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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i40e: Fix XDP program unloading while removing the driver The commit 6533e558c650 ("i40e: Fix reset path while removing the driver") introduced a new PF state "__I40E_IN_REMOVE" to block modifying the XDP program while the driver is being removed. Unfortunately, such a change is useful only if the ".ndo_bpf()" callback was called out of the rmmod context because unloading the existing XDP program is also a part of driver removing procedure. In other words, from the rmmod context the driver is expected to unload the XDP program without reporting any errors. Otherwise, the kernel warning with callstack is printed out to dmesg. Example failing scenario: 1. Load the i40e driver. 2. Load the XDP program. 3. Unload the i40e driver (using "rmmod" command). The example kernel warning log: [ +0.004646] WARNING: CPU: 94 PID: 10395 at net/core/dev.c:9290 unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x7a9/0x870 [...] [ +0.010959] RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x7a9/0x870 [...] [ +0.002726] Call Trace: [ +0.002457] <TASK> [ +0.002119] ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b82364abc54b19829b26459989d2781fc4822c28 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6533e558c6505e94c3e0ed4281ed5e31ec985f4d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2754d83160c96ae22afff8687ddb575d3b790587 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b399a68054dfb36eed121846ef5fcddba40b7740 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4bc336b2345f1485438c0eb7246d9c8a8d09f8ff https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5266302cb2c74d8ab0e9a69d5752fffaea70496e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0075b8c94d76830c7b6f018f6e4eeb0bf6465fdc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01fc5142ae6b06b61ed51a624f2732d65 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: lantiq_etop: fix double free in detach The number of the currently released descriptor is never incremented which results in the same skb being released multiple times. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/504d4721ee8e432af4b5f196a08af38bc4dac5fe https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a2db00a554cfda57c397cce79b2804bf9633fec https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/907443174e76b854d28024bd079f0e53b94dc9a1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22b16618a80858b3a9d607708444426948cc4ae1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69ad5fa0ce7c548262e0770fc2b726fe7ab4f156 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2b66e2b3939af63699e4a4bd25a8ac4a9b1d1b3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d23909ae041761cb2aa0c3cb1748598d8b6bc54 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84aaaa796a19195fc59290154fef9aeb1 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Defer work in bpf_timer_cancel_and_free Currently, the same case as previous patch (two timer callbacks trying to cancel each other) can be invoked through bpf_map_update_elem as well, or more precisely, freeing map elements containing timers. Since this relies on hrtimer_cancel as well, it is prone to the same deadlock situation as the previous patch. It would be sufficient to use hrtimer_try_to_cancel to fix this problem, as the timer cannot be enqueued after async_cancel_and_free. Once async_cancel_and_free has been done, the timer must be reinitialized before it can be armed again. The callback running in parallel trying to arm the timer will fail, and freeing bpf_hrtimer without waiting is sufficient (given kfree_rcu), and bpf_timer_cb will return HRTIMER_NORESTART, preventing the timer from being rearmed again. However, there exists a UAF scenario where the callback arms the timer before entering this function, such that if cancellation fails (due to timer callback invoking this routine, or the target timer callback running concurrently). In such a case, if the timer expiration is significantly far in the future, the RCU grace period expiration happening before it will free the bpf_hrtimer state and along with it the struct hrtimer, that is enqueued. Hence, it is clear cancellation needs to occur after async_cancel_and_free, and yet it cannot be done inline due to deadlock issues. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b00628b1c7d595ae5b544e059c27b1f5828314b4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7aa5a19279c3639ae8b758b63f05d0c616a39fa1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6fcd19d7eac1335eb76bc16b6a66b7f574d1d69 •

CVSS: 4.9EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ppp: reject claimed-as-LCP but actually malformed packets Since 'ppp_async_encode()' assumes valid LCP packets (with code from 1 to 7 inclusive), add 'ppp_check_packet()' to ensure that LCP packet has an actual body beyond PPP_LCP header bytes, and reject claimed-as-LCP but actually malformed data otherwise. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97d1efd8be26615ff680cdde86937d5943138f37 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e8f1c21174f9482033bbb59f13ce1a8cbe843c3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ba12c2afd933fc1bf800f6d3f6c7ec8f602ce56 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebc5c630457783d17d0c438b0ad70b232a64a82f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3134bdf7356ed952dcecb480861d2afcc1e40492 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/099502ca410922b56353ccef2749bc0de669da78 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d683e7f3fc48f59576af34631b4fb07fd • CWE-20: Improper Input Validation •

CVSS: 4.1EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: prefer nft_chain_validate nft_chain_validate already performs loop detection because a cycle will result in a call stack overflow (ctx->level >= NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE). It also follows maps via ->validate callback in nft_lookup, so there appears no reason to iterate the maps again. nf_tables_check_loops() and all its helper functions can be removed. This improves ruleset load time significantly, from 23s down to 12s. This also fixes a crash bug. Old loop detection code can result in unbounded recursion: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at .... Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 4 PID: 1539 Comm: nft Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5+ #1 [..] with a suitable ruleset during validation of register stores. I can't see any actual reason to attempt to check for this from nft_validate_register_store(), at this point the transaction is still in progress, so we don't have a full picture of the rule graph. For nf-next it might make sense to either remove it or make this depend on table->validate_state in case we could catch an error earlier (for improved error reporting to userspace). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20a69341f2d00cd042e81c82289fba8a13c05a25 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1947e4c3346faa8ac7e343652c0fd3b3e394202f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd4348e0a50286282c314ad6d2b0740e7c812c24 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31c35f9f89ef585f1edb53e17ac73a0ca4a9712b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8246b7466c8da49d0d9e85e26cbd69dd6d3e3d1e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6b6e430470e1c3c5513311cb35a15a205595abe https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/717c91c6ed73e248de6a15bc53adefb81446c9d0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9df785aeb7dcc8efd1d4110bb27d26005 • CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow •