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CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix overrunning reservations in ringbuf The BPF ring buffer internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circular buffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters: consumer_pos is the consumer counter to show which logical position the consumer consumed the data, and producer_pos which is the producer counter denoting the amount of data reserved by all producers. Each time a record is reserved, the producer that "owns" the record will successfully advance producer counter. In user space each time a record is read, the consumer of the data advanced the consumer counter once it finished processing. Both counters are stored in separate pages so that from user space, the producer counter is read-only and the consumer counter is read-write. One aspect that simplifies and thus speeds up the implementation of both producers and consumers is how the data area is mapped twice contiguously back-to-back in the virtual memory, allowing to not take any special measures for samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer data area, because the next page after the last data page would be first data page again, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtual memory. Each record has a struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr { u32 len; u32 pg_off; } header for book-keeping the length and offset, and is inaccessible to the BPF program. Helpers like bpf_ringbuf_reserve() return `(void *)hdr + BPF_RINGBUF_HDR_SZ` for the BPF program to use. Bing-Jhong and Muhammad reported that it is however possible to make a second allocated memory chunk overlapping with the first chunk and as a result, the BPF program is now able to edit first chunk's header. For example, consider the creation of a BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF map with size of 0x4000. Next, the consumer_pos is modified to 0x3000 /before/ a call to bpf_ringbuf_reserve() is made. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/457f44363a8894135c85b7a9afd2bd8196db24ab https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be35504b959f2749bab280f4671e8df96dcf836f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f98f40eb1ed52af8b81f61901b6c0289ff59de4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1b9df0435bc61e0b44f578846516df8ef476686 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/511804ab701c0503b72eac08217eabfd366ba069 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47416c852f2a04d348ea66ee451cbdcf8119f225 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfa1a2329a691ffd991fcf7248a57d752e712881 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-41009 • CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 10EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: core: Fix race by not overwriting udev->descriptor in hub_port_init() Syzbot reported an out-of-bounds read in sysfs.c:read_descriptors(): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_descriptors+0x263/0x280 drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c:883 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801e78b8c8 by task udevd/5011 CPU: 0 PID: 5011 Comm: udevd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc6-syzkaller-00195-g40f71e7cd3c6 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:351 print_report mm/kasan/report.c:462 [inline] kasan_report+0x11c/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:572 read_descriptors+0x263/0x280 drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c:883 ... Allocated by task 758: ... __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:966 [inline] __kmalloc+0x5e/0x190 mm/slab_common.c:979 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:563 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:680 [inline] usb_get_configuration+0x1f7/0x5170 drivers/usb/core/config.c:887 usb_enumerate_device drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2407 [inline] usb_new_device+0x12b0/0x19d0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2545 As analyzed by Khazhy Kumykov, the cause of this bug is a race between read_descriptors() and hub_port_init(): The first routine uses a field in udev->descriptor, not expecting it to change, while the second overwrites it. Prior to commit 45bf39f8df7f ("USB: core: Don't hold device lock while reading the "descriptors" sysfs file") this race couldn't occur, because the routines were mutually exclusive thanks to the device locking. Removing that locking from read_descriptors() exposed it to the race. The best way to fix the bug is to keep hub_port_init() from changing udev->descriptor once udev has been initialized and registered. Drivers expect the descriptors stored in the kernel to be immutable; we should not undermine this expectation. In fact, this change should have been made long ago. So now hub_port_init() will take an additional argument, specifying a buffer in which to store the device descriptor it reads. (If udev has not yet been initialized, the buffer pointer will be NULL and then hub_port_init() will store the device descriptor in udev as before.) This eliminates the data race responsible for the out-of-bounds read. The changes to hub_port_init() appear more extensive than they really are, because of indentation changes resulting from an attempt to avoid writing to other parts of the usb_device structure after it has been initialized. Similar changes should be made to the code that reads the BOS descriptor, but that can be handled in a separate patch later on. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/218925bfd5d1436e337c4f961e9c149fbe32de6d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77358093331e9769855140bf94a3f00ecdcf4bb1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c87fb861ec185fdc578b4fdc6a05920b6a843840 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45bf39f8df7f05efb83b302c65ae3b9bc92b7065 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6badaf880edf51a2da7a439699676394dfdef3e5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f35b5d3bd6914c68f743741443dfd3a64b0e455 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1e89c8b29d003a20ed2dae6bdae1598d1f23e42 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1bcb238c54a9c6dc4bded06b06ba7458a •

