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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: defer final 'struct net' free in netns dismantle Ilya reported a slab-use-after-free in dst_destroy [1] Issue is in xfrm6_net_init() and xfrm4_net_init() : They copy xfrm[46]_dst_ops_template into net->xfrm.xfrm[46]_dst_ops. But net structure might be freed before all the dst callbacks are called. So when dst_destroy() calls later : if (dst->ops->destroy) dst->ops->destroy(dst); dst->ops points to the old net->xfrm.xfrm[46]_dst_ops, which has been freed. See a relevant issue fixed in : ac888d58869b ("net: do not delay dst_entries_add() in dst_release()") A fix is to queue the 'struct net' to be freed after one another cleanup_net() round (and existing rcu_barrier()) [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112) Read of size 8 at addr ffff8882137ccab0 by task swapper/37/0 Dec 03 05:46:18 kernel: CPU: 37 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/37 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0 #67 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL, BIOS 1.16.1-1.el9 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:124) print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:378) ? dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:489) ? dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112) ? kasan_addr_to_slab (mm/kasan/common.c:37) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:603) ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8a572a6b5f2a79280d6e302cb3c1cb1fbaeb3e8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e29fa5b742479f73400468314a1c6b9cf553ee4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce43f6a650a6689551a217276fb0dcca33790425 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eeca98948d8c4922e6deb16bfc9ee0bd9902dbb0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1bd631fc9a4515878c1bb7effd19335d2f2d87c2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3267b254dc0a04dfa362a2be24573cfa6d2d78f5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7a79e51297f7b82adb687086f5cb2da446f1e40 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6610c7f8a8d47fd1123eed55ba8c11c24 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: control: Avoid WARN() for symlink errors Using WARN() for showing the error of symlink creations don't give more information than telling that something goes wrong, since the usual code path is a lregister callback from each control element creation. More badly, the use of WARN() rather confuses fuzzer as if it were serious issues. This patch downgrades the warning messages to use the normal dev_err() instead of WARN(). For making it clearer, add the function name to the prefix, too. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a135dfb5de1501327895729b4f513370d2555b4d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5a1ca7b59804d6779644001a878ed925a4688ca https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36c0764474b637bbee498806485bed524cad486b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2e538a9827dd04ab5273bf4be8eb2edb84357b0 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bnxt_en: Fix aggregation ID mask to prevent oops on 5760X chips The 5760X (P7) chip's HW GRO/LRO interface is very similar to that of the previous generation (5750X or P5). However, the aggregation ID fields in the completion structures on P7 have been redefined from 16 bits to 12 bits. The freed up 4 bits are redefined for part of the metadata such as the VLAN ID. The aggregation ID mask was not modified when adding support for P7 chips. Including the extra 4 bits for the aggregation ID can potentially cause the driver to store or fetch the packet header of GRO/LRO packets in the wrong TPA buffer. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13d2d3d381ee9844f89bd436ab0f44204660027e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe9274027697c69c1430dc7ee568f82b331ef972 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24c6843b7393ebc80962b59d7ae71af91bf0dcc1 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: do not defer rule destruction via call_rcu nf_tables_chain_destroy can sleep, it can't be used from call_rcu callbacks. Moreover, nf_tables_rule_release() is only safe for error unwinding, while transaction mutex is held and the to-be-desroyed rule was not exposed to either dataplane or dumps, as it deactives+frees without the required synchronize_rcu() in-between. nft_rule_expr_deactivate() callbacks will change ->use counters of other chains/sets, see e.g. nft_lookup .deactivate callback, these must be serialized via transaction mutex. Also add a few lockdep asserts to make this more explicit. Calling synchronize_rcu() isn't ideal, but fixing this without is hard and way more intrusive. As-is, we can get: WARNING: .. net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:5515 nft_set_destroy+0x.. Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work RIP: 0010:nft_set_destroy+0x3fe/0x5c0 Call Trace: <TASK> nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x6b7/0xad0 process_one_work+0x64a/0xce0 worker_thread+0x613/0x10d0 In case the synchronize_rcu becomes an issue, we can explore alternatives. One way would be to allocate nft_trans_rule objects + one nft_trans_chain object, deactivate the rules + the chain and then defer the freeing to the nft destroy workqueue. We'd still need to keep the synchronize_rcu path as a fallback to handle -ENOMEM corner cases though. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfd05c68e4c6320304e9f371ffa356b6e4b9cc53 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c03d278fdf35e73dd0ec543b9b556876b9d9a8dc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb401e5799e0acacb405f2128097e9c4ccf82f8a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27f0574253f6c24c8ee4e3f0a685b75ed3a256ed https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7cf0bd232b565d9852cb25fd094f77254773e048 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b04df3da1b5c6f6dc7cdccc37941740c078c4043 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix using rcu_read_(un)lock while iterating The usage of rcu_read_(un)lock while inside list_for_each_entry_rcu is not safe since for the most part entries fetched this way shall be treated as rcu_dereference: Note that the value returned by rcu_dereference() is valid only within the enclosing RCU read-side critical section [1]_. For example, the following is **not** legal:: rcu_read_lock(); p = rcu_dereference(head.next); rcu_read_unlock(); x = p->address; /* BUG!!! */ rcu_read_lock(); y = p->data; /* BUG!!! */ rcu_read_unlock(); • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a0bfde167b506423111ddb8cd71930497a40fc54 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b475c1109251e30ec21fb574d72a1c71a4ab0039 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ccde10127447c1a5caad8469fede945bdb62fdf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0108132d7d76d884e443d18b4f067cdf2811911b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f9ecc90b5d501b3a5a62d0685d5104f934bb0104 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/581dd2dc168fe0ed2a7a5534a724f0d3751c93ae •