CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0CVE-2024-41043 – netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: drop bogus WARN_ON
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-41043
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: drop bogus WARN_ON Happens when rules get flushed/deleted while packet is out, so remove this WARN_ON. This WARN exists in one form or another since v4.14, no need to backport this to older releases, hence use a more recent fixes tag. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f801968889459ecae1eab524b039676e6eaa319 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86858da8335db48bde9be02abd7156a69d622e86 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/631a4b3ddc7831b20442c59c28b0476d0704c9af •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-41042 – netfilter: nf_tables: prefer nft_chain_validate
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-41042
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: prefer nft_chain_validate nft_chain_validate already performs loop detection because a cycle will result in a call stack overflow (ctx->level >= NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE). It also follows maps via ->validate callback in nft_lookup, so there appears no reason to iterate the maps again. nf_tables_check_loops() and all its helper functions can be removed. This improves ruleset load time significantly, from 23s down to 12s. This also fixes a crash bug. Old loop detection code can result in unbounded recursion: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at .... Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 4 PID: 1539 Comm: nft Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5+ #1 [..] with a suitable ruleset during validation of register stores. I can't see any actual reason to attempt to check for this from nft_validate_register_store(), at this point the transaction is still in progress, so we don't have a full picture of the rule graph. For nf-next it might make sense to either remove it or make this depend on table->validate_state in case we could catch an error earlier (for improved error reporting to userspace). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20a69341f2d00cd042e81c82289fba8a13c05a25 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1947e4c3346faa8ac7e343652c0fd3b3e394202f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd4348e0a50286282c314ad6d2b0740e7c812c24 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31c35f9f89ef585f1edb53e17ac73a0ca4a9712b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8246b7466c8da49d0d9e85e26cbd69dd6d3e3d1e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6b6e430470e1c3c5513311cb35a15a205595abe https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/717c91c6ed73e248de6a15bc53adefb81446c9d0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9df785aeb7dcc8efd1d4110bb27d26005 •
CVSS: 4.7EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2024-41041 – udp: Set SOCK_RCU_FREE earlier in udp_lib_get_port().
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-41041
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udp: Set SOCK_RCU_FREE earlier in udp_lib_get_port(). syzkaller triggered the warning [0] in udp_v4_early_demux(). In udp_v[46]_early_demux() and sk_lookup(), we do not touch the refcount of the looked-up sk and use sock_pfree() as skb->destructor, so we check SOCK_RCU_FREE to ensure that the sk is safe to access during the RCU grace period. Currently, SOCK_RCU_FREE is flagged for a bound socket after being put into the hash table. Moreover, the SOCK_RCU_FREE check is done too early in udp_v[46]_early_demux() and sk_lookup(), so there could be a small race window: CPU1 CPU2 ---- ---- udp_v4_early_demux() udp_lib_get_port() | |- hlist_add_head_rcu() |- sk = __udp4_lib_demux_lookup() | |- DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(sk_is_refcounted(sk)); `- sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE) We had the same bug in TCP and fixed it in commit 871019b22d1b ("net: set SOCK_RCU_FREE before inserting socket into hashtable"). Let's apply the same fix for UDP. [0]: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11198 at net/ipv4/udp.c:2599 udp_v4_early_demux+0x481/0xb70 net/ipv4/udp.c:2599 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 11198 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.9.0-g93bda33046e7 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:udp_v4_early_demux+0x481/0xb70 net/ipv4/udp.c:2599 Code: c5 7a 15 fe bb 01 00 00 00 44 89 e9 31 ff d3 e3 81 e3 bf ef ff ff 89 de e8 2c 74 15 fe 85 db 0f 85 02 06 00 00 e8 9f 7a 15 fe <0f> 0b e8 98 7a 15 fe 49 8d 7e 60 e8 4f 39 2f fe 49 c7 46 60 20 52 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000ce3fa58 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8318c92c RDX: ffff888036ccde00 RSI: ffffffff8318c2f1 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff88805a2dd6e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0001ffffffffffff R12: ffff88805a2dd680 R13: 0000000000000007 R14: ffff88800923f900 R15: ffff88805456004e FS: 00007fc449127640(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fc449126e38 CR3: 000000003de4b002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ip_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0+0xbdd/0xd20 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:349 ip_rcv_finish+0xda/0x150 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:447 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline] ip_rcv+0x16c/0x180 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb3/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:5624 __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0xd0 net/core/dev.c:5738 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5824 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x271/0x300 net/core/dev.c:5884 tun_rx_batched drivers/net/tun.c:1549 [inline] tun_get_user+0x24db/0x2c50 drivers/net/tun.c:2002 tun_chr_write_iter+0x107/0x1a0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0x76f/0x8d0 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0xbf/0x190 fs/read_write.c:643 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x41/0x50 fs/read_write.c:652 x64_sys_call+0xe66/0x1990 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7fc44a68bc1f Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 e9 cf f5 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 3c d0 f5 ff 48 RSP: 002b:00007fc449126c90 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bc050 RCX: 00007fc44a68bc1f R ---truncated--- • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6acc9b432e6714d72d7d77ec7c27f6f8358d0c71 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a67c4e47626e6daccda62888f8b096abb5d3940 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f965684c57c3117cfd2f754dd3270383c529fba https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ddf516e50bf8a7bc9b3bd8a9831f9c7a8131a32a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6db0d3ea6536e7120871e5448b3032570152ec6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c5fd77ca13d657c6e99bf04f0917445e6a80231e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20ceae10623c3b29fdf7609690849475bcdebdb0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c0b485a8c6116516f33925b9ce5b6104 • CWE-911: Improper Update of Reference Count •
