CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2023-52898 – xhci: Fix null pointer dereference when host dies
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-52898
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xhci: Fix null pointer dereference when host dies Make sure xhci_free_dev() and xhci_kill_endpoint_urbs() do not race and cause null pointer dereference when host suddenly dies. Usb core may call xhci_free_dev() which frees the xhci->devs[slot_id] virt device at the same time that xhci_kill_endpoint_urbs() tries to loop through all the device's endpoints, checking if there are any cancelled urbs left to give back. hold the xhci spinlock while freeing the virt device • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fac4b5cecb3928a0a81069aaa815a2edc8dd5a1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/133b902378e4acbd824c29dd0d48570ad596e368 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/081105213ff6f661c114781d469233c7d0e09c2e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c462ac871f49753eca86bb960f573b993976a5ea https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea2ee5e9991caf74e0604f994c1831a5867055b2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2bc47c43e70cf904b1af49f76d572326c08bca7 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2023-52896 – btrfs: fix race between quota rescan and disable leading to NULL pointer deref
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-52896
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix race between quota rescan and disable leading to NULL pointer deref If we have one task trying to start the quota rescan worker while another one is trying to disable quotas, we can end up hitting a race that results in the quota rescan worker doing a NULL pointer dereference. The steps for this are the following: 1) Quotas are enabled; 2) Task A calls the quota rescan ioctl and enters btrfs_qgroup_rescan(). It calls qgroup_rescan_init() which returns 0 (success) and then joins a transaction and commits it; 3) Task B calls the quota disable ioctl and enters btrfs_quota_disable(). It clears the bit BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED from fs_info->flags and calls btrfs_qgroup_wait_for_completion(), which returns immediately since the rescan worker is not yet running. Then it starts a transaction and locks fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock; 4) Task A queues the rescan worker, by calling btrfs_queue_work(); 5) The rescan worker starts, and calls rescan_should_stop() at the start of its while loop, which results in 0 iterations of the loop, since the flag BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED was cleared from fs_info->flags by task B at step 3); 6) Task B sets fs_info->quota_root to NULL; 7) The rescan worker tries to start a transaction and uses fs_info->quota_root as the root argument for btrfs_start_transaction(). This results in a NULL pointer dereference down the call chain of btrfs_start_transaction(). The stack trace is something like the one reported in Link tag below: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000041: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000208-0x000000000000020f] CPU: 1 PID: 34 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 6.1.0-syzkaller-13872-gb6bb9676f216 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 Workqueue: btrfs-qgroup-rescan btrfs_work_helper RIP: 0010:start_transaction+0x48/0x10f0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:564 Code: 48 89 fb 48 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ab7ab0 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000041 RBX: 0000000000000208 RCX: ffff88801779ba80 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52000156f5d R10: fffff52000156f5d R11: 1ffff92000156f5c R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000003 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2bea75b718 CR3: 000000001d0cc000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0x3bb/0x6a0 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:3402 btrfs_work_helper+0x312/0x850 fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:280 process_one_work+0x877/0xdb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0xb14/0x1330 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x266/0x300 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 </TASK> Modules linked in: So fix this by having the rescan worker function not attempt to start a transaction if it didn't do any rescan work. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26b3901d20bf9da2c6a00cb1fb48932166f80a45 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32747e01436aac8ef93fe85b5b523b4f3b52f040 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89d4cca583fc9594ee7d1a0bc986886d6fb587e6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e804861bd4e69cc5fe1053eedcb024982dde8e48 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31198e58c09e21d4f65c49d2361f76b87aca4c3f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89ac597e3e807b91e2ebd6a7c36fec7b97290233 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bd43374857103ba3cac751d6d4afa8d83b5d92a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/64287cd456a22373053998c1fccf14b65 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2023-52894 – usb: gadget: f_ncm: fix potential NULL ptr deref in ncm_bitrate()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-52894
