CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2023-52705 – nilfs2: fix underflow in second superblock position calculations
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-52705
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: fix underflow in second superblock position calculations Macro NILFS_SB2_OFFSET_BYTES, which computes the position of the second superblock, underflows when the argument device size is less than 4096 bytes. Therefore, when using this macro, it is necessary to check in advance that the device size is not less than a lower limit, or at least that underflow does not occur. The current nilfs2 implementation lacks this check, causing out-of-bound block access when mounting devices smaller than 4096 bytes: I/O error, dev loop0, sector 36028797018963960 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 1 prio class 2 NILFS (loop0): unable to read secondary superblock (blocksize = 1024) In addition, when trying to resize the filesystem to a size below 4096 bytes, this underflow occurs in nilfs_resize_fs(), passing a huge number of segments to nilfs_sufile_resize(), corrupting parameters such as the number of segments in superblocks. This causes excessive loop iterations in nilfs_sufile_resize() during a subsequent resize ioctl, causing semaphore ns_segctor_sem to block for a long time and hang the writer thread: INFO: task segctord:5067 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Not tainted 6.2.0-rc8-syzkaller-00015-gf6feea56f66d #0 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:segctord state:D stack:23456 pid:5067 ppid:2 flags:0x00004000 Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5293 [inline] __schedule+0x1409/0x43f0 kernel/sched/core.c:6606 schedule+0xc3/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6682 rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0xfcf/0x14a0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1190 nilfs_transaction_lock+0x25c/0x4f0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:357 nilfs_segctor_thread_construct fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2486 [inline] nilfs_segctor_thread+0x52f/0x1140 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2570 kthread+0x270/0x300 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 </TASK> ... Call Trace: <TASK> folio_mark_accessed+0x51c/0xf00 mm/swap.c:515 __nilfs_get_page_block fs/nilfs2/page.c:42 [inline] nilfs_grab_buffer+0x3d3/0x540 fs/nilfs2/page.c:61 nilfs_mdt_submit_block+0xd7/0x8f0 fs/nilfs2/mdt.c:121 nilfs_mdt_read_block+0xeb/0x430 fs/nilfs2/mdt.c:176 nilfs_mdt_get_block+0x12d/0xbb0 fs/nilfs2/mdt.c:251 nilfs_sufile_get_segment_usage_block fs/nilfs2/sufile.c:92 [inline] nilfs_sufile_truncate_range fs/nilfs2/sufile.c:679 [inline] nilfs_sufile_resize+0x7a3/0x12b0 fs/nilfs2/sufile.c:777 nilfs_resize_fs+0x20c/0xed0 fs/nilfs2/super.c:422 nilfs_ioctl_resize fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:1033 [inline] nilfs_ioctl+0x137c/0x2440 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:1301 ... This fixes these issues by inserting appropriate minimum device size checks or anti-underflow checks, depending on where the macro is used. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: nilfs2: corrige el desbordamiento en los cálculos de la posición del segundo superbloque. La macro NILFS_SB2_OFFSET_BYTES, que calcula la posición del segundo superbloque, sufre un desbordamiento cuando el tamaño del dispositivo del argumento es inferior a 4096 bytes. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f7a1135b202977b82457adde7db6c390056863b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b96591e2c35c8b47db0ec816b5fc6cb8868000ff https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52844d8382cd9166d708032def8905ffc3ae550f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ee5ed0126a2211f7174492da2ca2c29f43755c5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a158782b56b070485d54d25fc9aaf2c8f3752205 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8ef5109f93cea9933bbac0455d8c18757b3fcb4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99b9402a36f0799f25feee4465bfa4b8dfa74b4d •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0CVE-2023-52704 – freezer,umh: Fix call_usermode_helper_exec() vs SIGKILL
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-52704
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: freezer,umh: Fix call_usermode_helper_exec() vs SIGKILL Tetsuo-San noted that commit f5d39b020809 ("freezer,sched: Rewrite core freezer logic") broke call_usermodehelper_exec() for the KILLABLE case. Specifically it was missed that the second, unconditional, wait_for_completion() was not optional and ensures the on-stack completion is unused before going out-of-scope. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: freezer,umh: Fix call_usermode_helper_exec() vs SIGKILL .Tetsuo-San notó que la confirmación f5d39b020809 ("freezer,sched: Rewrite core freezer logic") rompió call_usermodehelper_exec() para el caso KILLABLE. Específicamente, se pasó por alto que el segundo wait_for_completion() incondicional no era opcional y garantiza que la finalización en la pila no se utilice antes de salir del alcance. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5d39b020809146cc28e6e73369bf8065e0310aa https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f9f6c54da876b3f0bece2b569456ceb96965ed7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eedeb787ebb53de5c5dcf7b7b39d01bf1b0f037d •
CVSS: 3.3EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2023-52703 – net/usb: kalmia: Don't pass act_len in usb_bulk_msg error path
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-52703