CVSS: 5.2EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2024-41040 – net/sched: Fix UAF when resolving a clash
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-41040
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: Fix UAF when resolving a clash KASAN reports the following UAF: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tcf_ct_flow_table_process_conn+0x12b/0x380 [act_ct] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888c07603600 by task handler130/6469 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x70 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x33/0x3d0 print_report+0xc0/0x2b0 kasan_report+0xd0/0x120 __asan_load1+0x6c/0x80 tcf_ct_flow_table_process_conn+0x12b/0x380 [act_ct] tcf_ct_act+0x886/0x1350 [act_ct] tcf_action_exec+0xf8/0x1f0 fl_classify+0x355/0x360 [cls_flower] __tcf_classify+0x1fd/0x330 tcf_classify+0x21c/0x3c0 sch_handle_ingress.constprop.0+0x2c5/0x500 __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0xb25/0x1510 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x220/0x4c0 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x446/0x620 napi_complete_done+0x157/0x3d0 gro_cell_poll+0xcf/0x100 __napi_poll+0x65/0x310 net_rx_action+0x30c/0x5c0 __do_softirq+0x14f/0x491 __irq_exit_rcu+0x82/0xc0 irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20 common_interrupt+0xa1/0xb0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40 Allocated by task 6469: kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_krealloc+0x133/0x190 krealloc+0xaa/0x130 nf_ct_ext_add+0xed/0x230 [nf_conntrack] tcf_ct_act+0x1095/0x1350 [act_ct] tcf_action_exec+0xf8/0x1f0 fl_classify+0x355/0x360 [cls_flower] __tcf_classify+0x1fd/0x330 tcf_classify+0x21c/0x3c0 sch_handle_ingress.constprop.0+0x2c5/0x500 __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0xb25/0x1510 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x220/0x4c0 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x446/0x620 napi_complete_done+0x157/0x3d0 gro_cell_poll+0xcf/0x100 __napi_poll+0x65/0x310 net_rx_action+0x30c/0x5c0 __do_softirq+0x14f/0x491 Freed by task 6469: kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x60 ____kasan_slab_free+0x180/0x1f0 __kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x30 slab_free_freelist_hook+0xd2/0x1a0 __kmem_cache_free+0x1a2/0x2f0 kfree+0x78/0x120 nf_conntrack_free+0x74/0x130 [nf_conntrack] nf_ct_destroy+0xb2/0x140 [nf_conntrack] __nf_ct_resolve_clash+0x529/0x5d0 [nf_conntrack] nf_ct_resolve_clash+0xf6/0x490 [nf_conntrack] __nf_conntrack_confirm+0x2c6/0x770 [nf_conntrack] tcf_ct_act+0x12ad/0x1350 [act_ct] tcf_action_exec+0xf8/0x1f0 fl_classify+0x355/0x360 [cls_flower] __tcf_classify+0x1fd/0x330 tcf_classify+0x21c/0x3c0 sch_handle_ingress.constprop.0+0x2c5/0x500 __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0xb25/0x1510 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x220/0x4c0 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x446/0x620 napi_complete_done+0x157/0x3d0 gro_cell_poll+0xcf/0x100 __napi_poll+0x65/0x310 net_rx_action+0x30c/0x5c0 __do_softirq+0x14f/0x491 The ct may be dropped if a clash has been resolved but is still passed to the tcf_ct_flow_table_process_conn function for further usage. This issue can be fixed by retrieving ct from skb again after confirming conntrack. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f07c548314776231f0d47d73ec6caa5b17e876e8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0cc254e5aa37cf05f65bcdcdc0ac5c58010feb33 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30822781c89943b6a3ed122324ceb37cea7042a3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b81a523d54ea689414f67c9fb81a5b917a41ed55 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b4d68df3f57ea746c430941ba9c03d7d8b5a23f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e71b10a100861fb27d9c5755dfd68f615629fae https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/799a34901b634008db4a7ece3900e2b971d4c932 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef472cc6693b16b202a916482df72f35d • CWE-416: Use After Free •
CVSS: 5.2EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0CVE-2024-41039 – firmware: cs_dsp: Fix overflow checking of wmfw header
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-41039
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: cs_dsp: Fix overflow checking of wmfw header Fix the checking that firmware file buffer is large enough for the wmfw header, to prevent overrunning the buffer. The original code tested that the firmware data buffer contained enough bytes for the sums of the size of the structs wmfw_header + wmfw_adsp1_sizes + wmfw_footer But wmfw_adsp1_sizes is only used on ADSP1 firmware. For ADSP2 and Halo Core the equivalent struct is wmfw_adsp2_sizes, which is 4 bytes longer. So the length check didn't guarantee that there are enough bytes in the firmware buffer for a header with wmfw_adsp2_sizes. This patch splits the length check into three separate parts. Each of the wmfw_header, wmfw_adsp?_sizes and wmfw_footer are checked separately before they are used. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6bc909e7673c30abcbdb329e7d0aa2e83c103d7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd035f0810b33c2a8792effdb82bf35920221565 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c9877a96e033bf6c6470b3b4f06106d91ace11e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49a79f344d0a17c6a5eef53716cc76fcdbfca9ba https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3019b86bce16fbb5bc1964f3544d0ce7d0137278 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-41039 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2300408 • CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow •