6 results (0.005 seconds)

CVSS: 7.8EPSS: 1%CPEs: 1EXPL: 0

The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (bandwidth consumption) by sending ACK messages for packets that have not yet been received (optimistic ACKs), which can cause the sender to increase its transmission rate until it fills available bandwidth. • http://www.cs.umd.edu/~capveg/optack/optack-extended.pdf http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/102014 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/15468 https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/23055 •

CVSS: 10.0EPSS: 0%CPEs: 1EXPL: 0

The original design of TCP does not check that the TCP sequence number in an ICMP error message is within the range of sequence numbers for data that has been sent but not acknowledged (aka "TCP sequence number checking"), which makes it easier for attackers to forge ICMP error messages for specific TCP connections and cause a denial of service, as demonstrated using (1) blind connection-reset attacks with forged "Destination Unreachable" messages, (2) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged "Source Quench" messages, or (3) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged ICMP messages that cause the Path MTU to be reduced. NOTE: CVE-2004-0790, CVE-2004-0791, and CVE-2004-1060 have been SPLIT based on different attacks; CVE-2005-0065, CVE-2005-0066, CVE-2005-0067, and CVE-2005-0068 are related identifiers that are SPLIT based on the underlying vulnerability. While CVE normally SPLITs based on vulnerability, the attack-based identifiers exist due to the variety and number of affected implementations and solutions that address the attacks instead of the underlying vulnerabilities. • http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/icmp-attacks-against-tcp.html http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13124 •

CVSS: 5.0EPSS: 0%CPEs: 1EXPL: 0

The original design of ICMP does not require authentication for host-generated ICMP error messages, which makes it easier for attackers to forge ICMP error messages for specific TCP connections and cause a denial of service, as demonstrated using (1) blind connection-reset attacks with forged "Destination Unreachable" messages, (2) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged "Source Quench" messages, or (3) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged ICMP messages that cause the Path MTU to be reduced. NOTE: CVE-2004-0790, CVE-2004-0791, and CVE-2004-1060 have been SPLIT based on different attacks; CVE-2005-0065, CVE-2005-0066, CVE-2005-0067, and CVE-2005-0068 are related identifiers that are SPLIT based on the underlying vulnerability. While CVE normally SPLITs based on vulnerability, the attack-based identifiers exist due to the variety and number of affected implementations and solutions that address the attacks instead of the underlying vulnerabilities. • http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/icmp-attacks-against-tcp.html http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13124 •

CVSS: 5.0EPSS: 0%CPEs: 1EXPL: 0

The original design of TCP does not check that the TCP Acknowledgement number in an ICMP error message generated by an intermediate router is within the range of possible values for data that has already been acknowledged (aka "TCP acknowledgement number checking"), which makes it easier for attackers to forge ICMP error messages for specific TCP connections and cause a denial of service, as demonstrated using (1) blind connection-reset attacks with forged "Destination Unreachable" messages, (2) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged "Source Quench" messages, or (3) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged ICMP messages that cause the Path MTU to be reduced. NOTE: CVE-2004-0790, CVE-2004-0791, and CVE-2004-1060 have been SPLIT based on different attacks; CVE-2005-0065, CVE-2005-0066, CVE-2005-0067, and CVE-2005-0068 are related identifiers that are SPLIT based on the underlying vulnerability. While CVE normally SPLITs based on vulnerability, the attack-based identifiers exist due to the variety and number of affected implementations and solutions that address the attacks instead of the underlying vulnerabilities. • http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/icmp-attacks-against-tcp.html http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13124 •

CVSS: 5.0EPSS: 0%CPEs: 1EXPL: 0

The original design of TCP does not require that port numbers be assigned randomly (aka "Port randomization"), which makes it easier for attackers to forge ICMP error messages for specific TCP connections and cause a denial of service, as demonstrated using (1) blind connection-reset attacks with forged "Destination Unreachable" messages, (2) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged "Source Quench" messages, or (3) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged ICMP messages that cause the Path MTU to be reduced. NOTE: CVE-2004-0790, CVE-2004-0791, and CVE-2004-1060 have been SPLIT based on different attacks; CVE-2005-0065, CVE-2005-0066, CVE-2005-0067, and CVE-2005-0068 are related identifiers that are SPLIT based on the underlying vulnerability. While CVE normally SPLITs based on vulnerability, the attack-based identifiers exist due to the variety and number of affected implementations and solutions that address the attacks instead of the underlying vulnerabilities. • http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/icmp-attacks-against-tcp.html http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13124 •