CVE-2024-50250
fsdax: dax_unshare_iter needs to copy entire blocks
Severity Score
Exploit Likelihood
Affected Versions
4Public Exploits
0Exploited in Wild
-Decision
Descriptions
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsdax: dax_unshare_iter needs to copy entire blocks The code that copies data from srcmap to iomap in dax_unshare_iter is
very very broken, which bfoster's recent fsx changes have exposed. If the pos and len passed to dax_file_unshare are not aligned to an
fsblock boundary, the iter pos and length in the _iter function will
reflect this unalignment. dax_iomap_direct_access always returns a pointer to the start of the
kmapped fsdax page, even if its pos argument is in the middle of that
page. This is catastrophic for data integrity when iter->pos is not
aligned to a page, because daddr/saddr do not point to the same byte in
the file as iter->pos. Hence we corrupt user data by copying it to the
wrong place. If iter->pos + iomap_length() in the _iter function not aligned to a
page, then we fail to copy a full block, and only partially populate the
destination block. This is catastrophic for data confidentiality
because we expose stale pmem contents. Fix both of these issues by aligning copy_pos/copy_len to a page
boundary (remember, this is fsdax so 1 fsblock == 1 base page) so that
we always copy full blocks. We're not done yet -- there's no call to invalidate_inode_pages2_range,
so programs that have the file range mmap'd will continue accessing the
old memory mapping after the file metadata updates have completed. Be careful with the return value -- if the unshare succeeds, we still
need to return the number of bytes that the iomap iter thinks we're
operating on.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsdax: dax_unshare_iter needs to copy entire blocks The code that copies data from srcmap to iomap in dax_unshare_iter is very very broken, which bfoster's recent fsx changes have exposed. If the pos and len passed to dax_file_unshare are not aligned to an fsblock boundary, the iter pos and length in the _iter function will reflect this unalignment. dax_iomap_direct_access always returns a pointer to the start of the kmapped fsdax page, even if its pos argument is in the middle of that page. This is catastrophic for data integrity when iter->pos is not aligned to a page, because daddr/saddr do not point to the same byte in the file as iter->pos. Hence we corrupt user data by copying it to the wrong place. If iter->pos + iomap_length() in the _iter function not aligned to a page, then we fail to copy a full block, and only partially populate the destination block. This is catastrophic for data confidentiality because we expose stale pmem contents. Fix both of these issues by aligning copy_pos/copy_len to a page boundary (remember, this is fsdax so 1 fsblock == 1 base page) so that we always copy full blocks. We're not done yet -- there's no call to invalidate_inode_pages2_range, so programs that have the file range mmap'd will continue accessing the old memory mapping after the file metadata updates have completed. Be careful with the return value -- if the unshare succeeds, we still need to return the number of bytes that the iomap iter thinks we're operating on.
Attila Szász discovered that the HFS+ file system implementation in the Linux Kernel contained a heap overflow vulnerability. An attacker could use a specially crafted file system image that, when mounted, could cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code. Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel. An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system.
CVSS Scores
SSVC
- Decision:-
Timeline
- 2024-10-21 CVE Reserved
- 2024-11-09 CVE Published
- 2024-12-19 CVE Updated
- 2025-03-18 EPSS Updated
- ---------- Exploited in Wild
- ---------- KEV Due Date
- ---------- First Exploit
CWE
CAPEC
References (6)
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