// For flags

CVE-2024-50250

fsdax: dax_unshare_iter needs to copy entire blocks

Severity Score

"-"
*CVSS v-

Exploit Likelihood

*EPSS

Affected Versions

*CPE

Public Exploits

0
*Multiple Sources

Exploited in Wild

-
*KEV

Decision

-
*SSVC
Descriptions

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsdax: dax_unshare_iter needs to copy entire blocks The code that copies data from srcmap to iomap in dax_unshare_iter is
very very broken, which bfoster's recent fsx changes have exposed. If the pos and len passed to dax_file_unshare are not aligned to an
fsblock boundary, the iter pos and length in the _iter function will
reflect this unalignment. dax_iomap_direct_access always returns a pointer to the start of the
kmapped fsdax page, even if its pos argument is in the middle of that
page. This is catastrophic for data integrity when iter->pos is not
aligned to a page, because daddr/saddr do not point to the same byte in
the file as iter->pos. Hence we corrupt user data by copying it to the
wrong place. If iter->pos + iomap_length() in the _iter function not aligned to a
page, then we fail to copy a full block, and only partially populate the
destination block. This is catastrophic for data confidentiality
because we expose stale pmem contents. Fix both of these issues by aligning copy_pos/copy_len to a page
boundary (remember, this is fsdax so 1 fsblock == 1 base page) so that
we always copy full blocks. We're not done yet -- there's no call to invalidate_inode_pages2_range,
so programs that have the file range mmap'd will continue accessing the
old memory mapping after the file metadata updates have completed. Be careful with the return value -- if the unshare succeeds, we still
need to return the number of bytes that the iomap iter thinks we're
operating on.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsdax: dax_unshare_iter needs to copy entire blocks The code that copies data from srcmap to iomap in dax_unshare_iter is very very broken, which bfoster's recent fsx changes have exposed. If the pos and len passed to dax_file_unshare are not aligned to an fsblock boundary, the iter pos and length in the _iter function will reflect this unalignment. dax_iomap_direct_access always returns a pointer to the start of the kmapped fsdax page, even if its pos argument is in the middle of that page. This is catastrophic for data integrity when iter->pos is not aligned to a page, because daddr/saddr do not point to the same byte in the file as iter->pos. Hence we corrupt user data by copying it to the wrong place. If iter->pos + iomap_length() in the _iter function not aligned to a page, then we fail to copy a full block, and only partially populate the destination block. This is catastrophic for data confidentiality because we expose stale pmem contents. Fix both of these issues by aligning copy_pos/copy_len to a page boundary (remember, this is fsdax so 1 fsblock == 1 base page) so that we always copy full blocks. We're not done yet -- there's no call to invalidate_inode_pages2_range, so programs that have the file range mmap'd will continue accessing the old memory mapping after the file metadata updates have completed. Be careful with the return value -- if the unshare succeeds, we still need to return the number of bytes that the iomap iter thinks we're operating on.

Michael Randrianantenaina discovered that the Bluetooth driver in the Linux Kernel contained an improper access control vulnerability. A nearby attacker could use this to connect a rogue device and possibly execute arbitrary code. Attila Szász discovered that the HFS+ file system implementation in the Linux Kernel contained a heap overflow vulnerability. An attacker could use a specially crafted file system image that, when mounted, could cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code.

*Credits: N/A
CVSS Scores
Attack Vector
-
Attack Complexity
-
Privileges Required
-
User Interaction
-
Scope
-
Confidentiality
-
Integrity
-
Availability
-
* Common Vulnerability Scoring System
SSVC
  • Decision:-
Exploitation
-
Automatable
-
Tech. Impact
-
* Organization's Worst-case Scenario
Timeline
  • 2024-10-21 CVE Reserved
  • 2024-11-09 CVE Published
  • 2025-04-19 EPSS Updated
  • 2025-05-04 CVE Updated
  • ---------- Exploited in Wild
  • ---------- KEV Due Date
  • ---------- First Exploit
CWE
CAPEC
Affected Vendors, Products, and Versions
Vendor Product Version Other Status
Vendor Product Version Other Status <-- --> Vendor Product Version Other Status
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 6.1.113 < 6.1.116
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 6.1.113 < 6.1.116"
en
Affected
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 6.2 < 6.6.60
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 6.2 < 6.6.60"
en
Affected
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 6.2 < 6.11.7
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 6.2 < 6.11.7"
en
Affected
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 6.2 < 6.12
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 6.2 < 6.12"
en
Affected