linux Kernel Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" | 5.16.10 Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version "5.16.10" | en |
Affected
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