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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: fastrpc: avoid double fput() on failed usercopy If the copy back to userland fails for the FASTRPC_IOCTL_ALLOC_DMA_BUFF ioctl(), we shouldn't assume that 'buf->dmabuf' is still valid. In fact, dma_buf_fd() called fd_install() before, i.e. "consumed" one reference, leaving us with none. Calling dma_buf_put() will therefore put a reference we no longer own, leading to a valid file descritor table entry for an already released 'file' object which is a straight use-after-free. Simply avoid calling dma_buf_put() and rely on the process exit code to do the necessary cleanup, if needed, i.e. if the file descriptor is still valid. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6cffd79504ce040f460831030d3069fa1c99bb71 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e6fd2b5fcf8e7119305a6042bd92e7f2b9ed215 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5ce7ee5fcc07583159f54ab4af5164de00148f5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e4382d0a39f9a1e260d62fdc079ddae5293c037d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76f85c307ef9f10aa2cef1b1d5ee654c1f3345fc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46963e2e0629cb31c96b1d47ddd89dc3d8990b34 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ibmvnic: don't release napi in __ibmvnic_open() If __ibmvnic_open() encounters an error such as when setting link state, it calls release_resources() which frees the napi structures needlessly. Instead, have __ibmvnic_open() only clean up the work it did so far (i.e. disable napi and irqs) and leave the rest to the callers. If caller of __ibmvnic_open() is ibmvnic_open(), it should release the resources immediately. If the caller is do_reset() or do_hard_reset(), they will release the resources on the next reset. This fixes following crash that occurred when running the drmgr command several times to add/remove a vnic interface: [102056] ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Disabling rx_scrq[6] irq [102056] ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Disabling rx_scrq[7] irq [102056] ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Replenished 8 pools Kernel attempted to read user page (10) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000010 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000a3c840 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries ... CPU: 9 PID: 102056 Comm: kworker/9:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-autotest-g6441998e2e37 #1 Workqueue: events_long __ibmvnic_reset [ibmvnic] NIP: c000000000a3c840 LR: c0080000029b5378 CTR: c000000000a3c820 REGS: c0000000548e37e0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.16.0-rc5-autotest-g6441998e2e37) MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28248484 XER: 00000004 CFAR: c0080000029bdd24 DAR: 0000000000000010 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c0080000029b55d0 c0000000548e3a80 c0000000028f0200 0000000000000000 ... NIP [c000000000a3c840] napi_enable+0x20/0xc0 LR [c0080000029b5378] __ibmvnic_open+0xf0/0x430 [ibmvnic] Call Trace: [c0000000548e3a80] [0000000000000006] 0x6 (unreliable) [c0000000548e3ab0] [c0080000029b55d0] __ibmvnic_open+0x348/0x430 [ibmvnic] [c0000000548e3b40] [c0080000029bcc28] __ibmvnic_reset+0x500/0xdf0 [ibmvnic] [c0000000548e3c60] [c000000000176228] process_one_work+0x288/0x570 [c0000000548e3d00] [c000000000176588] worker_thread+0x78/0x660 [c0000000548e3da0] [c0000000001822f0] kthread+0x1c0/0x1d0 [c0000000548e3e10] [c00000000000cf64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 7d2948f8 792307e0 4e800020 60000000 3c4c01eb 384239e0 f821ffd1 39430010 38a0fff6 e92d1100 f9210028 39200000 <e9030010> f9010020 60420000 e9210020 ---[ end trace 5f8033b08fd27706 ]--- • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed651a10875f13135a5f59c1bae4d51b377b3925 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/960dfaf3b578dd23af012590e809ae2d58ba1827 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e08cb9056fb2564d1f6bad789bdf79ab09bf2f81 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61772b0908c640d0309c40f7d41d062ca4e979fa •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipmr,ip6mr: acquire RTNL before calling ip[6]mr_free_table() on failure path ip[6]mr_free_table() can only be called under RTNL lock. RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/dev.c (10367) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5890 at net/core/dev.c:10367 unregister_netdevice_many+0x1246/0x1850 net/core/dev.c:10367 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 5890 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller-11627-g422ee58dc0ef #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many+0x1246/0x1850 net/core/dev.c:10367 Code: 0f 85 9b ee ff ff e8 69 07 4b fa ba 7f 28 00 00 48 c7 c6 00 90 ae 8a 48 c7 c7 40 90 ae 8a c6 05 6d b1 51 06 01 e8 8c 90 d8 01 <0f> 0b e9 70 ee ff ff e8 3e 07 4b fa 4c 89 e7 e8 86 2a 59 fa e9 ee RSP: 0018:ffffc900046ff6e0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff888050f51d00 RSI: ffffffff815fa008 RDI: fffff520008dfece RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffff815f3d6e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff4 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffc900046ff750 