// For flags

CVE-2025-38554

mm: fix a UAF when vma->mm is freed after vma->vm_refcnt got dropped

Severity Score

"-"
*CVSS v-

Exploit Likelihood

*EPSS

Affected Versions

*CPE

Public Exploits

0
*Multiple Sources

Exploited in Wild

-
*KEV

Decision

-
*SSVC
Descriptions

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: fix a UAF when vma->mm is freed after vma->vm_refcnt got dropped By inducing delays in the right places, Jann Horn created a reproducer for
a hard to hit UAF issue that became possible after VMAs were allowed to be
recycled by adding SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to their cache. Race description is borrowed from Jann's discovery report:
lock_vma_under_rcu() looks up a VMA locklessly with mas_walk() under
rcu_read_lock(). At that point, the VMA may be concurrently freed, and it
can be recycled by another process. vma_start_read() then increments the
vma->vm_refcnt (if it is in an acceptable range), and if this succeeds,
vma_start_read() can return a recycled VMA. In this scenario where the VMA has been recycled, lock_vma_under_rcu()
will then detect the mismatching ->vm_mm pointer and drop the VMA through
vma_end_read(), which calls vma_refcount_put(). vma_refcount_put() drops
the refcount and then calls rcuwait_wake_up() using a copy of vma->vm_mm. This is wrong: It implicitly assumes that the caller is keeping the VMA's
mm alive, but in this scenario the caller has no relation to the VMA's mm,
so the rcuwait_wake_up() can cause UAF. The diagram depicting the race:
T1 T2 T3
== == ==
lock_vma_under_rcu mas_walk <VMA gets removed from mm> mmap <the same VMA is reallocated> vma_start_read __refcount_inc_not_zero_limited_acquire munmap __vma_enter_locked refcount_add_not_zero vma_end_read vma_refcount_put __refcount_dec_and_test rcuwait_wait_event <finish operation> rcuwait_wake_up [UAF] Note that rcuwait_wait_event() in T3 does not block because refcount was
already dropped by T1. At this point T3 can exit and free the mm causing
UAF in T1. To avoid this we move vma->vm_mm verification into vma_start_read() and
grab vma->vm_mm to stabilize it before vma_refcount_put() operation. [surenb@google.com: v3]

*Credits: N/A
CVSS Scores
Attack Vector
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Attack Complexity
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Privileges Required
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User Interaction
-
Scope
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Confidentiality
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Integrity
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Availability
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* Common Vulnerability Scoring System
SSVC
  • Decision:-
Exploitation
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Automatable
-
Tech. Impact
-
* Organization's Worst-case Scenario
Timeline
  • 2025-04-16 CVE Reserved
  • 2025-08-19 CVE Published
  • 2025-08-19 CVE Updated
  • 2025-08-25 EPSS Updated
  • ---------- Exploited in Wild
  • ---------- KEV Due Date
  • ---------- First Exploit
CWE
CAPEC
Affected Vendors, Products, and Versions
Vendor Product Version Other Status
Vendor Product Version Other Status <-- --> Vendor Product Version Other Status
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 6.15 < 6.15.10
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 6.15 < 6.15.10"
en
Affected
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 6.15 < 6.16.1
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 6.15 < 6.16.1"
en
Affected
Linux
Search vendor "Linux"
Linux Kernel
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel"
>= 6.15 < 6.17-rc1
Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 6.15 < 6.17-rc1"
en
Affected