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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mctp i2c: handle NULL header address daddr can be NULL if there is no neighbour table entry present, in that case the tx packet should be dropped. saddr will usually be set by MCTP core, but check for NULL in case a packet is transmitted by a different protocol. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5b8abf9fc3dacd7529d363e26fe8230935d65f8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4707893315802a0917231b94cb20cbe50ccbfe03 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e886e44397ba89f6e8da8471386112b4f5b67b7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c222adadc1612e4f097688875962a28e3f5ab44 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01e215975fd80af81b5b79f009d49ddd35976c13 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: ip_tunnel: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in ip_tunnel_init_flow() There are code paths from which the function is called without holding the RCU read lock, resulting in a suspicious RCU usage warning [1]. Fix by using l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index() which will acquire the RCU read lock before calling l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index_rcu(). [1] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.12.0-rc3-custom-gac8f72681cf2 #141 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/core/dev.c:876 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by ip/361: #0: ffffffff86fc7cb0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x377/0xf60 stack backtrace: CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 361 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-custom-gac8f72681cf2 #141 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xba/0x110 lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4f/0xd6 dev_get_by_index_rcu+0x1d3/0x210 l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index_rcu+0x2b/0xf0 ip_tunnel_bind_dev+0x72f/0xa00 ip_tunnel_newlink+0x368/0x7a0 ipgre_newlink+0x14c/0x170 __rtnl_newlink+0x1173/0x19c0 rtnl_newlink+0x6c/0xa0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xf60 netlink_rcv_skb+0x171/0x450 netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7f0 netlink_sendmsg+0x8c1/0xd80 ____sys_sendmsg+0x8f9/0xc20 ___sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x1e0 __sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x1f0 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab6c9463b137163ba53fc050bf2c72bed2c997b8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/760852df570747e500a9632d34cbbf4faef30855 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db53cd3d88dc328dea2e968c9c8d3b4294a8a674 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2742758c9c85c84e077ede5f916479f724e11c2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5edcb3fdb12c3d46a6e79eeeec27d925b80fc168 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72c0f482e39c87317ebf67661e28c8d86c93e870 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/699b48fc31727792edf2cab3829586ae6ba649e2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6dfaa458fe923211c766238a224e0a3c0 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: ip_tunnel: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in ip_tunnel_find() The per-netns IP tunnel hash table is protected by the RTNL mutex and ip_tunnel_find() is only called from the control path where the mutex is taken. Add a lockdep expression to hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() in ip_tunnel_find() in order to validate that the mutex is held and to silence the suspicious RCU usage warning [1]. [1] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.12.0-rc3-custom-gd95d9a31aceb #139 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:221 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by ip/362: #0: ffffffff86fc7cb0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x377/0xf60 stack backtrace: CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 362 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-custom-gd95d9a31aceb #139 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xba/0x110 lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4f/0xd6 ip_tunnel_find+0x435/0x4d0 ip_tunnel_newlink+0x517/0x7a0 ipgre_newlink+0x14c/0x170 __rtnl_newlink+0x1173/0x19c0 rtnl_newlink+0x6c/0xa0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xf60 netlink_rcv_skb+0x171/0x450 netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7f0 netlink_sendmsg+0x8c1/0xd80 ____sys_sendmsg+0x8f9/0xc20 ___sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x1e0 __sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x1f0 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c54419321455631079c7d6e60bc732dd0c5914c5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27c1c98bd3b44b7c5f5c0ecfe1a1ec1240b73829 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f20fe2cfe06ca1b008b09da4f2b4e0c5547ccef6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90e0569dd3d32f4f4d2ca691d3fa5a8a14a13c12 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: resource,kexec: walk_system_ram_res_rev must retain resource flags walk_system_ram_res_rev() erroneously discards resource flags when passing the information to the callback. This causes systems with IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED memory to have these resources selected during kexec to store kexec buffers if that memory happens to be at placed above normal system ram. This leads to undefined behavior after reboot. If the kexec buffer is never touched, nothing happens. If the kexec buffer is touched, it could lead to a crash (like below) or undefined behavior. Tested on a system with CXL memory expanders with driver managed memory, TPM enabled, and CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC=y. Adding printk's showed the flags were being discarded and as a result the check for IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED passes. find_next_iomem_res: name(System RAM (kmem)) start(10000000000) end(1034fffffff) flags(83000200) locate_mem_hole_top_down: start(10000000000) end(1034fffffff) flags(0) [.] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff89834ffff000 [.] • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7acf164b259d9007264d9d8501da1023f140a3b4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc9031b7919bd346514ea9a720f433b8daf3970d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b125a0def25a082ae944c9615208bf359abdb61c •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 10EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: core: zero-initialize the report buffer Since the report buffer is used by all kinds of drivers in various ways, let's zero-initialize it during allocation to make sure that it can't be ever used to leak kernel memory via specially-crafted report. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27ce405039bfe6d3f4143415c638f56a3df77dca https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2b6cadad699d44a8a5b2a60f3d960e00d6fb3b7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe6c9b48ebc920ff21c10c50ab2729440c734254 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7ea60184e1e88a3c9e437b3265cbb6439aa7e26 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f9e88f2672c4635960570ee9741778d4135ecf5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7dc68d82ab3fcfc3f65322465da3d7031d4ab46 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/05ade5d4337867929e7ef664e7ac8e0c734f1aaf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1884ab3d22536a5c14b17c78c2ce76d17 •