CVSS: 8.7EPSS: 0%CPEs: 1EXPL: 0CVE-2023-49104
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-49104
An issue was discovered in ownCloud owncloud/oauth2 before 0.6.1, when Allow Subdomains is enabled. An attacker is able to pass in a crafted redirect-url that bypasses validation, and consequently allows an attacker to redirect callbacks to a Top Level Domain controlled by the attacker. Se descubrió un problema en ownCloud owncloud/oauth2 anterior a 0.6.1, cuando Permitir subdominios está habilitado. Un atacante puede pasar una URL de redireccionamiento manipulada que omite la validación y, en consecuencia, le permite redirigir las devoluciones de llamada a un Dominio de Nivel Superior controlado por el atacante. • https://owncloud.com/security-advisories/subdomain-validation-bypass https://owncloud.org/security • CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect') •
CVSS: 8.8EPSS: 0%CPEs: 1EXPL: 1CVE-2023-31999
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-31999
All versions of @fastify/oauth2 used a statically generated state parameter at startup time and were used across all requests for all users. The purpose of the Oauth2 state parameter is to prevent Cross-Site-Request-Forgery attacks. As such, it should be unique per user and should be connected to the user's session in some way that will allow the server to validate it. v7.2.0 changes the default behavior to store the state in a cookie with the http-only and same-site=lax attributes set. The state is now by default generated for every user. Note that this contains a breaking change in the checkStateFunction function, which now accepts the full Request object. • https://auth0.com/docs/secure/attack-protection/state-parameters https://github.com/fastify/fastify-oauth2/releases/tag/v7.2.0 https://hackerone.com/reports/2020418 • CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) •