// For flags

CVE-2025-29779

Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing has Inadequate Fault Injection Countermeasures in `secure_redundant_execution`

Severity Score

5.4
*CVSS v4

Exploit Likelihood

*EPSS

Affected Versions

*CPE

Public Exploits

0
*Multiple Sources

Exploited in Wild

-
*KEV

Decision

Track*
*SSVC
Descriptions

Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing provides a Python implementation of Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) scheme. In versions 0.7.6b0 and prior, the `secure_redundant_execution` function in feldman_vss.py attempts to mitigate fault injection attacks by executing a function multiple times and comparing results. However, several critical weaknesses exist. Python's execution environment cannot guarantee true isolation between redundant executions, the constant-time comparison implementation in Python is subject to timing variations, the randomized execution order and timing provide insufficient protection against sophisticated fault attacks, and the error handling may leak timing information about partial execution results. These limitations make the protection ineffective against targeted fault injection attacks, especially from attackers with physical access to the hardware. A successful fault injection attack could allow an attacker to bypass the redundancy check mechanisms, extract secret polynomial coefficients during share generation or verification, force the acceptance of invalid shares during verification, and/or manipulate the commitment verification process to accept fraudulent commitments. This undermines the core security guarantees of the Verifiable Secret Sharing scheme. As of time of publication, no patched versions of Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing exist, but other mitigations are available. Long-term remediation requires reimplementing the security-critical functions in a lower-level language like Rust. Short-term mitigations include deploying the software in environments with physical security controls, increasing the redundancy count (from 5 to a higher number) by modifying the source code, adding external verification of cryptographic operations when possible, considering using hardware security modules (HSMs) for key operations.

Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing provides a Python implementation of Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) scheme. In versions 0.8.0b2 and prior, the `secure_redundant_execution` function in feldman_vss.py attempts to mitigate fault injection attacks by executing a function multiple times and comparing results. However, several critical weaknesses exist. Python's execution environment cannot guarantee true isolation between redundant executions, the constant-time comparison implementation in Python is subject to timing variations, the randomized execution order and timing provide insufficient protection against sophisticated fault attacks, and the error handling may leak timing information about partial execution results. These limitations make the protection ineffective against targeted fault injection attacks, especially from attackers with physical access to the hardware. A successful fault injection attack could allow an attacker to bypass the redundancy check mechanisms, extract secret polynomial coefficients during share generation or verification, force the acceptance of invalid shares during verification, and/or manipulate the commitment verification process to accept fraudulent commitments. This undermines the core security guarantees of the Verifiable Secret Sharing scheme. As of time of publication, no patched versions of Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing exist, but other mitigations are available. Long-term remediation requires reimplementing the security-critical functions in a lower-level language like Rust. Short-term mitigations include deploying the software in environments with physical security controls, increasing the redundancy count (from 5 to a higher number) by modifying the source code, adding external verification of cryptographic operations when possible, considering using hardware security modules (HSMs) for key operations.

*Credits: N/A
CVSS Scores
Attack Vector
Physical
Attack Complexity
High
Attack Requirements
Present
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
System
Vulnerable | Subsequent
Confidentiality
High
None
Integrity
High
None
Availability
High
None
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
None
* Common Vulnerability Scoring System
SSVC
  • Decision:Track*
Exploitation
None
Automatable
No
Tech. Impact
Total
* Organization's Worst-case Scenario
Timeline
  • 2025-03-11 CVE Reserved
  • 2025-03-14 CVE Published
  • 2025-03-19 CVE Updated
  • 2025-03-20 EPSS Updated
  • ---------- Exploited in Wild
  • ---------- KEV Due Date
  • ---------- First Exploit
CWE
  • CWE-1240: Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation
  • CWE-1279: Cryptographic Operations are run Before Supporting Units are Ready
CAPEC
Affected Vendors, Products, and Versions
Vendor Product Version Other Status
Vendor Product Version Other Status <-- --> Vendor Product Version Other Status
DavidOsipov
Search vendor "DavidOsipov"
PostQuantum-Feldman-VSS
Search vendor "DavidOsipov" for product "PostQuantum-Feldman-VSS"
<= 0.8.0
Search vendor "DavidOsipov" for product "PostQuantum-Feldman-VSS" and version " <= 0.8.0"
en
Affected