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CVSS: 7.0EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: fix slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_withdraw_cookie() We got the following issue in our fault injection stress test: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_withdraw_cookie+0x4d9/0x600 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888118efc000 by task kworker/u78:0/109 CPU: 13 PID: 109 Comm: kworker/u78:0 Not tainted 6.8.0-dirty #566 Call Trace: <TASK> kasan_report+0x93/0xc0 cachefiles_withdraw_cookie+0x4d9/0x600 fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x5c8/0x1230 fscache_cookie_worker+0x91/0x1c0 process_one_work+0x7fa/0x1800 [...] Allocated by task 117: kmalloc_trace+0x1b3/0x3c0 cachefiles_acquire_volume+0xf3/0x9c0 fscache_create_volume_work+0x97/0x150 process_one_work+0x7fa/0x1800 [...] Freed by task 120301: kfree+0xf1/0x2c0 cachefiles_withdraw_cache+0x3fa/0x920 cachefiles_put_unbind_pincount+0x1f6/0x250 cachefiles_daemon_release+0x13b/0x290 __fput+0x204/0xa00 task_work_run+0x139/0x230 do_exit+0x87a/0x29b0 [...] ================================================================== Following is the process that triggers the issue: p1 | p2 ------------------------------------------------------------ fscache_begin_lookup fscache_begin_volume_access fscache_cache_is_live(fscache_cache) cachefiles_daemon_release cachefiles_put_unbind_pincount cachefiles_daemon_unbind cachefiles_withdraw_cache fscache_withdraw_cache fscache_set_cache_state(cache, FSCACHE_CACHE_IS_WITHDRAWN); cachefiles_withdraw_objects(cache) fscache_wait_for_objects(fscache) atomic_read(&fscache_cache->object_count) == 0 fscache_perform_lookup cachefiles_lookup_cookie cachefiles_alloc_object refcount_set(&object->ref, 1); object->volume = volume fscache_count_object(vcookie->cache); atomic_inc(&fscache_cache->object_count) cachefiles_withdraw_volumes cachefiles_withdraw_volume fscache_withdraw_volume __cachefiles_free_volume kfree(cachefiles_volume) fscache_cookie_state_machine cachefiles_withdraw_cookie cache = object->volume->cache; // cachefiles_volume UAF !!! After setting FSCACHE_CACHE_IS_WITHDRAWN, wait for all the cookie lookups to complete first, and then wait for fscache_cache->object_count == 0 to avoid the cookie exiting after the volume has been freed and triggering the above issue. Therefore call fscache_withdraw_volume() before calling cachefiles_withdraw_objects(). This way, after setting FSCACHE_CACHE_IS_WITHDRAWN, only the following two cases will occur: 1) fscache_begin_lookup fails in fscache_begin_volume_access(). 2) fscache_withdraw_volume() will ensure that fscache_count_object() has been executed before calling fscache_wait_for_objects(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe2140e2f57fef8562e0f9b7cd447d2b08dc2f35 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8de253177112a47c9af157d23ae934779188b4e1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e67589a4a7b7e5660b524d1d5fe61242bcbcc11 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef81340401e8a371d6b17f69e76d861920972cfe https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d8f805789072ea7fd39504694b7bd17e5f751c4 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-41057 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2300431 • CWE-416: Use After Free •

CVSS: 5.2EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: cs_dsp: Use strnlen() on name fields in V1 wmfw files Use strnlen() instead of strlen() on the algorithm and coefficient name string arrays in V1 wmfw files. In V1 wmfw files the name is a NUL-terminated string in a fixed-size array. cs_dsp should protect against overrunning the array if the NUL terminator is missing. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6bc909e7673c30abcbdb329e7d0aa2e83c103d7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16d76857d6b5426f41b587d0bb925de3f25bfb21 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/392cff2f86a25a4286ff3151c7739143c61c1781 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53a9f8cdbf35a682e9894e1a606f4640e5359185 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/680e126ec0400f6daecf0510c5bb97a55779ff03 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-41056 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2300430 • CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: prevent derefencing NULL ptr in pfn_section_valid() Commit 5ec8e8ea8b77 ("mm/sparsemem: fix race in accessing memory_section->usage") changed pfn_section_valid() to add a READ_ONCE() call around "ms->usage" to fix a race with section_deactivate() where ms->usage can be cleared. The READ_ONCE() call, by itself, is not enough to prevent NULL pointer dereference. We need to check its value before dereferencing it. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90ad17575d26874287271127d43ef3c2af876cea https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b448de2459b6d62a53892487ab18b7d823ff0529 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68ed9e33324021e9d6b798e9db00ca3093d2012a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70064241f2229f7ba7b9599a98f68d9142e81a97 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ec8e8ea8b7783fab150cf86404fc38cb4db8800 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a01daace71b521563c38bbbf874e14c3e58adb7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0100aeb8a12d51950418e685f879cc80cb8e5982 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc17f2377818dca643a74499c3f533350 • CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: wait for ondemand_object_worker to finish when dropping object When queuing ondemand_object_worker() to re-open the object, cachefiles_object is not pinned. The cachefiles_object may be freed when the pending read request is completed intentionally and the related erofs is umounted. If ondemand_object_worker() runs after the object is freed, it will incur use-after-free problem as shown below. process A processs B process C process D cachefiles_ondemand_send_req() // send a read req X // wait for its completion // close ondemand fd cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release() // set object as CLOSE cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read() // set object as REOPENING queue_work(fscache_wq, &info->ondemand_work) // close /dev/cachefiles cachefiles_daemon_release cachefiles_flush_reqs complete(&req->done) // read req X is completed // umount the erofs fs cachefiles_put_object() // object will be freed cachefiles_ondemand_deinit_obj_info() kmem_cache_free(object) // both info and object are freed ondemand_object_worker() When dropping an object, it is no longer necessary to reopen the object, so use cancel_work_sync() to cancel or wait for ondemand_object_worker() to finish. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f17443d52d805c9a7fab5e67a4e8b973626fe1cd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f740fd943bb1fbf79b7eaba3c71eb7536f437f51 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a7e54c1959c0feb2de23397ec09c7692364313e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec9289369259d982e735a71437e32e6b4035290c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3179bae72b1b5e555ba839d6d9f40a350a4d78a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b26525b2183632f16a3a4108fe6a4bfa8afac6ed https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12e009d60852f7bce0afc373ca0b320f14150418 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: cyclic allocation of msg_id to avoid reuse Reusing the msg_id after a maliciously completed reopen request may cause a read request to remain unprocessed and result in a hung, as shown below: t1 | t2 | t3 ------------------------------------------------- cachefiles_ondemand_select_req cachefiles_ondemand_object_is_close(A) cachefiles_ondemand_set_object_reopening(A) queue_work(fscache_object_wq, &info->work) ondemand_object_worker cachefiles_ondemand_init_object(A) cachefiles_ondemand_send_req(OPEN) // get msg_id 6 wait_for_completion(&req_A->done) cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read // read msg_id 6 req_A cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd copy_to_user // Malicious completion msg_id 6 copen 6,-1 cachefiles_ondemand_copen complete(&req_A->done) // will not set the object to close // because ondemand_id && fd is valid. // ondemand_object_worker() is done // but the object is still reopening. // new open req_B cachefiles_ondemand_init_object(B) cachefiles_ondemand_send_req(OPEN) // reuse msg_id 6 process_open_req copen 6,A.size // The expected failed copen was executed successfully Expect copen to fail, and when it does, it closes fd, which sets the object to close, and then close triggers reopen again. However, due to msg_id reuse resulting in a successful copen, the anonymous fd is not closed until the daemon exits. Therefore read requests waiting for reopen to complete may trigger hung task. To avoid this issue, allocate the msg_id cyclically to avoid reusing the msg_id for a very short duration of time. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8383054506c77b814489c09877b5db83fd4abf2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35710c6c4a1c64478ec1b5e0e81d386c0844dec6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de045a82e1a4e04be62718d3c2981a55150765a0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d3bf4e9aa23f0d9e99ebe7a94f232ddba54ee17 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19f4f399091478c95947f6bd7ad61622300c30d9 •