CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0CVE-2024-35818 – LoongArch: Define the __io_aw() hook as mmiowb()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-35818
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: Define the __io_aw() hook as mmiowb() Commit fb24ea52f78e0d595852e ("drivers: Remove explicit invocations of mmiowb()") remove all mmiowb() in drivers, but it says: "NOTE: mmiowb() has only ever guaranteed ordering in conjunction with spin_unlock(). However, pairing each mmiowb() removal in this patch with the corresponding call to spin_unlock() is not at all trivial, so there is a small chance that this change may regress any drivers incorrectly relying on mmiowb() to order MMIO writes between CPUs using lock-free synchronisation." The mmio in radeon_ring_commit() is protected by a mutex rather than a spinlock, but in the mutex fastpath it behaves similar to spinlock. We can add mmiowb() calls in the radeon driver but the maintainer says he doesn't like such a workaround, and radeon is not the only example of mutex protected mmio. So we should extend the mmiowb tracking system from spinlock to mutex, and maybe other locking primitives. This is not easy and error prone, so we solve it in the architectural code, by simply defining the __io_aw() hook as mmiowb(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97cd43ba824aec764f5ea2790d0c0a318f885167 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7d7c6cdea875be3b241d7d39873bb431db7154d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b61a7dc6712b78799b3949997e8a5e94db5c4b0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9adec248bba33b1503252caf8e59d81febfc5ceb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c68ece8b2a5c5ff9b2fcaea923dd73efeb174cd •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2024-35817 – drm/amdgpu: amdgpu_ttm_gart_bind set gtt bound flag
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-35817
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: amdgpu_ttm_gart_bind set gtt bound flag Otherwise after the GTT bo is released, the GTT and gart space is freed but amdgpu_ttm_backend_unbind will not clear the gart page table entry and leave valid mapping entry pointing to the stale system page. Then if GPU access the gart address mistakely, it will read undefined value instead page fault, harder to debug and reproduce the real issue. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: drm/amdgpu: amdgpu_ttm_gart_bind establece el indicador vinculado a gtt. De lo contrario, después de que se libera GTT bo, se libera el espacio GTT y gart, pero amdgpu_ttm_backend_unbind no borrará la entrada de la tabla de páginas de gart y dejará una asignación válida. entrada que apunta a la página del sistema obsoleto. Luego, si la GPU accede a la dirección de Gart por error, leerá un valor indefinido en lugar de un error de página, lo que será más difícil de depurar y reproducir el problema real. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d5f1a7f3b1039925f79c7894f153c2a905201fb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/589c414138a1bed98e652c905937d8f790804efe https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fcd12cb90888ef2d8af8d4c04e913252eee4ef3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8d27caef2c829a306e1f762fb95f06e8ec676f6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5cdce3dda3b3dacde902f63a8ee72c2b7f91912d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c6064cbe58b43533e3451ad6a8ba9736c109ac3 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 9EXPL: 0CVE-2024-35811 – wifi: brcmfmac: Fix use-after-free bug in brcmf_cfg80211_detach
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-35811
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: Fix use-after-free bug in brcmf_cfg80211_detach This is the candidate patch of CVE-2023-47233 : https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47233 In brcm80211 driver,it starts with the following invoking chain to start init a timeout worker: ->brcmf_usb_probe ->brcmf_usb_probe_cb ->brcmf_attach ->brcmf_bus_started ->brcmf_cfg80211_attach ->wl_init_priv ->brcmf_init_escan ->INIT_WORK(&cfg->escan_timeout_work, brcmf_cfg80211_escan_timeout_worker); If we disconnect the USB by hotplug, it will call brcmf_usb_disconnect to make cleanup. The invoking chain is : brcmf_usb_disconnect ->brcmf_usb_disconnect_cb ->brcmf_detach ->brcmf_cfg80211_detach ->kfree(cfg); While the timeout woker may still be running. This will cause a use-after-free bug on cfg in brcmf_cfg80211_escan_timeout_worker. Fix it by deleting the timer and canceling the worker in brcmf_cfg80211_detach. [arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com: keep timer delete as is and cancel work just before free] En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: wifi: brcmfmac: corregido el error de use after free en brcmf_cfg80211_detach Este es el parche candidato de CVE-2023-47233: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail /CVE-2023-47233 En el controlador brcm80211, comienza con la siguiente cadena de invocación para iniciar un trabajador de tiempo de espera: ->brcmf_usb_probe ->brcmf_usb_probe_cb ->brcmf_attach ->brcmf_bus_started ->brcmf_cfg80211_attach ->wl_init_priv ->brcmf_init_escan ->INIT_WORK(&cfg ->escan_timeout_work, brcmf_cfg80211_escan_timeout_worker); Si desconectamos el USB mediante hotplug, llamará a brcmf_usb_disconnect para realizar la limpieza. La cadena de invocación es: brcmf_usb_disconnect ->brcmf_usb_disconnect_cb ->brcmf_detach ->brcmf_cfg80211_detach ->kfree(cfg); Mientras que el activador de tiempo de espera aún puede estar ejecutándose. Esto provocará un error de use after free en cfg en brcmf_cfg80211_escan_timeout_worker. