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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/oa: Fix overflow in oa batch buffer By default xe_bb_create_job() appends a MI_BATCH_BUFFER_END to batch buffer, this is not a problem if batch buffer is only used once but oa reuses the batch buffer for the same metric and at each call it appends a MI_BATCH_BUFFER_END, printing the warning below and then overflowing. [ 381.072016] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 381.072019] xe 0000:00:02.0: [drm] Assertion `bb->len * 4 + bb_prefetch(q->gt) <= size` failed! platform: LUNARLAKE subplatform: 1 graphics: Xe2_LPG / Xe2_HPG 20.04 step B0 media: Xe2_LPM / Xe2_HPM 20.00 step B0 tile: 0 VRAM 0 B GT: 0 type 1 So here checking if batch buffer already have MI_BATCH_BUFFER_END if not append it. v2: - simply fix, suggestion from Ashutosh (cherry picked from commit 9ba0e0f30ca42a98af3689460063edfb6315718a) En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: drm/xe/oa: Corregir desbordamiento en el búfer por lotes de oa. De manera predeterminada, xe_bb_create_job() agrega un MI_BATCH_BUFFER_END al buffer por lotes, esto no es un problema si el buffer por lotes solo se usa una vez, pero oa reutiliza el búfer por lotes para la misma métrica y en cada llamada agrega un MI_BATCH_BUFFER_END, imprimiendo la advertencia a continuación y luego desbordándose. [ 381.072016] ------------[ cortar aquí ]------------ [ 381.072019] xe 0000:00:02.0: [drm] ¡La afirmación `bb-&gt;len * 4 + bb_prefetch(q-&gt;gt) &lt;= size` falló! Plataforma: LUNARLAKE Subplataforma: 1 Gráficos: Xe2_LPG / Xe2_HPG 20.04 Paso B0 Medios: Xe2_LPM / Xe2_HPM 20.00 Paso B0 Mosaico: 0 VRAM 0 B GT: 0 Tipo 1 Aquí se verifica si el buffer de lote ya tiene MI_BATCH_BUFFER_END si no, se agrega. v2: - simplemente se arregla, sugerencia de Ashutosh (seleccionada del commit 9ba0e0f30ca42a98af3689460063edfb6315718a) • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bcb5be3421705e682b0b32073ad627056d6bc2a2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c10ba06bb1b48acce6d4d9c1e33beb9954f1788 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: unicode: Don't special case ignorable code points We don't need to handle them separately. Instead, just let them decompose/casefold to themselves. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: unicode: No aplicar mayúsculas y minúsculas especiales a los puntos de código que se puedan ignorar. No necesitamos manejarlos por separado. En su lugar, simplemente dejamos que se descompongan o se conviertan en mayúsculas y minúsculas por sí mismos. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/18b5f47e7da46d3a0d7331e48befcaf151ed2ddf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39fffca572844d733b137a0ff9eacd67b9b0c8e3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/651b954cd8d5b0a358ceb47c93876bb6201224e4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21526498d25e54bda3c650f756493d63fd9131b7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac20736861f3c9c8e0a78273a4c57e9bcb0d8cc6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/876d3577a5b353e482d9228d45fa0d82bf1af53a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c26d2f1d3f5e4be3e196526bead29ecb139cf91 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 1EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking Use instruction (jump) history to record instructions that performed register spill/fill to/from stack, regardless if this was done through read-only r10 register, or any other register after copying r10 into it *and* potentially adjusting offset. To make this work reliably, we push extra per-instruction flags into instruction history, encoding stack slot index (spi) and stack frame number in extra 10 bit flags we take away from prev_idx in instruction history. We don't touch idx field for maximum performance, as it's checked most frequently during backtracking. This change removes basically the last remaining practical limitation of precision backtracking logic in BPF verifier. It fixes known deficiencies, but also opens up new opportunities to reduce number of verified states, explored in the subsequent patches. There are only three differences in selftests' BPF object files according to veristat, all in the positive direction (less states). File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) States (A) States (B) States (DIFF) -------------------------------------- ------------- --------- --------- ------------- ---------- ---------- ------------- test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.linked3.o cls_redirect 2987 2864 -123 (-4.12%) 240 231 -9 (-3.75%) xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_tc 82848 82661 -187 (-0.23%) 5107 5073 -34 (-0.67%) xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_xdp 85116 84964 -152 (-0.18%) 5162 5130 -32 (-0.62%) Note, I avoided renaming jmp_history to more generic insn_hist to minimize number of lines changed and potential merge conflicts between bpf and bpf-next trees. Notice also cur_hist_entry pointer reset to NULL at the beginning of instruction verification loop. This pointer avoids the problem of relying on last jump history entry's insn_idx to determine whether we already have entry for current instruction or not. It can happen that we added jump history entry because current instruction is_jmp_point(), but also we need to add instruction flags for stack access. