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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: unset the binding mark of a reused connection Steve French reported null pointer dereference error from sha256 lib. cifs.ko can send session setup requests on reused connection. If reused connection is used for binding session, conn->binding can still remain true and generate_preauth_hash() will not set sess->Preauth_HashValue and it will be NULL. It is used as a material to create an encryption key in ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey. ->Preauth_HashValue cause null pointer dereference error from crypto_shash_update(). BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 8 PID: 429254 Comm: kworker/8:39 Hardware name: LENOVO 20MAS08500/20MAS08500, BIOS N2CET69W (1.52 ) Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ksmbd] RIP: 0010:lib_sha256_base_do_update.isra.0+0x11e/0x1d0 [sha256_ssse3] <TASK> ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80 ? __die+0x24/0x80 ? page_fault_oops+0x99/0x1b0 ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5a544e3bab78142207e0242d22442db85ba1eff https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9914f1bd61d5e838bb1ab15a71076d37a6db65d1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93d54a4b59c4b3d803d20aa645ab5ca71f3b3b02 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41bc256da7e47b679df87c7fc7a5b393052b9cce https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c8496f44f5bb5c06cdef5eb130ab259643392a1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78c5a6f1f630172b19af4912e755e1da93ef0ab5 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/tdx: Fix data leak in mmio_read() The mmio_read() function makes a TDVMCALL to retrieve MMIO data for an address from the VMM. Sean noticed that mmio_read() unintentionally exposes the value of an initialized variable (val) on the stack to the VMM. This variable is only needed as an output value. It did not need to be passed to the VMM in the first place. Do not send the original value of *val to the VMM. [ dhansen: clarify what 'val' is used for. ] • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31d58c4e557d46fa7f8557714250fb6f89c941ae https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26c6af49d26ffc377e392e30d4086db19eed0ef7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef00818c50cf55a3a56bd9a9fae867c92dfb84e7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b55ce742afcb8e8189d82f2f1e635ba1b5a461fa https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6fb565a2d15277896583d471b21bc14a0c99661 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: Intel: Boards: Fix NULL pointer deref in BYT/CHT boards harder Since commit 13f58267cda3 ("ASoC: soc.h: don't create dummy Component via COMP_DUMMY()") dummy codecs declared like this: SND_SOC_DAILINK_DEF(dummy, DAILINK_COMP_ARRAY(COMP_DUMMY())); expand to: static struct snd_soc_dai_link_component dummy[] = { }; Which means that dummy is a zero sized array and thus dais[i].codecs should not be dereferenced *at all* since it points to the address of the next variable stored in the data section as the "dummy" variable has an address but no size, so even dereferencing dais[0] is already an out of bounds array reference. Which means that the if (dais[i].codecs->name) check added in commit 7d99a70b6595 ("ASoC: Intel: Boards: Fix NULL pointer deref in BYT/CHT boards") relies on that the part of the next variable which the name member maps to just happens to be NULL. Which apparently so far it usually is, except when it isn't and then it results in crashes like this one: [ 28.795659] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000030011 ... [ 28.795780] Call Trace: [ 28.795787] <TASK> ... [ 28.795862] ? strcmp+0x18/0x40 [ 28.795872] 0xffffffffc150c605 [ 28.795887] platform_probe+0x40/0xa0 ... [ 28.795979] ? __pfx_init_module+0x10/0x10 [snd_soc_sst_bytcr_wm5102] Really fix things this time around by checking dais.num_codecs != 0. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d99a70b65951108d82e1618c67abe69c3ed7720 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85cda5b040bda9c577b34eb72d5b2e5b7e31985c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0cc65482f5b03ac2b1c240bc34665e43ea2d71bb •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: misaligned: Restrict user access to kernel memory raw_copy_{to,from}_user() do not call access_ok(), so this code allowed userspace to access any virtual memory address. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c83232161f609bbc452a1255f823f41afc411dd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3b6ff6c896aee5ef9b581e40d0045ff04fcbc8c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b686ecdeacf6658e1348c1a32a08e2e72f7c0f00 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: mcp251x: fix deadlock if an interrupt occurs during mcp251x_open The mcp251x_hw_wake() function is called with the mpc_lock mutex held and disables the interrupt handler so that no interrupts can be processed while waking the device. If an interrupt has already occurred then waiting for the interrupt handler to complete will deadlock because it will be trying to acquire the same mutex. CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- mcp251x_open() mutex_lock(&priv->mcp_lock) request_threaded_irq() <interrupt> mcp251x_can_ist() mutex_lock(&priv->mcp_lock) mcp251x_hw_wake() disable_irq() <-- deadlock Use disable_irq_nosync() instead because the interrupt handler does everything while holding the mutex so it doesn't matter if it's still running. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ce8c0abcba314e1fe954a1840f6568bf5aef2ef https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a49b6b1caf5cefc05264d29079d52c99cb188e0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/513c8fc189b52f7922e36bdca58997482b198f0e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7ab9e14b23a3eac6714bdc4dba244d8aa1ef646 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fecde9c3f9a4b97b68bb97c9f47e5b662586ba7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e554113a1cd2a9cfc6c7af7bdea2141c5757e188 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7dd9c26bd6cf679bcfdef01a8659791aa6487a29 •