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e756af5b30b008f6ffcfebf8ad0b477f6f225b62 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/202c503935042272e2f9e1bb549d5f69a8681169 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e3f03f4ef7c36091f46e7349096efb5a2cdb3a1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bacb8c3ab86dcd760c15903fcee58169bc3026aa https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c36205123dc57349b59b4f1a2301eb278cbc731 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b812f706fd7090be74812101114a0e165b36744 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/190794848e2b9d15de92d502b6ac652806904f5a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6678a1e7d896c00030b31491690e8ddc9 •
CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 9EXPL: 0CVE-2024-35809 – PCI/PM: Drain runtime-idle callbacks before driver removal
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-35809
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI/PM: Drain runtime-idle callbacks before driver removal A race condition between the .runtime_idle() callback and the .remove() callback in the rtsx_pcr PCI driver leads to a kernel crash due to an unhandled page fault [1]. The problem is that rtsx_pci_runtime_idle() is not expected to be running after pm_runtime_get_sync() has been called, but the latter doesn't really guarantee that. It only guarantees that the suspend and resume callbacks will not be running when it returns. However, if a .runtime_idle() callback is already running when pm_runtime_get_sync() is called, the latter will notice that the runtime PM status of the device is RPM_ACTIVE and it will return right away without waiting for the former to complete. In fact, it cannot wait for .runtime_idle() to complete because it may be called from that callback (it arguably does not make much sense to do that, but it is not strictly prohibited). Thus in general, whoever is providing a .runtime_idle() callback needs to protect it from running in parallel with whatever code runs after pm_runtime_get_sync(). [Note that .runtime_idle() will not start after pm_runtime_get_sync() has returned, but it may continue running then if it has started earlier.] One way to address that race condition is to call pm_runtime_barrier() after pm_runtime_get_sync() (not before it, because a nonzero value of the runtime PM usage counter is necessary to prevent runtime PM callbacks from being invoked) to wait for the .runtime_idle() callback to complete should it be running at that point. A suitable place for doing that is in pci_device_remove() which calls pm_runtime_get_sync() before removing the driver, so it may as well call pm_runtime_barrier() subsequently, which will prevent the race in question from occurring, not just in the rtsx_pcr driver, but in any PCI drivers providing .runtime_idle() callbacks. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a87375bb586515c0af63d5dcdcd58ec4acf20a6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47d8aafcfe313511a98f165a54d0adceb34e54b1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bbe068b24409ef740657215605284fc7cdddd491 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7cc94dd36e48879e76ae7a8daea4ff322b7d9674 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/900b81caf00c89417172afe0e7e49ac4eb110f4b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d86ad8c3e152349454b82f37007ff6ba45f26989 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d534198311c345e4b062c4b88bb609efb8bd91d5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6347348c6aba52dda0b33296684cbb627 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0CVE-2024-35808 – md/dm-raid: don't call md_reap_sync_thread() directly
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-35808
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/dm-raid: don't call md_reap_sync_thread() directly Currently md_reap_sync_thread() is called from raid_message() directly without holding 'reconfig_mutex', this is definitely unsafe because md_reap_sync_thread() can change many fields that is protected by 'reconfig_mutex'. However, hold 'reconfig_mutex' here is still problematic because this will cause deadlock, for example, commit 130443d60b1b ("md: refactor idle/frozen_sync_thread() to fix deadlock"). Fix this problem by using stop_sync_thread() to unregister sync_thread, like md/raid did. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: md/dm-raid: no llame a md_reap_sync_thread() directamente Actualmente, se llama a md_reap_sync_thread() desde raid_message() directamente sin mantener presionado 'reconfig_mutex', esto definitivamente no es seguro porque md_reap_sync_thread( ) puede cambiar muchos campos protegidos por 'reconfig_mutex'. Sin embargo, mantener 'reconfig_mutex' aquí sigue siendo problemático porque esto causará un punto muerto, por ejemplo, confirme 130443d60b1b ("md: refactor idle/frozen_sync_thread() to fix deadlock"). Solucione este problema usando stop_sync_thread() para cancelar el registro de sync_thread, como lo hizo md/raid. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be83651f0050ca8621d58d35dad558e9c45cb18f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/347dcdc15a1706f61aa545ae498ededdf31aeebc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e59b8d76ff511505eb0dd1478329f09e0f04669 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd32b27a66db8776d8b8e82ec7d7dde97a8693b0 •