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/usb: kalmia: Don't pass act_len in usb_bulk_msg error path syzbot reported that act_len in kalmia_send_init_packet() is uninitialized when passing it to the first usb_bulk_msg error path. Jiri Pirko noted that it's pointless to pass it in the error path, and that the value that would be printed in the second error path would be the value of act_len from the first call to usb_bulk_msg.[1] With this in mind, let's just not pass act_len to the usb_bulk_msg error paths. 1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y9pY61y1nwTuzMOa@nanopsycho/ En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: net/usb: kalmia: No pasar act_len en la ruta de error usb_bulk_msg syzbot informó que act_len en kalmia_send_init_packet() no está inicializado al pasarlo a la primera ruta de error usb_bulk_msg. Jiri Pirko señaló que no tiene sentido pasarlo en la ruta de error y que el valor que se imprimiría en la segunda ruta de error sería el valor de act_len de la primera llamada a usb_bulk_msg.[1] Con esto en mente, simplemente no pasemos act_len a las rutas de error usb_bulk_msg. 1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y9pY61y1nwTuzMOa@nanopsycho/ • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d40261236e8e278cb1936cb5e934262971692b10 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b5de7d44890b78519acbcc80d8d1f23ff2872e5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/723ef7b66f37c0841f5a451ccbce47ee1641e081 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a753352622b4f3c0219e0e9c73114b2848ae6042 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/525bdcb0838d19d918c7786151ee14661967a030 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/338f826d3afead6e4df521f7972a4bef04a72efb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02df3170c04a8356cd571ab9155a42f030190abc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c68f345b7c425b38656e1791a0486769a • CWE-15: External Control of System or Configuration Setting •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0CVE-2023-52702 – net: openvswitch: fix possible memory leak in ovs_meter_cmd_set()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-52702
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: fix possible memory leak in ovs_meter_cmd_set() old_meter needs to be free after it is detached regardless of whether the new meter is successfully attached. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: net: openvswitch: corrige una posible pérdida de memoria en ovs_meter_cmd_set() old_meter debe estar libre después de desconectarlo, independientemente de si el nuevo medidor se conectó correctamente. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7c4c44c9a95d87e50ced38f7480e779cb472174 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c0f65ee0a3329eb4b94beaef0268633696e2d0c6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1563e998a938f095548054ef09e277b562b79536 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e336a9e08618203a456fb5367f1387b14554f55e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2fa28f5c6fcbfc794340684f36d2581b4f2d20b5 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0CVE-2023-52701 – net: use a bounce buffer for copying skb->mark
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-52701
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: use a bounce buffer for copying skb->mark syzbot found arm64 builds would crash in sock_recv_mark() when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y x86 and powerpc are not detecting the issue because they define user_access_begin. This will be handled in a different patch, because a check_object_size() is missing. Only data from skb->cb[] can be copied directly to/from user space, as explained in commit 79a8a642bf05 ("net: Whitelist the skbuff_head_cache "cb" field") syzbot report was: usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'skbuff_head_cache' (offset 168, size 4)! ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102 ! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4410 Comm: syz-executor533 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc7-syzkaller-17907-g2d3827b3f393 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/21/2023 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:90 lr : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:90 sp : ffff80000fb9b9a0 x29: ffff80000fb9b9b0 x28: ffff0000c6073400 x27: 0000000020001a00 x26: 0000000000000014 x25: ffff80000cf52000 x24: fffffc0000000000 x23: 05ffc00000000200 x22: fffffc000324bf80 x21: ffff0000c92fe1a8 x20: 0000000000000001 x19: 0000000000000004 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 656a626f2042554c x16: ffff0000c6073dd0 x15: ffff80000dbd2118 x14: ffff0000c6073400 x13: 00000000ffffffff x12: ffff0000c6073400 x11: ff808000081bbb4c x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 7b0572d7cc0ccf00 x8 : 7b0572d7cc0ccf00 x7 : ffff80000bf650d4 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff0001fefbff08 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 000000000000006c Call trace: usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:90 __check_heap_object+0xa8/0x100 mm/slub.c:4761 check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:196 [inline] __check_object_size+0x208/0x6b8 mm/usercopy.c:251 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:199 [inline] __copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:115 [inline] put_cmsg+0x408/0x464 net/core/scm.c:238 sock_recv_mark net/socket.c:975 [inline] __sock_recv_cmsgs+0x1fc/0x248 net/socket.c:984 sock_recv_cmsgs include/net/sock.h:2728 [inline] packet_recvmsg+0x2d8/0x678 net/packet/af_packet.c:3482 ____sys_recvmsg+0x110/0x3a0 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2737 [inline] __sys_recvmsg+0x194/0x210 net/socket.c:2767 __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2777 [inline] __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2774 [inline] __arm64_sys_recvmsg+0x2c/0x3c net/socket.c:2774 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x64/0x178 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common+0xbc/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x110 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:193 el0_svc+0x58/0x14c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:637 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:655 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591 Code: 91388800 aa0903e1 f90003e8 94e6d752 (d4210000) En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: net: use un búfer de rebote para copiar skb->mark syzbot encontró que las compilaciones arm64 fallarían en sock_recv_mark() cuando CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y x86 y powerpc no detectan el problema porque definen user_access_begin . Esto se manejará en un parche diferente, porque falta check_object_size(). Solo los datos de skb->cb[] se pueden copiar directamente hacia/desde el espacio de usuario, como se explica en la confirmación 79a8a642bf05 ("net: Lista blanca del campo skbuff_head_cache "cb") El informe de syzbot fue: copia de usuario: intento de exposición de la memoria del kernel detectado desde SLUB objeto 'skbuff_head_cache' (desplazamiento 168, tamaño 4)! • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fd1d51cfa253b5ee7dae18d7cf1df830e9b6137 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/863a7de987f02a901bf215509276a7de0370e0f9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2558b8039d059342197610498c8749ad294adee5 •