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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: break out if skb_header_pointer returns NULL in sctp_rcv_ootb We should always check if skb_header_pointer's return is NULL before using it, otherwise it may cause null-ptr-deref, as syzbot reported: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: 0010:sctp_rcv_ootb net/sctp/input.c:705 [inline] RIP: 0010:sctp_rcv+0x1d84/0x3220 net/sctp/input.c:196 Call Trace: <IRQ> sctp6_rcv+0x38/0x60 net/sctp/ipv6.c:1109 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2e9/0x1ca0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:422 ip6_input_finish+0x62/0x170 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:463 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline] ip6_input+0x9c/0xd0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:472 dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:76 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0x28c/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:297 En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: sctp: se rompe si skb_header_pointer devuelve NULL en sctp_rcv_ootb. Siempre debemos verificar si el retorno de skb_header_pointer es NULL antes de usarlo; de lo contrario, puede causar null-ptr-deref, como informó syzbot: KASAN : null-ptr-deref en el rango [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: 0010:sctp_rcv_ootb net/sctp/input.c:705 [en línea] RIP: 0010:sctp_rcv+0x1d84/0x3220 net/sctp/input .c:196 Seguimiento de llamadas : sctp6_rcv+0x38/0x60 net/sctp/ipv6.c:1109 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2e9/0x1ca0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:422 ip6_input_finish+0x62/0x170 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:463 incluir/linux /netfilter.h:307 [en línea] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [en línea] ip6_input+0x9c/0xd0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:472 dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [en línea] ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:76 [en línea] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [en línea] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [en línea] ipv6_rcv+0x28c/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c :297 • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3acb50c18d8d6650f10919464ade4dcdaf41d62f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77bc7dcf0fcc1519341a91788d7a2914fcfddf6d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c630a7b4f9dec63f08bd881ab77984a724a5124 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec018021cf445abbe8e2f3e2a7f1dcc813cb8ea1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c6591ae8e63f93c895ad5e2703c36c548aac997 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8180611c238e11676612eb2a9828b1c7a3a4d77b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7e745f8e94492a8ac0b0a26e25f2b19d342918f •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mac80211-hwsim: fix late beacon hrtimer handling Thomas explained in https://lore.kernel.org/r/87mtoeb4hb.ffs@tglx that our handling of the hrtimer here is wrong: If the timer fires late (e.g. due to vCPU scheduling, as reported by Dmitry/syzbot) then it tries to actually rearm the timer at the next deadline, which might be in the past already: 1 2 3 N N+1 | | | ... | | ^ intended to fire here (1) ^ next deadline here (2) ^ actually fired here The next time it fires, it's later, but will still try to schedule for the next deadline (now 3), etc. until it catches up with N, but that might take a long time, causing stalls etc. Now, all of this is simulation, so we just have to fix it, but note that the behaviour is wrong even per spec, since there's no value then in sending all those beacons unaligned - they should be aligned to the TBTT (1, 2, 3, ... in the picture), and if we're a bit (or a lot) late, then just resume at that point. Therefore, change the code to use hrtimer_forward_now() which will ensure that the next firing of the timer would be at N+1 (in the picture), i.e. the next interval point after the current time. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01e59e467ecf976c782eecd4dc99644802cc60e2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9bee85de2c8155388c09a2e1530a243ec1c96f05 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c204cf594df3b9468368dc9d0b24d482d93cda7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed2adf69e29848d1eb9df99633dde655421c92ed https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/313bbd1990b6ddfdaa7da098d0c56b098a833572 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mac80211: limit injected vht mcs/nss in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap Limit max values for vht mcs and nss in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap routine in order to fix the following warning reported by syzbot: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000186f3e8 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: 0000000000000618 RBX: ffff88804ef76500 RCX: ffffc900143a5000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff888f478e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000100 R10: ffffffff888f46f9 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff8 R13: ffff88804ef7653c R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007fbf5718f700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b2de23000 CR3: 000000006a671000 CR4: 00000000001506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 Call Trace: ieee80211_monitor_select_queue+0xa6/0x250 net/mac80211/iface.c:740 netdev_core_pick_tx+0x169/0x2e0 net/core/dev.c:4089 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6f9/0x3710 net/core/dev.c:4165 __bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2114 [inline] __bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2139 [inline] __bpf_redirect+0x5ba/0xd20 net/core/filter.c:2162 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2429 [inline] bpf_clone_redirect+0x2ae/0x420 net/core/filter.c:2401 bpf_prog_eeb6f53a69e5c6a2+0x59/0x234 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:717 [inline] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:624 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:631 [inline] bpf_test_run+0x381/0xa30 net/bpf/test_run.c:119 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xb84/0x1ee0 net/bpf/test_run.c:663 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3307 [inline] __sys_bpf+0x2137/0x5df0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4605 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4691 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x4665f9 En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: mac80211: límite inyectado de vht mcs/nss en ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap. Limite los valores máximos para vht mcs y nss en la rutina ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap para corregir la siguiente advertencia reportada por syzbot: ADVERTENCIA: CPU: 0 PID : 10717 en include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [en línea] ADVERTENCIA: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 en include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12 d0 neto/ mac80211/tx.c:2244 Módulos vinculados en: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0 Nombre del hardware: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01 /2011 RIP: 0010:ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [en línea] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244 RSP: 86f3e8 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: 0000000000000618 RBX: ffff88804ef76500 RCX: ffffc900143a5000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff888f478e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 000 R09: 0000000000000100 R10: ffffffff888f46f9 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000ffffff8 R13: ffff88804ef7653c R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007fbf5718f700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000( 0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b2de23000 CR3: 000000006a671000 CR4: 000000000015 06f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 ieee80211_monitor_select_queue+0xa6 /0x250 net/mac80211/iface.c:740 netdev_core_pick_tx+0x169/0x2e0 net/core/dev.c:4089 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6f9/0x3710 net/core/dev.c:4165 __bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2114 [ en línea] __bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2139 [en línea] __bpf_redirect+0x5ba/0xd20 net/core/filter.c:2162 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2429 [en línea] bpf_clone_redirect+0x2ae/0x420 net/core /filter.c:2401 bpf_prog_eeb6f53a69e5c6a2+0x59/0x234 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:717 [en línea] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:624 [en línea] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:631 [ en línea] bpf_test_run+0x381/0xa30 net/bpf/test_run.c:119 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xb84/0x1ee0 net/bpf/test_run.c:663 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3307 [en línea] 5df0 núcleo/bpf/ syscall.c:4605 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4691 [en línea] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 [en línea] __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 4 arco/x86/ entrada/common.c:50 [en línea] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entrada_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x4665f9 • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/646e76bb5daf4ca38438c69ffb72cccb605f3466 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5bb852aa2ad963074f0ad73030dbc20a30853e3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce5f372f5f084ff51c285fc27b232f15a3d00f0b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76538c7b4df314bb937e44c5cb1782f37d47443c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab85997465b972d39d9747fc16311fa5773374b2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1282bb00835ff79d2d9c023055d514df5b4de260 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/997ee230e4f5285cd98445c102d9033c7ec4814b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13cb6d826e0ac0d144b0d48191ff1a111 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/cma: Ensure rdma_addr_cancel() happens before issuing more requests The FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice on the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the work, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution background request cannot be active twice. CPU 1 CPU 2 rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_IDLE -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) #1 process_one_req(): for #1 addr_handler(): RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); [.. handler still running ..] rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) !! two requests are now on the req_list rdma_destroy_id(): destroy_id_handler_unlock(): _destroy_id(): cma_cancel_operation(): rdma_addr_cancel() // process_one_req() self removes it spin_lock_bh(&lock); cancel_delayed_work(&req->work); if (!list_empty(&req->list)) == true ! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done kfree(id_priv) process_one_req(): for #2 addr_handler(): mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); !! • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e51060f08a61965c4dd91516d82fe90617152590 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a085fa9b7d644a234465091e038c1911e1a4f2a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03d884671572af8bcfbc9e63944c1021efce7589 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/305d568b72f17f674155a2a8275f865f207b3808 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 9EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mac80211: fix use-after-free in CCMP/GCMP RX When PN checking is done in mac80211, for fragmentation we need to copy the PN to the RX struct so we can later use it to do a comparison, since commit bf30ca922a0c ("mac80211: check defrag PN against current frame"). Unfortunately, in that commit I used the 'hdr' variable without it being necessarily valid, so use-after-free could occur if it was necessary to reallocate (parts of) the frame. Fix this by reloading the variable after the code that results in the reallocations, if any. This fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=214401. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: mac80211: corrige el use after free en CCMP/GCMP RX. Cuando se realiza la verificación de PN en mac80211, para la fragmentación necesitamos copiar el PN a la estructura RX para poder usarlo más tarde. para hacer una comparación, desde la confirmación bf30ca922a0c ("mac80211: verifique la desfragmentación PN con el marco actual"). Desafortunadamente, en esa confirmación utilicé la variable 'hdr' sin que fuera necesariamente válida, por lo que podría ocurrir un use after free si fuera necesario reasignar (partes de) el marco. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/608b0a2ae928a74a2f89e02227339dd79cdb63cf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0f613fe6de344dc17ba04a88921a2094c13d3fa https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a9b57952fed41556c950a92123086724eaf11919 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f716b48ed25503e6961f4b5b40ece36f7e4ed26 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8b3a6150dc8ac78d5fdd5fbdfc4806249ef8b2c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e64ea0597050157f926ac2ba9b478a44ee5be945 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf30ca922a0c0176007e074b0acc77ed345e9990 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f0bf30c01d3f4de7d6c5e27b102a808c •