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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: xhci: Check endpoint is valid before dereferencing it When the host controller is not responding, all URBs queued to all endpoints need to be killed. This can cause a kernel panic if we dereference an invalid endpoint. Fix this by using xhci_get_virt_ep() helper to find the endpoint and checking if the endpoint is valid before dereferencing it. [233311.853271] xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.1.auto: xHCI host controller not responding, assume dead [233311.853393] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000e8 [233311.853964] pc : xhci_hc_died+0x10c/0x270 [233311.853971] lr : xhci_hc_died+0x1ac/0x270 [233311.854077] Call trace: [233311.854085] xhci_hc_died+0x10c/0x270 [233311.854093] xhci_stop_endpoint_command_watchdog+0x100/0x1a4 [233311.854105] call_timer_fn+0x50/0x2d4 [233311.854112] expire_timers+0xac/0x2e4 [233311.854118] run_timer_softirq+0x300/0xabc [233311.854127] __do_softirq+0x148/0x528 [233311.854135] irq_exit+0x194/0x1a8 [233311.854143] __handle_domain_irq+0x164/0x1d0 [233311.854149] gic_handle_irq.22273+0x10c/0x188 [233311.854156] el1_irq+0xfc/0x1a8 [233311.854175] lpm_cpuidle_enter+0x25c/0x418 [msm_pm] [233311.854185] cpuidle_enter_state+0x1f0/0x764 [233311.854194] do_idle+0x594/0x6ac [233311.854201] cpu_startup_entry+0x7c/0x80 [233311.854209] secondary_start_kernel+0x170/0x198 • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/50e8725e7c429701e530439013f9681e1fa36b5d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/375be2dd61a072f7b1cac9b17eea59e07b58db3a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d2820d5f375563690c96e60676855205abfb7f5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9891e5c73cab3fd9ed532dc50e9799e55e974766 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66fc1600855c05c4ba4e997184c91cf298e0405c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f39c813af0b64f44af94e435c07bfa1ddc2575f5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08864dc14a6803f0377ca77b9740b26db30c020f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8fb5bc76eb86437ab87002d4a36d6da0 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: fix general protection fault in nilfs_btree_insert() If nilfs2 reads a corrupted disk image and tries to reads a b-tree node block by calling __nilfs_btree_get_block() against an invalid virtual block address, it returns -ENOENT because conversion of the virtual block address to a disk block address fails. However, this return value is the same as the internal code that b-tree lookup routines return to indicate that the block being searched does not exist, so functions that operate on that b-tree may misbehave. When nilfs_btree_insert() receives this spurious 'not found' code from nilfs_btree_do_lookup(), it misunderstands that the 'not found' check was successful and continues the insert operation using incomplete lookup path data, causing the following crash: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f] ... RIP: 0010:nilfs_btree_get_nonroot_node fs/nilfs2/btree.c:418 [inline] RIP: 0010:nilfs_btree_prepare_insert fs/nilfs2/btree.c:1077 [inline] RIP: 0010:nilfs_btree_insert+0x6d3/0x1c10 fs/nilfs2/btree.c:1238 Code: bc 24 80 00 00 00 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 74 08 4c 89 ff e8 4b 02 92 fe 4d 8b 3f 49 83 c7 28 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 28 00 74 08 4c 89 ff e8 2e 02 92 fe 4d 8b 3f 49 83 c7 02 ... Call Trace: <TASK> nilfs_bmap_do_insert fs/nilfs2/bmap.c:121 [inline] nilfs_bmap_insert+0x20d/0x360 fs/nilfs2/bmap.c:147 nilfs_get_block+0x414/0x8d0 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:101 __block_write_begin_int+0x54c/0x1a80 fs/buffer.c:1991 __block_write_begin fs/buffer.c:2041 [inline] block_write_begin+0x93/0x1e0 fs/buffer.c:2102 nilfs_write_begin+0x9c/0x110 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:261 generic_perform_write+0x2e4/0x5e0 mm/filemap.c:3772 __generic_file_write_iter+0x176/0x400 mm/filemap.c:3900 generic_file_write_iter+0xab/0x310 mm/filemap.c:3932 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2186 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline] vfs_write+0x7dc/0xc50 fs/read_write.c:584 ksys_write+0x177/0x2a0 fs/read_write.c:637 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd ... </TASK> This patch fixes the root cause of this problem by replacing the error code that __nilfs_btree_get_block() returns on block address conversion failure from -ENOENT to another internal code -EINVAL which means that the b-tree metadata is corrupted. By returning -EINVAL, it propagates without glitches, and for all relevant b-tree operations, functions in the upper bmap layer output an error message indicating corrupted b-tree metadata via nilfs_bmap_convert_error(), and code -EIO will be eventually returned as it should be. