CVE-2025-40123
bpf: Enforce expected_attach_type for tailcall compatibility
Severity Score
Exploit Likelihood
Affected Versions
Public Exploits
0Exploited in Wild
-Decision
Descriptions
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Enforce expected_attach_type for tailcall compatibility Yinhao et al. recently reported: Our fuzzer tool discovered an uninitialized pointer issue in the bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() function within the Linux kernel's BPF subsystem. This leads to a NULL pointer dereference when a BPF program attempts to deference the txq member of struct xdp_buff object. The test initializes two programs of BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: progA acts as the
entry point for bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() and its expected_attach_type can
neither be of be BPF_XDP_DEVMAP nor BPF_XDP_CPUMAP. progA calls into a slot
of a tailcall map it owns. progB's expected_attach_type must be BPF_XDP_DEVMAP
to pass xdp_is_valid_access() validation. The program returns struct xdp_md's
egress_ifindex, and the latter is only allowed to be accessed under mentioned
expected_attach_type. progB is then inserted into the tailcall which progA
calls. The underlying issue goes beyond XDP though. Another example are programs
of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR. sock_addr_is_valid_access() as well
as sock_addr_func_proto() have different logic depending on the programs'
expected_attach_type. Similarly, a program attached to BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME
should not be allowed doing a tailcall into a program which calls bpf_bind()
out of BPF which is only enabled for BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT. In short, specifying expected_attach_type allows to open up additional
functionality or restrictions beyond what the basic bpf_prog_type enables.
The use of tailcalls must not violate these constraints. Fix it by enforcing
expected_attach_type in __bpf_prog_map_compatible(). Note that we only enforce this for tailcall maps, but not for BPF devmaps or
cpumaps: There, the programs are invoked through dev_map_bpf_prog_run*() and
cpu_map_bpf_prog_run*() which set up a new environment / context and therefore
these situations are not prone to this issue.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Enforce expected_attach_type for tailcall compatibility Yinhao et al. recently reported: Our fuzzer tool discovered an uninitialized pointer issue in the bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() function within the Linux kernel's BPF subsystem. This leads to a NULL pointer dereference when a BPF program attempts to deference the txq member of struct xdp_buff object. The test initializes two programs of BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: progA acts as the entry point for bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() and its expected_attach_type can neither be of be BPF_XDP_DEVMAP nor BPF_XDP_CPUMAP. progA calls into a slot of a tailcall map it owns. progB's expected_attach_type must be BPF_XDP_DEVMAP to pass xdp_is_valid_access() validation. The program returns struct xdp_md's egress_ifindex, and the latter is only allowed to be accessed under mentioned expected_attach_type. progB is then inserted into the tailcall which progA calls. The underlying issue goes beyond XDP though. Another example are programs of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR. sock_addr_is_valid_access() as well as sock_addr_func_proto() have different logic depending on the programs' expected_attach_type. Similarly, a program attached to BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME should not be allowed doing a tailcall into a program which calls bpf_bind() out of BPF which is only enabled for BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT. In short, specifying expected_attach_type allows to open up additional functionality or restrictions beyond what the basic bpf_prog_type enables. The use of tailcalls must not violate these constraints. Fix it by enforcing expected_attach_type in __bpf_prog_map_compatible(). Note that we only enforce this for tailcall maps, but not for BPF devmaps or cpumaps: There, the programs are invoked through dev_map_bpf_prog_run*() and cpu_map_bpf_prog_run*() which set up a new environment / context and therefore these situations are not prone to this issue.
Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel. An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system.
CVSS Scores
SSVC
- Decision:-
Timeline
- 2025-04-16 CVE Reserved
- 2025-11-12 CVE Published
- 2025-12-01 CVE Updated
- 2026-04-11 EPSS Updated
- ---------- Exploited in Wild
- ---------- KEV Due Date
- ---------- First Exploit
CWE
CAPEC
References (6)
| URL | Tag | Source |
|---|---|---|
| https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e43f899b03a3492ce5fc44e8900becb04dae9c0 | Vuln. Introduced |
| URL | Date | SRC |
|---|
| URL | Date | SRC |
|---|
Affected Vendors, Products, and Versions
| Vendor | Product | Version | Other | Status | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vendor | Product | Version | Other | Status | <-- --> | Vendor | Product | Version | Other | Status |
| Linux Search vendor "Linux" | Linux Kernel Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" | >= 4.17 < 6.1.156 Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 4.17 < 6.1.156" | en |
Affected
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| Linux Search vendor "Linux" | Linux Kernel Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" | >= 4.17 < 6.6.112 Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 4.17 < 6.6.112" | en |
Affected
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| Linux Search vendor "Linux" | Linux Kernel Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" | >= 4.17 < 6.12.53 Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 4.17 < 6.12.53" | en |
Affected
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| Linux Search vendor "Linux" | Linux Kernel Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" | >= 4.17 < 6.17.3 Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 4.17 < 6.17.3" | en |
Affected
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| Linux Search vendor "Linux" | Linux Kernel Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" | >= 4.17 < 6.18 Search vendor "Linux" for product "Linux Kernel" and version " >= 4.17 < 6.18" | en |
Affected
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