CVE-2024-39508 – io_uring/io-wq: Use set_bit() and test_bit() at worker->flags
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-39508
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/io-wq: Use set_bit() and test_bit() at worker->flags Utilize set_bit() and test_bit() on worker->flags within io_uring/io-wq to address potential data races. The structure io_worker->flags may be accessed through various data paths, leading to concurrency issues. When KCSAN is enabled, it reveals data races occurring in io_worker_handle_work and io_wq_activate_free_worker functions. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in io_worker_handle_work / io_wq_activate_free_worker write to 0xffff8885c4246404 of 4 bytes by task 49071 on cpu 28: io_worker_handle_work (io_uring/io-wq.c:434 io_uring/io-wq.c:569) io_wq_worker (io_uring/io-wq.c:?) <snip> read to 0xffff8885c4246404 of 4 bytes by task 49024 on cpu 5: io_wq_activate_free_worker (io_uring/io-wq.c:? io_uring/io-wq.c:285) io_wq_enqueue (io_uring/io-wq.c:947) io_queue_iowq (io_uring/io_uring.c:524) io_req_task_submit (io_uring/io_uring.c:1511) io_handle_tw_list (io_uring/io_uring.c:1198) <snip> Line numbers against commit 18daea77cca6 ("Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm"). These races involve writes and reads to the same memory location by different tasks running on different CPUs. To mitigate this, refactor the code to use atomic operations such as set_bit(), test_bit(), and clear_bit() instead of basic "and" and "or" operations. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab702c3483db9046bab9f40306f1a28b22dbbdc0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1cbb0affb15470a9621267fe0a8568007553a4bf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a565304927fbd28c9f028c492b5c1714002cbab •
CVE-2024-39501 – drivers: core: synchronize really_probe() and dev_uevent()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-39501
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers: core: synchronize really_probe() and dev_uevent() Synchronize the dev->driver usage in really_probe() and dev_uevent(). These can run in different threads, what can result in the following race condition for dev->driver uninitialization: Thread #1: ========== really_probe() { ... probe_failed: ... device_unbind_cleanup(dev) { ... dev->driver = NULL; // <= Failed probe sets dev->driver to NULL ... } ... } Thread #2: ========== dev_uevent() { ... if (dev->driver) // If dev->driver is NULLed from really_probe() from here on, // after above check, the system crashes add_uevent_var(env, "DRIVER=%s", dev->driver->name); ... } really_probe() holds the lock, already. So nothing needs to be done there. dev_uevent() is called with lock held, often, too. But not always. What implies that we can't add any locking in dev_uevent() itself. So fix this race by adding the lock to the non-protected path. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/239378f16aa1ab5c502e42a06359d2de4f88ebb4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb3641a5831789d83a58a39ed4a928bcbece7080 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13d25e82b6d00d743c7961dcb260329f86bedf7c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/760603e30bf19d7b4c28e9d81f18b54fa3b745ad https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec772ed7cb21b46fb132f89241682553efd0b721 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08891eeaa97c079b7f95d60b62dcf0e3ce034b69 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a42b0060d6ff2f7e59290a26d5f162a3c6329b90 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95d03d369ea647b89e950667f1c3363ea •
CVE-2024-39496 – btrfs: zoned: fix use-after-free due to race with dev replace
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-39496
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: zoned: fix use-after-free due to race with dev replace While loading a zone's info during creation of a block group, we can race with a device replace operation and then trigger a use-after-free on the device that was just replaced (source device of the replace operation). This happens because at btrfs_load_zone_info() we extract a device from the chunk map into a local variable and then use the device while not under the protection of the device replace rwsem. So if there's a device replace operation happening when we extract the device and that device is the source of the replace operation, we will trigger a use-after-free if before we finish using the device the replace operation finishes and frees the device. Fix this by enlarging the critical section under the protection of the device replace rwsem so that all uses of the device are done inside the critical section. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: btrfs:zoned: corrige el use-after-free debido a la ejecución con el reemplazo de desarrollo. Mientras cargamos la información de una zona durante la creación de un grupo de bloques, podemos ejecutar una operación de reemplazo de dispositivo y luego activar un use-after-free en el dispositivo que acaba de ser reemplazado (dispositivo fuente de la operación de reemplazo). Esto sucede porque en btrfs_load_zone_info() extraemos un dispositivo del mapa de fragmentos en una variable local y luego usamos el dispositivo mientras no está bajo la protección del dispositivo y reemplazamos rwsem. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17765964703b88d8befd899f8501150bb7e07e43 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/092571ef9a812566c8f2c9038d9c2a64c49788d6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a0cc006f4214b87e70983c692e05bb36c59b5752 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0090d6e1b210551e63cf43958dc7a1ec942cdde9 • CWE-416: Use After Free •
CVE-2024-39495 – greybus: Fix use-after-free bug in gb_interface_release due to race condition.
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-39495
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: greybus: Fix use-after-free bug in gb_interface_release due to race condition. In gb_interface_create, &intf->mode_switch_completion is bound with gb_interface_mode_switch_work. Then it will be started by gb_interface_request_mode_switch. Here is the relevant code. if (!queue_work(system_long_wq, &intf->mode_switch_work)) { ... } If we call gb_interface_release to make cleanup, there may be an unfinished work. This function will call kfree to free the object "intf". • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74cd0a421896b2e07eafe7da4275302bfecef201 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b6bb0b4abfd79b8698ee161bb73c0936a2aaf83 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb071f5c75d4b1c177824de74ee75f9dd34123b9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a733d69a4a59c2d08620e6589d823c24be773dc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b8fba38bdfb848fac52e71270b2aa3538c996ea https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03ea2b129344152157418929f06726989efc0445 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c9c5d7f26acc2c669c1dcf57d1bb43ee99220ce • CWE-416: Use After Free •
CVE-2024-39494 – ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.name
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-39494
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.name ->d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed; there are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (->d_lock on dentry, ->d_lock on its parent, ->i_rwsem exclusive on the parent's inode, rename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable snapshot of the name instead. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: ima: corrige el use-after-free en dentry dname.name ->d_name.name puede cambiar al cambiar el nombre y el valor anterior se puede liberar; existen condiciones suficientes para estabilizarlo (->d_lock on dentry, ->d_lock on its parent, ->i_rwsem exclusivo en el inodo del padre, rename_lock), pero ninguna de ellas se cumple en ninguno de los sitios. En su lugar, tome una instantánea estable del nombre. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7fb374981e31c193b1152ed8d3b0a95b671330d4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd431c3ac1fc34a9268580dd59ad3e3c76b32a8c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a78a6f0da57d058e2009e9958fdcef66f165208c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be84f32bb2c981ca670922e047cdde1488b233de • CWE-416: Use After Free •