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41f6f64e6999a837048b1bd13a2f8742964eca6b •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix user-after-free from session log off There is racy issue between smb2 session log off and smb2 session setup. It will cause user-after-free from session log off. This add session_lock when setting SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED and referece count to session struct not to free session while it is being used. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f62358ce85b2d4c949ef1b648be01b29cec667a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a9839c37fd813b432988f58a9d9dd59253d3eb2c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5511999e9615e4318e9142d23b29bd1597befc08 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee371898b53a9b9b51c02d22a8c31bfb86d45f0d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7aa8804c0b67b3cb263a472d17f2cb50d7f1a930 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-rq-qos: fix crash on rq_qos_wait vs. rq_qos_wake_function race We're seeing crashes from rq_qos_wake_function that look like this: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffafe180a40084 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 10027c067 PMD 10115d067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-00013-geca631b8fe80 #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1d/0x40 Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 9c 41 5c fa 65 ff 05 62 97 30 4c 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 0f b1 17 75 0a 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 cc cc cc cc 89 c6 e8 2c 0b 00 RSP: 0018:ffffafe180580ca0 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffafe180a3f7a8 RCX: 0000000000000011 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffffafe180a40084 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000001e7240 R09: 0000000000000011 R10: 0000000000000028 R11: 0000000000000888 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: ffffafe180a40084 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9aaf1f280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffafe180a40084 CR3: 000000010e428002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> try_to_wake_up+0x5a/0x6a0 rq_qos_wake_function+0x71/0x80 __wake_up_common+0x75/0xa0 __wake_up+0x36/0x60 scale_up.part.0+0x50/0x110 wb_timer_fn+0x227/0x450 ... So rq_qos_wake_function() calls wake_up_process(data->task), which calls try_to_wake_up(), which faults in raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&p->pi_lock). p comes from data->task, and data comes from the waitqueue entry, which is stored on the waiter's stack in rq_qos_wait(). Analyzing the core dump with drgn, I found that the waiter had already woken up and moved on to a completely unrelated code path, clobbering what was previously data->task. Meanwhile, the waker was passing the clobbered garbage in data->task to wake_up_process(), leading to the crash. What's happening is that in between rq_qos_wake_function() deleting the waitqueue entry and calling wake_up_process(), rq_qos_wait() is finding that it already got a token and returning. The race looks like this: rq_qos_wait() rq_qos_wake_function() ============================================================== prepare_to_wait_exclusive() data->got_token = true; list_del_init(&curr->entry); if (data.got_token) break; finish_wait(&rqw->wait, &data.wq); ^- returns immediately because list_empty_careful(&wq_entry->entry) is true ... return, go do something else ... wake_up_process(data->task) (NO LONGER VALID!)-^ Normally, finish_wait() is supposed to synchronize against the waker. But, as noted above, it is returning immediately because the waitqueue entry has already been removed from the waitqueue. The bug is that rq_qos_wake_function() is accessing the waitqueue entry AFTER deleting it. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38cfb5a45ee013bfab5d1ae4c4738815e744b440 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d04b72c9ef2b0689bfc1057d21c4aeed087c329f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bc6d0f8b70a9101456cf02ab99acb75254e1852 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/455a469758e57a6fe070e3e342db12e4a629e0eb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5e900a3612b69423a0e1b0ab67841a1fb4af80f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c5b123ab289767afe940389dbb963c5c05e594e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04f283fc16c8d5db641b6bffd2d8310aa7eccebc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e972b08b91ef48488bae9789f03cfedb1 •