R15: ffff88807b7dc000 FS: 00007f4ab736e700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fee0b4f8990 CR3: 000000001e7d2000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> mroute_clean_tables+0x244/0xb40 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1509 ip6mr_free_table net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:389 [inline] ip6mr_rules_init net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:246 [inline] ip6mr_net_init net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1306 [inline] ip6mr_net_init+0x3f0/0x4e0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1298 ops_init+0xaf/0x470 net/core/net_namespace.c:140 setup_net+0x54f/0xbb0 net/core/net_namespace.c:331 copy_net_ns+0x318/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:475 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 copy_namespaces+0x391/0x450 kernel/nsproxy.c:178 copy_process+0x2e0c/0x7300 kernel/fork.c:2167 kernel_clone+0xe7/0xab0 kernel/fork.c:2555 __do_sys_clone+0xc8/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2672 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f4ab89f9059 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7f4ab89f902f. RSP: 002b:00007f4ab736e118 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4ab8b0bf60 RCX: 00007f4ab89f9059 RDX: 0000000020000280 RSI: 0000000020000270 RDI: 0000000040200000 RBP: 00007f4ab8a5308d R08: 0000000020000300 R09: 0000000020000300 R10: 00000000200002c0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffc3977cc1f R14: 00007f4ab736e300 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f243e5a7859a24d10975afb9a1708cac624ba6f1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80c529322600dfb1f985b5e3f14c3c6f522ce154 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b541845dfc4e7df551955e70deec0921d6b297c3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12b6703e9546902c56b4b9048b893ad49d62bdd4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16dcfde98a25340ff0f7879a16bea141d824a196 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09ac0fcb0a82d647f2c61d3d488d367b7ee5bd51 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3cab045c99dbb9a94eb2d1d405f399916eec698a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/feb9597e22755dce782aae26ac0590c06 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: fix a memleak when uncloning an skb dst and its metadata When uncloning an skb dst and its associated metadata, a new dst+metadata is allocated and later replaces the old one in the skb. This is helpful to have a non-shared dst+metadata attached to a specific skb. The issue is the uncloned dst+metadata is initialized with a refcount of 1, which is increased to 2 before attaching it to the skb. When tun_dst_unclone returns, the dst+metadata is only referenced from a single place (the skb) while its refcount is 2. Its refcount will never drop to 0 (when the skb is consumed), leading to a memory leak. Fix this by removing the call to dst_hold in tun_dst_unclone, as the dst+metadata refcount is already 1. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc4099f17240767554ff3a73977acb78ef615404 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ac84498fbe84a00e7aef185e2bb3e40ce71eca4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1ff27d100e2670b03cbfddb9117e5f9fc672540 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0be943916d781df2b652793bb2d3ae4f9624c10a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a80817adc2a4c1ba26a7aa5f3ed886e4a18dff88 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00e6d6c3bc14dfe32824e2c515f0e0f2d6ecf2f1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fdcb263fa5cda15b8cb24a641fa2718c47605314 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b1087b998e273f07be13dcb5f3ca4c30 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eeprom: ee1004: limit i2c reads to I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX Commit effa453168a7 ("i2c: i801: Don't silently correct invalid transfer size") revealed that ee1004_eeprom_read() did not properly limit how many bytes to read at once. In particular, i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data_or_emulated() takes the length to read as an u8. If count == 256 after taking into account the offset and page boundary, the cast to u8 overflows. And this is common when user space tries to read the entire EEPROM at once. To fix it, limit each read to I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32) bytes, already the maximum length i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data_or_emulated() allows. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aca56c298e2a6d20ab6308e203a8d37f2a7759d3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25714ad6bf5e98025579fa4c08ff2041a663910c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be9313f755a7bfa02230b15731d07074d5255ecb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07d9beb6e3c2e852e884113d6803ea4b3643ae38 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74650c34f93044d3ab441235f161f9e1e761e96b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a126a8c3dd51519513141b4fc94fd4813bca2c0f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/202d0e22fe512df0f1cb6253d40ce1058e373247 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7414af7bdad9a9cddb3a765ca98ea2070 •