CVSS: 5.3EPSS: 2%CPEs: 1EXPL: 0CVE-2019-1549 – Fork Protection
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2019-1549
OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random number generator (RNG). This was intended to include protection in the event of a fork() system call in order to ensure that the parent and child processes did not share the same RNG state. However this protection was not being used in the default case. A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high precision timer is mixed into the RNG state so the likelihood of a parent and child process sharing state is significantly reduced. If an application already calls OPENSSL_init_crypto() explicitly using OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK then this problem does not occur at all. • https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git%3Ba=commitdiff%3Bh=1b0fe00e2704b5e20334a16d3c9099d1ba2ef1be https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/GY6SNRJP2S7Y42GIIDO3HXPNMDYN2U3A https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZN4VVQJ3JDCHGIHV4Y2YTXBYQZ6PWQ7E https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Oct/1 https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20190919-0002 https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K44070243 https://support.f5.com/csp/article&# • CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values •
CVSS: 4.3EPSS: 3%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0CVE-2019-1563 – Padding Oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2019-1563
In situations where an attacker receives automated notification of the success or failure of a decryption attempt an attacker, after sending a very large number of messages to be decrypted, can recover a CMS/PKCS7 transported encryption key or decrypt any RSA encrypted message that was encrypted with the public RSA key, using a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. Applications are not affected if they use a certificate together with the private RSA key to the CMS_decrypt or PKCS7_decrypt functions to select the correct recipient info to decrypt. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1d (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1c). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0l (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0k). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2t (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2s). • http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-09/msg00054.html http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-09/msg00072.html http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-10/msg00012.html http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-10/msg00016.html http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/154467/Slackware-Security-Advisory-openssl-Updates.html https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git%3Ba=commitdiff%3Bh=08229ad838c50f644d7e928e2eef147b4308ad64 https://git.openssl.org/g • CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor CWE-203: Observable Discrepancy CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm •
CVSS: 3.3EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0CVE-2019-1552 – Windows builds with insecure path defaults
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2019-1552
OpenSSL has internal defaults for a directory tree where it can find a configuration file as well as certificates used for verification in TLS. This directory is most commonly referred to as OPENSSLDIR, and is configurable with the --prefix / --openssldir configuration options. For OpenSSL versions 1.1.0 and 1.1.1, the mingw configuration targets assume that resulting programs and libraries are installed in a Unix-like environment and the default prefix for program installation as well as for OPENSSLDIR should be '/usr/local'. However, mingw programs are Windows programs, and as such, find themselves looking at sub-directories of 'C:/usr/local', which may be world writable, which enables untrusted users to modify OpenSSL's default configuration, insert CA certificates, modify (or even replace) existing engine modules, etc. For OpenSSL 1.0.2, '/usr/local/ssl' is used as default for OPENSSLDIR on all Unix and Windows targets, including Visual C builds. • https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-412672.pdf https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git%3Ba=commitdiff%3Bh=54aa9d51b09d67e90db443f682cface795f5af9e https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git%3Ba=commitdiff%3Bh=b15a19c148384e73338aa7c5b12652138e35ed28 https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git%3Ba=commitdiff%3Bh=d333ebaf9c77332754a9d5e111e2f53e1de54fdd https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git%3Ba=commitdiff%3Bh=e32bc855a81a2d48d215c506bdeb4f598045f7e9 https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index? • CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation •
CVSS: 7.4EPSS: 3%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0CVE-2019-1543 – ChaCha20-Poly1305 with long nonces
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2019-1543
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored. • http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-07/msg00056.html https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:3700 https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git%3Ba=commitdiff%3Bh=ee22257b1418438ebaf54df98af4e24f494d1809 https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git%3Ba=commitdiff%3Bh=f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3 https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content&id=SB10365 https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/Y3IVFGSERAZLNJCK35TEM2R4726XIH3Z https://lis • CWE-323: Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values •
CVSS: 5.9EPSS: 1%CPEs: 180EXPL: 0CVE-2019-1559 – 0-byte record padding oracle
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2019-1559
If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data. In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do anyway). • http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-03/msg00041.html http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-04/msg00019.html http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-04/msg00046.html http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-04/msg00047.html http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-05/msg00049.html http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-06/msg00080.html http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/107174 https://access. • CWE-203: Observable Discrepancy CWE-325: Missing Cryptographic Step •