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c2a2ff67d46106715c2132021b98bd057c27545 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d9fde9eab1766170ff2ade67d09178d2cfd78749 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0ba060d3287108eba17603bee3810e4cf2c272d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/712bd74eccb9d3626a0a236641962eca8e11a243 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45627a1a6450662e1e0f8174ef07b05710a20062 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0bf463939c09e5b2c35c71ed74a5fd60a74d6a04 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7633355e5c7f29c049a9048e461427d1d8ed3051 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Add exception protection processing for vd in axi_chan_handle_err function Since there is no protection for vd, a kernel panic will be triggered here in exceptional cases. You can refer to the processing of axi_chan_block_xfer_complete function The triggered kernel panic is as follows: [ 67.848444] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000060 [ 67.848447] Mem abort info: [ 67.848449] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 67.848451] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 67.848454] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 67.848456] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 67.848458] Data abort info: [ 67.848460] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 67.848462] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 67.848465] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000800c4c0b000 [ 67.848468] [0000000000000060] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 67.848472] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 67.848475] Modules linked in: dmatest [ 67.848479] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.100-emu_x2rc+ #11 [ 67.848483] pstate: 62000085 (nZCv daIf -PAN -UAO +TCO BTYPE=--) [ 67.848487] pc : axi_chan_handle_err+0xc4/0x230 [ 67.848491] lr : axi_chan_handle_err+0x30/0x230 [ 67.848493] sp : ffff0803fe55ae50 [ 67.848495] x29: ffff0803fe55ae50 x28: ffff800011212200 [ 67.848500] x27: ffff0800c42c0080 x26: ffff0800c097c080 [ 67.848504] x25: ffff800010d33880 x24: ffff80001139d850 [ 67.848508] x23: ffff0800c097c168 x22: 0000000000000000 [ 67.848512] x21: 0000000000000080 x20: 0000000000002000 [ 67.848517] x19: ffff0800c097c080 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 67.848521] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 67.848525] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 67.848529] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000040 [ 67.848533] x11: ffff0800c0400248 x10: ffff0800c040024a [ 67.848538] x9 : ffff800010576cd4 x8 : ffff0800c0400270 [ 67.848542] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff0800c04003e0 [ 67.848546] x5 : ffff0800c0400248 x4 : ffff0800c4294480 [ 67.848550] x3 : dead000000000100 x2 : dead000000000122 [ 67.848555] x1 : 0000000000000100 x0 : ffff0800c097c168 [ 67.848559] Call trace: [ 67.848562] axi_chan_handle_err+0xc4/0x230 [ 67.848566] dw_axi_dma_interrupt+0xf4/0x590 [ 67.848569] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x60/0x220 [ 67.848573] handle_irq_event+0x64/0x120 [ 67.848576] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc4/0x220 [ 67.848580] __handle_domain_irq+0x80/0xe0 [ 67.848583] gic_handle_irq+0xc0/0x138 [ 67.848585] el1_irq+0xc8/0x180 [ 67.848588] arch_cpu_idle+0x14/0x2c [ 67.848591] default_idle_call+0x40/0x16c [ 67.848594] do_idle+0x1f0/0x250 [ 67.848597] cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x60 [ 67.848600] rest_init+0xc0/0xcc [ 67.848603] arch_call_rest_init+0x14/0x1c [ 67.848606] start_kernel+0x4cc/0x500 [ 67.848610] Code: eb0002ff 9a9f12d6 f2fbd5a2 f2fbd5a3 (a94602c1) [ 67.848613] ---[ end trace 585a97036f88203a ]--- • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f534dc438828cc3f1f8c6895b8bdfbef079521fb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53dd833fd0a2d8f0118d01ea063a70652689d31e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20d0a6d17e85a8a816a64fa7d7cae616f1617833 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5054d001ffaf76155637c5e5b922c11016cd6a5d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51a7ad5b60efac65691729d10745c28fa1016b96 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/57054fe516d59d03a7bcf1888e82479ccc244f87 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xhci: Fix null pointer dereference when host dies Make sure xhci_free_dev() and xhci_kill_endpoint_urbs() do