4 results (0.011 seconds)

CVSS: 7.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 59EXPL: 1

The IEEE 802.11 specifications through 802.11ax allow physically proximate attackers to intercept (possibly cleartext) target-destined frames by spoofing a target's MAC address, sending Power Save frames to the access point, and then sending other frames to the access point (such as authentication frames or re-association frames) to remove the target's original security context. This behavior occurs because the specifications do not require an access point to purge its transmit queue before removing a client's pairwise encryption key. • https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/usenix2023-wifi.pdf https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2023-0006 https://www.freebsd.org/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-23:11.wifi.asc https://www.wi-fi.org/discover-wi-fi/passpoint • CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing •

CVSS: 4.3EPSS: 0%CPEs: 50EXPL: 1

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that received fragments be cleared from memory after (re)connecting to a network. Under the right circumstances, when another device sends fragmented frames encrypted using WEP, CCMP, or GCMP, this can be abused to inject arbitrary network packets and/or exfiltrate user data. El estándar 802.11 que sustenta a Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, y WPA3) y Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) no requiere que los fragmentos recibidos se borren de la memoria después de (re)conectarse a una red. En las circunstancias adecuadas, cuando otro dispositivo envía tramas fragmentadas cifradas mediante WEP, CCMP o GCMP, se puede abusar de esto para inyectar paquetes de red arbitrarios y/o exfiltrar datos del usuario A flaw was found in the Linux kernels implementation of wifi fragmentation handling. An attacker with the ability to transmit within the wireless transmission range of an access point can abuse a flaw where previous contents of wifi fragments can be unintentionally transmitted to another device. • http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/05/11/12 https://github.com/vanhoefm/fragattacks/blob/master/SUMMARY.md https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/06/msg00019.html https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/06/msg00020.html https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/04/msg00002.html https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-wifi-faf-22epcEWu https://www.arista.com/en/support/advisories-notices/security-advisories/12 • CWE-212: Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer •

CVSS: 4.3EPSS: 0%CPEs: 385EXPL: 1

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets. El estándar 802.11 que sustenta a Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, y WPA3) y Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) no requiere que el flag A-MSDU en el campo de encabezado QoS de texto plano esté autenticada. Contra dispositivos que admiten la recepción de tramas A-MSDU que no son SSP (que es obligatorio como parte de 802.11n), un adversario puede abusar de esto para inyectar paquetes de red arbitrarios A flaw was found in the Linux kernels wifi implementation. An attacker within wireless broadcast range can inject custom data into the wireless communication circumventing checks on the data. • http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/05/11/12 https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-913875.pdf https://github.com/vanhoefm/fragattacks/blob/master/SUMMARY.md https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/06/msg00019.html https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/06/msg00020.html https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/04/msg00002.html https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-wifi-faf-22epcEWu https: • CWE-20: Improper Input Validation CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm •

CVSS: 3.1EPSS: 0%CPEs: 338EXPL: 1

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed. El estándar 802.11 que sustenta a Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, y WPA3) y Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) no requiere que todos los fragmentos de una trama estén cifrados con la misma clave. Un adversario puede abusar de esto para descifrar fragmentos seleccionados cuando otro dispositivo envía tramas fragmentadas y la clave de cifrado WEP, CCMP o GCMP es periódicamente renovada A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's WiFi implementation. An attacker within the wireless range can abuse a logic flaw in the WiFi implementation by reassembling packets from multiple fragments under different keys, treating them as valid. • http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/05/11/12 https://github.com/vanhoefm/fragattacks/blob/master/SUMMARY.md https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/06/msg00019.html https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/06/msg00020.html https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/04/msg00002.html https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-wifi-faf-22epcEWu https://www.arista.com/en/support/advisories-notices/security-advisories/12 • CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity •