// For flags

CVE-2024-50038

netfilter: xtables: avoid NFPROTO_UNSPEC where needed

Severity Score

8.1
*CVSS v3

Exploit Likelihood

*EPSS

Affected Versions

*CPE

Public Exploits

0
*Multiple Sources

Exploited in Wild

-
*KEV

Decision

Track
*SSVC
Descriptions

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: xtables: avoid NFPROTO_UNSPEC where needed syzbot managed to call xt_cluster match via ebtables: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11 at net/netfilter/xt_cluster.c:72 xt_cluster_mt+0x196/0x780 [..] ebt_do_table+0x174b/0x2a40 Module registers to NFPROTO_UNSPEC, but it assumes ipv4/ipv6 packet
processing. As this is only useful to restrict locally terminating
TCP/UDP traffic, register this for ipv4 and ipv6 family only. Pablo points out that this is a general issue, direct users of the
set/getsockopt interface can call into targets/matches that were only
intended for use with ip(6)tables. Check all UNSPEC matches and targets for similar issues: - matches and targets are fine except if they assume skb_network_header() is valid -- this is only true when called from inet layer: ip(6) stack pulls the ip/ipv6 header into linear data area.
- targets that return XT_CONTINUE or other xtables verdicts must be restricted too, they are incompatbile with the ebtables traverser, e.g. EBT_CONTINUE is a completely different value than XT_CONTINUE. Most matches/targets are changed to register for NFPROTO_IPV4/IPV6, as
they are provided for use by ip(6)tables. The MARK target is also used by arptables, so register for NFPROTO_ARP too. While at it, bail out if connbytes fails to enable the corresponding
conntrack family. This change passes the selftests in iptables.git.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: xtables: avoid NFPROTO_UNSPEC where needed syzbot managed to call xt_cluster match via ebtables: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11 at net/netfilter/xt_cluster.c:72 xt_cluster_mt+0x196/0x780 [..] ebt_do_table+0x174b/0x2a40 Module registers to NFPROTO_UNSPEC, but it assumes ipv4/ipv6 packet processing. As this is only useful to restrict locally terminating TCP/UDP traffic, register this for ipv4 and ipv6 family only. Pablo points out that this is a general issue, direct users of the set/getsockopt interface can call into targets/matches that were only intended for use with ip(6)tables. Check all UNSPEC matches and targets for similar issues: - matches and targets are fine except if they assume skb_network_header() is valid -- this is only true when called from inet layer: ip(6) stack pulls the ip/ipv6 header into linear data area. - targets that return XT_CONTINUE or other xtables verdicts must be restricted too, they are incompatbile with the ebtables traverser, e.g. EBT_CONTINUE is a completely different value than XT_CONTINUE. Most matches/targets are changed to register for NFPROTO_IPV4/IPV6, as they are provided for use by ip(6)tables. The MARK target is also used by arptables, so register for NFPROTO_ARP too. While at it, bail out if connbytes fails to enable the corresponding conntrack family. This change passes the selftests in iptables.git.

Michael Randrianantenaina discovered that the Bluetooth driver in the Linux Kernel contained an improper access control vulnerability. A nearby attacker could use this to connect a rougue device and possibly execute arbitrary code. Attila Szász discovered that the HFS+ file system implementation in the Linux Kernel contained a heap overflow vulnerability. An attacker could use a specially crafted file system image that, when mounted, could cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code.

*Credits: N/A
CVSS Scores
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
High
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Partial
Availability
Complete
* Common Vulnerability Scoring System
SSVC
  • Decision:Track
Exploitation
None
Automatable
No
Tech. Impact
Partial
* Organization's Worst-case Scenario
Timeline
  • 2024-10-21 CVE Reserved
  • 2024-10-21 CVE Published
  • 2024-12-19 CVE Updated
  • 2025-03-31 EPSS Updated
  • ---------- Exploited in Wild
  • ---------- KEV Due Date
  • ---------- First Exploit
CWE
CAPEC
Affected Vendors, Products, and Versions
Vendor Product Version Other Status
Vendor Product Version Other Status <-- --> Vendor Product Version Other Status
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 2.6.30 < 5.15.168
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 2.6.30 < 5.15.168"
en
Affected
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 2.6.30 < 6.1.113
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 2.6.30 < 6.1.113"
en
Affected
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 2.6.30 < 6.6.57
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 2.6.30 < 6.6.57"
en
Affected
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 2.6.30 < 6.11.4
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 2.6.30 < 6.11.4"
en
Affected
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 2.6.30 < 6.12
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 2.6.30 < 6.12"
en
Affected