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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 10EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: core: Fix race by not overwriting udev->descriptor in hub_port_init() Syzbot reported an out-of-bounds read in sysfs.c:read_descriptors(): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_descriptors+0x263/0x280 drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c:883 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801e78b8c8 by task udevd/5011 CPU: 0 PID: 5011 Comm: udevd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc6-syzkaller-00195-g40f71e7cd3c6 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:351 print_report mm/kasan/report.c:462 [inline] kasan_report+0x11c/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:572 read_descriptors+0x263/0x280 drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c:883 ... Allocated by task 758: ... __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:966 [inline] __kmalloc+0x5e/0x190 mm/slab_common.c:979 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:563 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:680 [inline] usb_get_configuration+0x1f7/0x5170 drivers/usb/core/config.c:887 usb_enumerate_device drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2407 [inline] usb_new_device+0x12b0/0x19d0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2545 As analyzed by Khazhy Kumykov, the cause of this bug is a race between read_descriptors() and hub_port_init(): The first routine uses a field in udev->descriptor, not expecting it to change, while the second overwrites it. Prior to commit 45bf39f8df7f ("USB: core: Don't hold device lock while reading the "descriptors" sysfs file") this race couldn't occur, because the routines were mutually exclusive thanks to the device locking. Removing that locking from read_descriptors() exposed it to the race. The best way to fix the bug is to keep hub_port_init() from changing udev->descriptor once udev has been initialized and registered. Drivers expect the descriptors stored in the kernel to be immutable; we should not undermine this expectation. In fact, this change should have been made long ago. So now hub_port_init() will take an additional argument, specifying a buffer in which to store the device descriptor it reads. (If udev has not yet been initialized, the buffer pointer will be NULL and then hub_port_init() will store the device descriptor in udev as before.) This eliminates the data race responsible for the out-of-bounds read. The changes to hub_port_init() appear more extensive than they really are, because of indentation changes resulting from an attempt to avoid writing to other parts of the usb_device structure after it has been initialized. Similar changes should be made to the code that reads the BOS descriptor, but that can be handled in a separate patch later on. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/218925bfd5d1436e337c4f961e9c149fbe32de6d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77358093331e9769855140bf94a3f00ecdcf4bb1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c87fb861ec185fdc578b4fdc6a05920b6a843840 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45bf39f8df7f05efb83b302c65ae3b9bc92b7065 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6badaf880edf51a2da7a439699676394dfdef3e5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f35b5d3bd6914c68f743741443dfd3a64b0e455 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1e89c8b29d003a20ed2dae6bdae1598d1f23e42 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1bcb238c54a9c6dc4bded06b06ba7458a •

CVSS: 4.4EPSS: 0%CPEs: 1EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: change vm->task_info handling This patch changes the handling and lifecycle of vm->task_info object. The major changes are: - vm->task_info is a dynamically allocated ptr now, and its uasge is reference counted. - introducing two new helper funcs for task_info lifecycle management - amdgpu_vm_get_task_info: reference counts up task_info before returning this info - amdgpu_vm_put_task_info: reference counts down task_info - last put to task_info() frees task_info from the vm. This patch also does logistical changes required for existing usage of vm->task_info. V2: Do not block all the prints when task_info not found (Felix) V3: Fixed review comments from Felix - Fix wrong indentation - No debug message for -ENOMEM - Add NULL check for task_info - Do not duplicate the debug messages (ti vs no ti) - Get first reference of task_info in vm_init(), put last in vm_fini() V4: Fixed review comments from Felix - fix double reference increment in create_task_info - change amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid - additional changes in amdgpu_gem.c while porting • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8f67b9ddf4f8fe6dd536590712b5912ad78f99c https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-41008 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2298079 • CWE-99: Improper Control of Resource Identifiers ('Resource Injection') •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: avoid too many retransmit packets If a TCP socket is using TCP_USER_TIMEOUT, and the other peer retracted its window to zero, tcp_retransmit_timer() can retransmit a packet every two jiffies (2 ms for HZ=1000), for about 4 minutes after TCP_USER_TIMEOUT has 'expired'. The fix is to make sure tcp_rtx_probe0_timed_out() takes icsk->icsk_user_timeout into account. Before blamed commit, the socket would not timeout after icsk->icsk_user_timeout, but would use standard exponential backoff for the retransmits. Also worth noting that before commit e89688e3e978 ("net: tcp: fix unexcepted socket die when snd_wnd is 0"), the issue would last 2 minutes instead of 4. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: tcp: evitar demasiados paquetes de retransmisión Si un socket TCP está usando TCP_USER_TIMEOUT y el otro par retrajo su ventana a cero, tcp_retransmit_timer() puede retransmitir un paquete cada dos santiamén (2 ms). para HZ=1000), durante aproximadamente 4 minutos después de que TCP_USER_TIMEOUT haya 'expirado'. La solución es asegurarse de que tcp_rtx_probe0_timed_out() tenga en cuenta icsk-&gt;icsk_user_timeout. Antes de el commit culpable, el socket no expiraba después de icsk-&gt;icsk_user_timeout, sino que usaba un retroceso exponencial estándar para las retransmisiones. También vale la pena señalar que antes de commit e89688e3e978 ("net: tcp: fix unexcepted socket die cuando snd_wnd es 0"), el problema duraría 2 minutos en lugar de 4. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b701a99e431db784714c32fc6b68123045714679 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bb7670f92bfbd05fc41a8f9a8f358b7ffed65f4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2346fca5bed130dc712f276ac63450201d52969 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d7e64d70a11d988553a08239c810a658e841982 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04317a2471c2f637b4c49cbd0e9c0d04a519f570 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e113cddefa27bbf5a79f72387b8fbd432a61a466 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dfcdd7f89e401d2c6616be90c76c2fac3fa98fde https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66cb64a1d2239cd0309f9b5038b054625 • CWE-99: Improper Control of Resource Identifiers ('Resource Injection') •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Fix UAF in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready() After the listener svc_sock is freed, and before invoking svc_tcp_accept() for the established child sock, there is a window that the newsock retaining a freed listener svc_sock in sk_user_data which cloning from parent. In the race window, if data is received on the newsock, we will observe use-after-free report in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready(). Reproduce by two tasks: 1. while :; do rpc.nfsd 0 ; rpc.nfsd; done 2. while :; do echo "" | ncat -4 127.0.0.1 2049 ; done KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x1cf/0x1f0 [sunrpc] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888139d96228 by task nc/102553 CPU: 7 PID: 102553 Comm: nc Not tainted 6.3.0+ #18 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x310 print_report+0x3e/0x70 kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 svc_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x1cf/0x1f0 [sunrpc] tcp_data_queue+0x9f4/0x20e0 tcp_rcv_established+0x666/0x1f60 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x51c/0x850 tcp_v4_rcv+0x23fc/0x2e80 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x62/0x300 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x267/0x350 ip_local_deliver+0x18b/0x2d0 ip_rcv+0x2fb/0x370 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x166/0x1b0 process_backlog+0x24c/0x5e0 __napi_poll+0xa2/0x500 net_rx_action+0x854/0xc90 __do_softirq+0x1bb/0x5de do_softirq+0xcb/0x100 </IRQ> <TASK> ... </TASK> Allocated by task 102371: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90 svc_setup_socket+0x52/0x4f0 [sunrpc] svc_addsock+0x20d/0x400 [sunrpc] __write_ports_addfd+0x209/0x390 [nfsd] write_ports+0x239/0x2c0 [nfsd] nfsctl_transaction_write+0xac/0x110 [nfsd] vfs_write+0x1c3/0xae0 ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Freed by task 102551: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190 __kmem_cache_free+0x133/0x270 svc_xprt_free+0x1e2/0x350 [sunrpc] svc_xprt_destroy_all+0x25a/0x440 [sunrpc] nfsd_put+0x125/0x240 [nfsd] nfsd_svc+0x2cb/0x3c0 [nfsd] write_threads+0x1ac/0x2a0 [nfsd] nfsctl_transaction_write+0xac/0x110 [nfsd] vfs_write+0x1c3/0xae0 ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Fix the UAF by simply doing nothing in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready() if state != TCP_LISTEN, that will avoid dereferencing svsk for all child socket. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: SUNRPC: corrige UAF en svc_tcp_listen_data_ready() Después de que se libera el oyente svc_sock, y antes de invocar svc_tcp_accept() para el calcetín secundario establecido, hay una ventana que indica que el newsock retiene un oyente liberado. svc_sock en sk_user_data que clona desde el padre. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa9251afc33c81606d70cfe91800a779096442ec https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7b8c2d06e437639694abe76978e915cfb73f428 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dfc896c4a75cb8cd7cb2dfd9b469cf1e3f004254 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42725e5c1b181b757ba11d804443922982334d9b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd5ec3ee52ce4b7e283cc11facfa420c297c8065 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbf4ace39b2e4f3833236afbb2336edbafd75eee https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef047411887ff0845afd642d6a687819308e1a4e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e1f989055622fd086c5dfb291fc72adf •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 9EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netrom: Fix a memory leak in nr_heartbeat_expiry() syzbot reported a memory leak in nr_create() [0]. Commit 409db27e3a2e ("netrom: Fix use-after-free of a listening socket.") added sock_hold() to the nr_heartbeat_expiry() function, where a) a socket has a SOCK_DESTROY flag or b) a listening socket has a SOCK_DEAD flag. But in the case "a," when the SOCK_DESTROY flag is set, the file descriptor has already been closed and the nr_release() function has been called. So it makes no sense to hold the reference count because no one will call another nr_destroy_socket() and put it as in the case "b." nr_connect nr_establish_data_link nr_start_heartbeat nr_release switch (nr->state) case NR_STATE_3 nr->state = NR_STATE_2 sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DESTROY); nr_rx_frame nr_process_rx_frame switch (nr->state) case NR_STATE_2 nr_state2_machine() nr_disconnect() nr_sk(sk)->state = NR_STATE_0 sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD) nr_heartbeat_expiry switch (nr->state) case NR_STATE_0 if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DESTROY) || (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN && sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))) sock_hold() // ( !!! ) nr_destroy_socket() To fix the memory leak, let's call sock_hold() only for a listening socket. Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. [0]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d327a1f3b12e1e206c16 • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a31caf5779ace8fa98b0d454133808e082ee7a1b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe9b9e621cebe6b7e83f7e954c70f8bb430520e5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7de16d75b20ab13b75a7291f449a1b00090edfea https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2d3ab1b1de3302de2c85769121fd4f890e47ceb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51e394c6f81adbfe7c34d15f58b3d4d44f144acf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/409db27e3a2eb5e8ef7226ca33be33361b3ed1c9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e666990abb2e42dd4ba979b4706280a3664cfae7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d616876256b38ecf9a1a1c7d674192c53 •