CVE-2024-58098
bpf: track changes_pkt_data property for global functions
Severity Score
Exploit Likelihood
Affected Versions
Public Exploits
0Exploited in Wild
-Decision
Descriptions
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: track changes_pkt_data property for global functions When processing calls to certain helpers, verifier invalidates all
packet pointers in a current state. For example, consider the
following program: __attribute__((__noinline__)) long skb_pull_data(struct __sk_buff *sk, __u32 len) { return bpf_skb_pull_data(sk, len); } SEC("tc") int test_invalidate_checks(struct __sk_buff *sk) { int *p = (void *)(long)sk->data; if ((void *)(p + 1) > (void *)(long)sk->data_end) return TCX_DROP; skb_pull_data(sk, 0); *p = 42; return TCX_PASS; } After a call to bpf_skb_pull_data() the pointer 'p' can't be used
safely. See function filter.c:bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() for a list
of such helpers. At the moment verifier invalidates packet pointers when processing
helper function calls, and does not traverse global sub-programs when
processing calls to global sub-programs. This means that calls to
helpers done from global sub-programs do not invalidate pointers in
the caller state. E.g. the program above is unsafe, but is not
rejected by verifier. This commit fixes the omission by computing field
bpf_subprog_info->changes_pkt_data for each sub-program before main
verification pass.
changes_pkt_data should be set if:
- subprogram calls helper for which bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data returns true;
- subprogram calls a global function, for which bpf_subprog_info->changes_pkt_data should be set. The verifier.c:check_cfg() pass is modified to compute this
information. The commit relies on depth first instruction traversal
done by check_cfg() and absence of recursive function calls:
- check_cfg() would eventually visit every call to subprogram S in a state when S is fully explored;
- when S is fully explored: - every direct helper call within S is explored (and thus changes_pkt_data is set if needed); - every call to subprogram S1 called by S was visited with S1 fully explored (and thus S inherits changes_pkt_data from S1). The downside of such approach is that dead code elimination is not
taken into account: if a helper call inside global function is dead
because of current configuration, verifier would conservatively assume
that the call occurs for the purpose of the changes_pkt_data
computation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: track changes_pkt_data property for global functions When processing calls to certain helpers, verifier invalidates all packet pointers in a current state. For example, consider the following program: __attribute__((__noinline__)) long skb_pull_data(struct __sk_buff *sk, __u32 len) { return bpf_skb_pull_data(sk, len); } SEC("tc") int test_invalidate_checks(struct __sk_buff *sk) { int *p = (void *)(long)sk->data; if ((void *)(p + 1) > (void *)(long)sk->data_end) return TCX_DROP; skb_pull_data(sk, 0); *p = 42; return TCX_PASS; } After a call to bpf_skb_pull_data() the pointer 'p' can't be used safely. See function filter.c:bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() for a list of such helpers. At the moment verifier invalidates packet pointers when processing helper function calls, and does not traverse global sub-programs when processing calls to global sub-programs. This means that calls to helpers done from global sub-programs do not invalidate pointers in the caller state. E.g. the program above is unsafe, but is not rejected by verifier. This commit fixes the omission by computing field bpf_subprog_info->changes_pkt_data for each sub-program before main verification pass. changes_pkt_data should be set if: - subprogram calls helper for which bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data returns true; - subprogram calls a global function, for which bpf_subprog_info->changes_pkt_data should be set. The verifier.c:check_cfg() pass is modified to compute this information. The commit relies on depth first instruction traversal done by check_cfg() and absence of recursive function calls: - check_cfg() would eventually visit every call to subprogram S in a state when S is fully explored; - when S is fully explored: - every direct helper call within S is explored (and thus changes_pkt_data is set if needed); - every call to subprogram S1 called by S was visited with S1 fully explored (and thus S inherits changes_pkt_data from S1). The downside of such approach is that dead code elimination is not taken into account: if a helper call inside global function is dead because of current configuration, verifier would conservatively assume that the call occurs for the purpose of the changes_pkt_data computation.
CVSS Scores
SSVC
- Decision:-
Timeline
- 2025-03-06 CVE Reserved
- 2025-05-05 CVE Published
- 2025-05-05 CVE Updated
- ---------- EPSS Updated
- ---------- Exploited in Wild
- ---------- KEV Due Date
- ---------- First Exploit
CWE
CAPEC
References (3)
URL | Tag | Source |
---|---|---|
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51c39bb1d5d105a02e29aa7960f0a395086e6342 | Vuln. Introduced |
URL | Date | SRC |
---|
URL | Date | SRC |
---|---|---|
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d572c60488b52882b719ed273767ee3b280413d | 2025-04-25 | |
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51081a3f25c742da5a659d7fc6fd77ebfdd555be | 2024-12-10 |
URL | Date | SRC |
---|
Affected Vendors, Products, and Versions
Vendor | Product | Version | Other | Status | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Vendor | Product | Version | Other | Status | <-- --> | Vendor | Product | Version | Other | Status |
Linux Search vendor "Linux" | Linux Kernel Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" | >= 5.6 < 6.12.25 Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 5.6 < 6.12.25" | en |
Affected
| ||||||
Linux Search vendor "Linux" | Linux Kernel Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" | >= 5.6 < 6.13 Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 5.6 < 6.13" | en |
Affected
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