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CVSS: 8.1EPSS: 0%CPEs: 85EXPL: 0

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames. Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA y WPA2) permite la reinstalación de la clave temporal (TK) PTK (Pairwise Transient Key) durante la negociación en cuatro pasos, haciendo que un atacante que se sitúe entro del radio responda, descifre o suplante frames. A new exploitation technique called key reinstallation attacks (KRACKs) affecting WPA2 has been discovered. A remote attacker within Wi-Fi range could exploit this attack to decrypt Wi-Fi traffic or possibly inject forged Wi-Fi packets by reinstalling a previously used pairwise key (PTK-TK) during a 4-way handshake. • http://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2017-007.txt http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3999 http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/228519 http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpuapr2018-3678067.html http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpujan2018-3236628.html http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101274 http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039573 http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039576 http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039577 http://www.security • CWE-323: Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values •

CVSS: 8.1EPSS: 0%CPEs: 85EXPL: 1

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11r allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the fast BSS transmission (FT) handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames. Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA y WPA2) que soporte IEEE 802.11r permite la reinstalación de la clave temporal PTK (Pairwise Transient Key) durante la negociación de la transmisión rápida (FT) BSS, haciendo que un atacante en el rango de radio reproduzca, descifre o suplante frames. A new exploitation technique called key reinstallation attacks (KRACK) affecting WPA2 has been discovered. A remote attacker within Wi-Fi range could exploit this attack to decrypt Wi-Fi traffic or possibly inject forged Wi-Fi packets by reinstalling a previously used pairwise key (PTK-TK) by retransmitting Fast BSS Transition (FT) Reassociation Requests. • http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-02/msg00021.html http://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2017-007.txt http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3999 http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/228519 http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpuapr2018-3678067.html http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpujan2018-3236628.html http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101274 http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039570 http://www.securitytracker.com/id& • CWE-323: Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values •

CVSS: 8.1EPSS: 0%CPEs: 85EXPL: 0

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) Peer Key (TPK) during the TDLS handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames. Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA y WPA2) permite la reinstalación de la clave TPK (Peer Key) TDLS (Tunneled Direct-Link Setup) durante la negociación TDLS, haciendo que un atacante que se sitúe dentro del radio reproduzca, descifre o suplante frames. A new exploitation technique called key reinstallation attacks (KRACK) affecting WPA2 has been discovered. A remote attacker within Wi-Fi range could exploit this attack to decrypt Wi-Fi traffic or possibly inject forged Wi-Fi packets by reinstalling a previously used Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) Peerkey (TPK) key during a TDLS handshake. • http://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2017-007.txt http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3999 http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/228519 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101274 http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039573 http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039576 http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039577 http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039578 http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039581 http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-3455-1 https://access.redhat.com/errat • CWE-323: Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values •

CVSS: 8.1EPSS: 0%CPEs: 85EXPL: 0

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients. Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA y WPA2) permite la reinstalación de la clave temporal GTK (Group Temporal Key) durante la negociación en cuatro pasos, haciendo que un atacante en el rango de radio reproduzca frames desde los puntos de acceso hasta los clientes. A new exploitation technique called key reinstallation attacks (KRACK) affecting WPA2 has been discovered. A remote attacker within Wi-Fi range could exploit this attack to decrypt Wi-Fi traffic or possibly inject forged Wi-Fi packets by reinstalling a previously used group key (GTK) during a 4-way handshake. • http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2017-10/msg00020.html http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2017-10/msg00023.html http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2017-10/msg00024.html http://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2017-007.txt http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3999 http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/228519 http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpuapr2018-3678067.html http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-a • CWE-323: Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values •

CVSS: 5.3EPSS: 0%CPEs: 85EXPL: 0

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients. Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA y WPA2) que soporte IEEE 802.11w permite la reinstalación de la clave temporal IGTK (Integrity Group Temporal Key) durante la negociación en cuatro pasos, haciendo que un atacante en el rango de radio suplante frames desde los puntos de acceso hasta los clientes. • http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2017-10/msg00020.html http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2017-10/msg00023.html http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2017-10/msg00024.html http://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2017-007.txt http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3999 http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/228519 http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpujan2018-3236628.html http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101274 http • CWE-323: Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values •