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CVSS: 7.8EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jfs: xattr: fix buffer overflow for invalid xattr When an xattr size is not what is expected, it is printed out to the kernel log in hex format as a form of debugging. But when that xattr size is bigger than the expected size, printing it out can cause an access off the end of the buffer. Fix this all up by properly restricting the size of the debug hex dump in the kernel log. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: jfs: xattr: corrige el desbordamiento del búfer para xattr no válido Cuando un tamaño de xattr no es el esperado, se imprime en el registro del kernel en formato hexadecimal como una forma de depuración. Pero cuando el tamaño de xattr es mayor que el tamaño esperado, imprimirlo puede provocar un acceso desde el final del búfer. Solucione todo esto restringiendo adecuadamente el tamaño del volcado hexadecimal de depuración en el registro del kernel. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0dedb5c511ed82cbaff4997a8decf2351ba549f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e84c9b1838152a87cf453270a5fa75c5037e83a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc745f6e83cb650f9a5f2c864158e3a5ea76dad0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/480e5bc21f2c42d90c2c16045d64d824dcdd5ec7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33aecc5799c93d3ee02f853cb94e201f9731f123 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4598233d9748fe4db4e13b9f473588aa25e87d69 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b537cb2f4c4a1357479716a9c339c0bda03d873f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c55b78818cfb732680c4a72ab270cc2d • CWE-120: Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow') CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow •

CVSS: 7.0EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/io-wq: Use set_bit() and test_bit() at worker->flags Utilize set_bit() and test_bit() on worker->flags within io_uring/io-wq to address potential data races. The structure io_worker->flags may be accessed through various data paths, leading to concurrency issues. When KCSAN is enabled, it reveals data races occurring in io_worker_handle_work and io_wq_activate_free_worker functions. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in io_worker_handle_work / io_wq_activate_free_worker write to 0xffff8885c4246404 of 4 bytes by task 49071 on cpu 28: io_worker_handle_work (io_uring/io-wq.c:434 io_uring/io-wq.c:569) io_wq_worker (io_uring/io-wq.c:?) <snip> read to 0xffff8885c4246404 of 4 bytes by task 49024 on cpu 5: io_wq_activate_free_worker (io_uring/io-wq.c:? io_uring/io-wq.c:285) io_wq_enqueue (io_uring/io-wq.c:947) io_queue_iowq (io_uring/io_uring.c:524) io_req_task_submit (io_uring/io_uring.c:1511) io_handle_tw_list (io_uring/io_uring.c:1198) <snip> Line numbers against commit 18daea77cca6 ("Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm"). These races involve writes and reads to the same memory location by different tasks running on different CPUs. To mitigate this, refactor the code to use atomic operations such as set_bit(), test_bit(), and clear_bit() instead of basic "and" and "or" operations. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab702c3483db9046bab9f40306f1a28b22dbbdc0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1cbb0affb15470a9621267fe0a8568007553a4bf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a565304927fbd28c9f028c492b5c1714002cbab https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-39508 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2297480 • CWE-364: Signal Handler Race Condition •

CVSS: 4.7EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers: core: synchronize really_probe() and dev_uevent() Synchronize the dev->driver usage in really_probe() and dev_uevent(). These can run in different threads, what can result in the following race condition for dev->driver uninitialization: Thread #1: ========== really_probe() { ... probe_failed: ... device_unbind_cleanup(dev) { ... dev->driver = NULL; // <= Failed probe sets dev->driver to NULL ... } ... } Thread #2: ========== dev_uevent() { ... if (dev->driver) // If dev->driver is NULLed from really_probe() from here on, // after above check, the system crashes add_uevent_var(env, "DRIVER=%s", dev->driver->name); ... } really_probe() holds the lock, already. So nothing needs to be done there. dev_uevent() is called with lock held, often, too. But not always. What implies that we can't add any locking in dev_uevent() itself. So fix this race by adding the lock to the non-protected path. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/239378f16aa1ab5c502e42a06359d2de4f88ebb4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb3641a5831789d83a58a39ed4a928bcbece7080 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13d25e82b6d00d743c7961dcb260329f86bedf7c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/760603e30bf19d7b4c28e9d81f18b54fa3b745ad https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec772ed7cb21b46fb132f89241682553efd0b721 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08891eeaa97c079b7f95d60b62dcf0e3ce034b69 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a42b0060d6ff2f7e59290a26d5f162a3c6329b90 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95d03d369ea647b89e950667f1c3363ea • CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') •

CVSS: 4.1EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vmci: prevent speculation leaks by sanitizing event in event_deliver() Coverity spotted that event_msg is controlled by user-space, event_msg->event_data.event is passed to event_deliver() and used as an index without sanitization. This change ensures that the event index is sanitized to mitigate any possibility of speculative information leaks. This bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis Security Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc. Only compile tested, no access to HW. A vulnerability was found in the event_deliver() function in the Linux kernel's VMCI component, where the issue involves a lack of sanitization for the event_data.event index controlled by user-space, which could lead to speculative information leaks. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d990201f9bb499b7c76ab00abeb7e803c0bcb2a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58730dfbd4ae01c1b022b0d234a8bf8c02cdfb81 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/681967c4ff210e06380acf9b9a1b33ae06e77cbd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f70ff737346744633e7b655c1fb23e1578491ff3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95ac3e773a1f8da83c4710a720fbfe80055aafae https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95bac1c8bedb362374ea1937b1d3e833e01174ee https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e293c6b38ac9029d76ff0d2a6b2d74131709a9a8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/757804e1c599af5d2a7f864c8e8b28424 • CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer •

CVSS: 7.8EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: zoned: fix use-after-free due to race with dev replace While loading a zone's info during creation of a block group, we can race with a device replace operation and then trigger a use-after-free on the device that was just replaced (source device of the replace operation). This happens because at btrfs_load_zone_info() we extract a device from the chunk map into a local variable and then use the device while not under the protection of the device replace rwsem. So if there's a device replace operation happening when we extract the device and that device is the source of the replace operation, we will trigger a use-after-free if before we finish using the device the replace operation finishes and frees the device. Fix this by enlarging the critical section under the protection of the device replace rwsem so that all uses of the device are done inside the critical section. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: btrfs:zoned: corrige el use-after-free debido a la ejecución con el reemplazo de desarrollo. Mientras cargamos la información de una zona durante la creación de un grupo de bloques, podemos ejecutar una operación de reemplazo de dispositivo y luego activar un use-after-free en el dispositivo que acaba de ser reemplazado (dispositivo fuente de la operación de reemplazo). Esto sucede porque en btrfs_load_zone_info() extraemos un dispositivo del mapa de fragmentos en una variable local y luego usamos el dispositivo mientras no está bajo la protección del dispositivo y reemplazamos rwsem. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17765964703b88d8befd899f8501150bb7e07e43 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/092571ef9a812566c8f2c9038d9c2a64c49788d6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a0cc006f4214b87e70983c692e05bb36c59b5752 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0090d6e1b210551e63cf43958dc7a1ec942cdde9 • CWE-416: Use After Free •