CVSS: 4.4EPSS: 0%CPEs: 1EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: change vm->task_info handling This patch changes the handling and lifecycle of vm->task_info object. The major changes are: - vm->task_info is a dynamically allocated ptr now, and its uasge is reference counted. - introducing two new helper funcs for task_info lifecycle management - amdgpu_vm_get_task_info: reference counts up task_info before returning this info - amdgpu_vm_put_task_info: reference counts down task_info - last put to task_info() frees task_info from the vm. This patch also does logistical changes required for existing usage of vm->task_info. V2: Do not block all the prints when task_info not found (Felix) V3: Fixed review comments from Felix - Fix wrong indentation - No debug message for -ENOMEM - Add NULL check for task_info - Do not duplicate the debug messages (ti vs no ti) - Get first reference of task_info in vm_init(), put last in vm_fini() V4: Fixed review comments from Felix - fix double reference increment in create_task_info - change amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid - additional changes in amdgpu_gem.c while porting • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8f67b9ddf4f8fe6dd536590712b5912ad78f99c https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-41008 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2298079 • CWE-99: Improper Control of Resource Identifiers ('Resource Injection') •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: avoid too many retransmit packets If a TCP socket is using TCP_USER_TIMEOUT, and the other peer retracted its window to zero, tcp_retransmit_timer() can retransmit a packet every two jiffies (2 ms for HZ=1000), for about 4 minutes after TCP_USER_TIMEOUT has 'expired'. The fix is to make sure tcp_rtx_probe0_timed_out() takes icsk->icsk_user_timeout into account. Before blamed commit, the socket would not timeout after icsk->icsk_user_timeout, but would use standard exponential backoff for the retransmits. Also worth noting that before commit e89688e3e978 ("net: tcp: fix unexcepted socket die when snd_wnd is 0"), the issue would last 2 minutes instead of 4. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: tcp: evitar demasiados paquetes de retransmisión Si un socket TCP está usando TCP_USER_TIMEOUT y el otro par retrajo su ventana a cero, tcp_retransmit_timer() puede retransmitir un paquete cada dos santiamén (2 ms). para HZ=1000), durante aproximadamente 4 minutos después de que TCP_USER_TIMEOUT haya 'expirado'. La solución es asegurarse de que tcp_rtx_probe0_timed_out() tenga en cuenta icsk-&gt;icsk_user_timeout. Antes de el commit culpable, el socket no expiraba después de icsk-&gt;icsk_user_timeout, sino que usaba un retroceso exponencial estándar para las retransmisiones. También vale la pena señalar que antes de commit e89688e3e978 ("net: tcp: fix unexcepted socket die cuando snd_wnd es 0"), el problema duraría 2 minutos en lugar de 4. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b701a99e431db784714c32fc6b68123045714679 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bb7670f92bfbd05fc41a8f9a8f358b7ffed65f4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2346fca5bed130dc712f276ac63450201d52969 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d7e64d70a11d988553a08239c810a658e841982 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04317a2471c2f637b4c49cbd0e9c0d04a519f570 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e113cddefa27bbf5a79f72387b8fbd432a61a466 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dfcdd7f89e401d2c6616be90c76c2fac3fa98fde https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66cb64a1d2239cd0309f9b5038b054625 • CWE-99: Improper Control of Resource Identifiers ('Resource Injection') •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Fix UAF in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready() After the listener svc_sock is freed, and before invoking svc_tcp_accept() for the established child sock, there is a window that the newsock retaining a freed listener svc_sock in sk_user_data which cloning from parent. In the race window, if data is received on the newsock, we will observe use-after-free report in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready(). Reproduce by two tasks: 1. while :; do rpc.nfsd 0 ; rpc.nfsd; done 2. while :; do echo "" | ncat -4 127.0.0.1 2049 ; done KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x1cf/0x1f0 [sunrpc] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888139d96228 by task nc/102553 CPU: 7 PID: 102553 Comm: nc Not tainted 6.3.0+ #18 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x310 print_report+0x3e/0x70 kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 svc_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x1cf/0x1f0 [sunrpc] tcp_data_queue+0x9f4/0x20e0 tcp_rcv_established+0x666/0x1f60 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x51c/0x850 tcp_v4_rcv+0x23fc/0x2e80 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x62/0x300 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x267/0x350 ip_local_deliver+0x18b/0x2d0 ip_rcv+0x2fb/0x370 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x166/0x1b0 process_backlog+0x24c/0x5e0 __napi_poll+0xa2/0x500 net_rx_action+0x854/0xc90 __do_softirq+0x1bb/0x5de do_softirq+0xcb/0x100 </IRQ> <TASK> ... </TASK> Allocated by task 102371: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90 svc_setup_socket+0x52/0x4f0 [sunrpc] svc_addsock+0x20d/0x400 [sunrpc] __write_ports_addfd+0x209/0x390 [nfsd] write_ports+0x239/0x2c0 [nfsd] nfsctl_transaction_write+0xac/0x110 [nfsd] vfs_write+0x1c3/0xae0 ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Freed by task 102551: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190 __kmem_cache_free+0x133/0x270 svc_xprt_free+0x1e2/0x350 [sunrpc] svc_xprt_destroy_all+0x25a/0x440 [sunrpc] nfsd_put+0x125/0x240 [nfsd] nfsd_svc+0x2cb/0x3c0 [nfsd] write_threads+0x1ac/0x2a0 [nfsd] nfsctl_transaction_write+0xac/0x110 [nfsd] vfs_write+0x1c3/0xae0 ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Fix the UAF by simply doing nothing in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready() if state != TCP_LISTEN, that will avoid dereferencing svsk for all child socket. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: SUNRPC: corrige UAF en svc_tcp_listen_data_ready() Después de que se libera el oyente svc_sock, y antes de invocar svc_tcp_accept() para el calcetín secundario establecido, hay una ventana que indica que el newsock retiene un oyente liberado. svc_sock en sk_user_data que clona desde el padre. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa9251afc33c81606d70cfe91800a779096442ec https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7b8c2d06e437639694abe76978e915cfb73f428 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dfc896c4a75cb8cd7cb2dfd9b469cf1e3f004254 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42725e5c1b181b757ba11d804443922982334d9b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd5ec3ee52ce4b7e283cc11facfa420c297c8065 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbf4ace39b2e4f3833236afbb2336edbafd75eee https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef047411887ff0845afd642d6a687819308e1a4e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e1f989055622fd086c5dfb291fc72adf •