not race and cause null pointer dereference when host suddenly dies. Usb core may call xhci_free_dev() which frees the xhci->devs[slot_id] virt device at the same time that xhci_kill_endpoint_urbs() tries to loop through all the device's endpoints, checking if there are any cancelled urbs left to give back. hold the xhci spinlock while freeing the virt device • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fac4b5cecb3928a0a81069aaa815a2edc8dd5a1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/133b902378e4acbd824c29dd0d48570ad596e368 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/081105213ff6f661c114781d469233c7d0e09c2e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c462ac871f49753eca86bb960f573b993976a5ea https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea2ee5e9991caf74e0604f994c1831a5867055b2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2bc47c43e70cf904b1af49f76d572326c08bca7 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix race between quota rescan and disable leading to NULL pointer deref If we have one task trying to start the quota rescan worker while another one is trying to disable quotas, we can end up hitting a race that results in the quota rescan worker doing a NULL pointer dereference. The steps for this are the following: 1) Quotas are enabled; 2) Task A calls the quota rescan ioctl and enters btrfs_qgroup_rescan(). It calls qgroup_rescan_init() which returns 0 (success) and then joins a transaction and commits it; 3) Task B calls the quota disable ioctl and enters btrfs_quota_disable(). It clears the bit BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED from fs_info->flags and calls btrfs_qgroup_wait_for_completion(), which returns immediately since the rescan worker is not yet running. Then it starts a transaction and locks fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock; 4) Task A queues the rescan worker, by calling btrfs_queue_work(); 5) The rescan worker starts, and calls rescan_should_stop() at the start of its while loop, which results in 0 iterations of the loop, since the flag BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED was cleared from fs_info->flags by task B at step 3); 6) Task B sets fs_info->quota_root to NULL; 7) The rescan worker tries to start a transaction and uses fs_info->quota_root as the root argument for btrfs_start_transaction(). This results in a NULL pointer dereference down the call chain of btrfs_start_transaction(). The stack trace is something like the one reported in Link tag below: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000041: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000208-0x000000000000020f] CPU: 1 PID: 34 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 6.1.0-syzkaller-13872-gb6bb9676f216 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 Workqueue: btrfs-qgroup-rescan btrfs_work_helper RIP: 0010:start_transaction+0x48/0x10f0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:564 Code: 48 89 fb 48 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ab7ab0 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000041 RBX: 0000000000000208 RCX: ffff88801779ba80 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52000156f5d R10: fffff52000156f5d R11: 1ffff92000156f5c R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000003 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2bea75b718 CR3: 000000001d0cc000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0x3bb/0x6a0 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:3402 btrfs_work_helper+0x312/0x850 fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:280 process_one_work+0x877/0xdb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0xb14/0x1330 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x266/0x300 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 </TASK> Modules linked in: So fix this by having the rescan worker function not attempt to start a transaction if it didn't do any rescan work. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26b3901d20bf9da2c6a00cb1fb48932166f80a45 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32747e01436aac8ef93fe85b5b523b4f3b52f040 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89d4cca583fc9594ee7d1a0bc986886d6fb587e6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e804861bd4e69cc5fe1053eedcb024982dde8e48 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31198e58c09e21d4f65c49d2361f76b87aca4c3f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89ac597e3e807b91e2ebd6a7c36fec7b97290233 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bd43374857103ba3cac751d6d4afa8d83b5d92a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/64287cd456a22373053998c1fccf14b65 •