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_ncm: fix potential NULL ptr deref in ncm_bitrate() In Google internal bug 265639009 we've received an (as yet) unreproducible crash report from an aarch64 GKI 5.10.149-android13 running device. AFAICT the source code is at: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/refs/tags/ASB-2022-12-05_13-5.10 The call stack is: ncm_close() -> ncm_notify() -> ncm_do_notify() with the crash at: ncm_do_notify+0x98/0x270 Code: 79000d0b b9000a6c f940012a f9400269 (b9405d4b) Which I believe disassembles to (I don't know ARM assembly, but it looks sane enough to me...): // halfword (16-bit) store presumably to event->wLength (at offset 6 of struct usb_cdc_notification) 0B 0D 00 79 strh w11, [x8, #6] // word (32-bit) store presumably to req->Length (at offset 8 of struct usb_request) 6C 0A 00 B9 str w12, [x19, #8] // x10 (NULL) was read here from offset 0 of valid pointer x9 // IMHO we're reading 'cdev->gadget' and getting NULL // gadget is indeed at offset 0 of struct usb_composite_dev 2A 01 40 F9 ldr x10, [x9] // loading req->buf pointer, which is at offset 0 of struct usb_request 69 02 40 F9 ldr x9, [x19] // x10 is null, crash, appears to be attempt to read cdev->gadget->max_speed 4B 5D 40 B9 ldr w11, [x10, #0x5c] which seems to line up with ncm_do_notify() case NCM_NOTIFY_SPEED code fragment: event->wLength = cpu_to_le16(8); req->length = NCM_STATUS_BYTECOUNT; /* SPEED_CHANGE data is up/down speeds in bits/sec */ data = req->buf + sizeof *event; data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget)); My analysis of registers and NULL ptr deref crash offset (Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000005c) heavily suggests that the crash is due to 'cdev->gadget' being NULL when executing: data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget)); which calls: ncm_bitrate(NULL) which then calls: gadget_is_superspeed(NULL) which reads ((struct usb_gadget *)NULL)->max_speed and hits a panic. AFAICT, if I'm counting right, the offset of max_speed is indeed 0x5C. (remember there's a GKI KABI reservation of 16 bytes in struct work_struct) It's not at all clear to me how this is all supposed to work... but returning 0 seems much better than panic-ing... • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fef6b29671b66dfb71f17e337c1ad14b5a2cedae https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63d161f29cd39c050e8873aa36e0c9fc013bb763 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a21da7f7aae618c785f7e4a275d43c06dc8412b6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e92c70059178da751e5af7de02384b7dfadb5ec7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a69c8dfb85b44be9cc223be07d35cc3a9baefbea https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09e4507ec8ef2d44da6ba4092b8ee2d81f216497 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6ec929595c7443250b2a4faea988c62019d5cd2 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2023-52893 – gsmi: fix null-deref in gsmi_get_variable
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-52893
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gsmi: fix null-deref in gsmi_get_variable We can get EFI variables without fetching the attribute, so we must allow for that in gsmi. commit 859748255b43 ("efi: pstore: Omit efivars caching EFI varstore access layer") added a new get_variable call with attr=NULL, which triggers panic in gsmi. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74c5b31c6618f01079212332b2e5f6c42f2d6307 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee5763ef829bd923033510de6d1df7c73f085e4b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32313c11bdc8a02c577abaf865be3664ab30410a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ffef77794fb5f1245c3249b86342bad2299accb5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae2a9dcc8caa60b1e14671294e5ec902ea5d1dfd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb0421d90f916dffe96b4c049ddf01c0c50620d2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6646d769fdb0ce4318ef9afd127f8526d1ca8393 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a769b05eeed7accc4019a1ed9799dd720 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2022-48899 – drm/virtio: Fix GEM handle creation UAF
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2022-48899
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: Fix GEM handle creation UAF Userspace can guess the handle value and try to race GEM object creation with handle close, resulting in a use-after-free if we dereference the object after dropping the handle's reference. For that reason, dropping the handle's reference must be done *after* we are done dereferencing the object. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62fb7a5e10962ac6ae2a2d2dbd3aedcb2a3e3257 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19ec87d06acfab2313ee82b2a689bf0c154e57ea https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d01d6d2b06c0d8390adf8f3ba08aa60b5642ef73 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68bcd063857075d2f9edfed6024387ac377923e2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/011ecdbcd520c90c344b872ca6b4821f7783b2f8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/adc48e5e408afbb01d261bd303fd9fbbbaa3e317 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52531258318ed59a2dc5a43df2eaf0eb1d65438e •