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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mac80211: limit injected vht mcs/nss in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap Limit max values for vht mcs and nss in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap routine in order to fix the following warning reported by syzbot: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000186f3e8 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: 0000000000000618 RBX: ffff88804ef76500 RCX: ffffc900143a5000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff888f478e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000100 R10: ffffffff888f46f9 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff8 R13: ffff88804ef7653c R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007fbf5718f700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b2de23000 CR3: 000000006a671000 CR4: 00000000001506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 Call Trace: ieee80211_monitor_select_queue+0xa6/0x250 net/mac80211/iface.c:740 netdev_core_pick_tx+0x169/0x2e0 net/core/dev.c:4089 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6f9/0x3710 net/core/dev.c:4165 __bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2114 [inline] __bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2139 [inline] __bpf_redirect+0x5ba/0xd20 net/core/filter.c:2162 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2429 [inline] bpf_clone_redirect+0x2ae/0x420 net/core/filter.c:2401 bpf_prog_eeb6f53a69e5c6a2+0x59/0x234 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:717 [inline] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:624 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:631 [inline] bpf_test_run+0x381/0xa30 net/bpf/test_run.c:119 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xb84/0x1ee0 net/bpf/test_run.c:663 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3307 [inline] __sys_bpf+0x2137/0x5df0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4605 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4691 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x4665f9 En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: mac80211: límite inyectado de vht mcs/nss en ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap. Limite los valores máximos para vht mcs y nss en la rutina ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap para corregir la siguiente advertencia reportada por syzbot: ADVERTENCIA: CPU: 0 PID : 10717 en include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [en línea] ADVERTENCIA: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 en include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12 d0 neto/ mac80211/tx.c:2244 Módulos vinculados en: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0 Nombre del hardware: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01 /2011 RIP: 0010:ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [en línea] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244 RSP: 86f3e8 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: 0000000000000618 RBX: ffff88804ef76500 RCX: ffffc900143a5000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff888f478e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 000 R09: 0000000000000100 R10: ffffffff888f46f9 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000ffffff8 R13: ffff88804ef7653c R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007fbf5718f700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000( 0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b2de23000 CR3: 000000006a671000 CR4: 000000000015 06f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 ieee80211_monitor_select_queue+0xa6 /0x250 net/mac80211/iface.c:740 netdev_core_pick_tx+0x169/0x2e0 net/core/dev.c:4089 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6f9/0x3710 net/core/dev.c:4165 __bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2114 [ en línea] __bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2139 [en línea] __bpf_redirect+0x5ba/0xd20 net/core/filter.c:2162 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2429 [en línea] bpf_clone_redirect+0x2ae/0x420 net/core /filter.c:2401 bpf_prog_eeb6f53a69e5c6a2+0x59/0x234 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:717 [en línea] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:624 [en línea] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:631 [ en línea] bpf_test_run+0x381/0xa30 net/bpf/test_run.c:119 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xb84/0x1ee0 net/bpf/test_run.c:663 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3307 [en línea] 5df0 núcleo/bpf/ syscall.c:4605 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4691 [en línea] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 [en línea] __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 4 arco/x86/ entrada/common.c:50 [en línea] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entrada_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x4665f9 • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/646e76bb5daf4ca38438c69ffb72cccb605f3466 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5bb852aa2ad963074f0ad73030dbc20a30853e3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce5f372f5f084ff51c285fc27b232f15a3d00f0b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76538c7b4df314bb937e44c5cb1782f37d47443c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab85997465b972d39d9747fc16311fa5773374b2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1282bb00835ff79d2d9c023055d514df5b4de260 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/997ee230e4f5285cd98445c102d9033c7ec4814b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13cb6d826e0ac0d144b0d48191ff1a111 •

CVSS: 4.7EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (mlxreg-fan) Return non-zero value when fan current state is enforced from sysfs Fan speed minimum can be enforced from sysfs. For example, setting current fan speed to 20 is used to enforce fan speed to be at 100% speed, 19 - to be not below 90% speed, etcetera. This feature provides ability to limit fan speed according to some system wise considerations, like absence of some replaceable units or high system ambient temperature. Request for changing fan minimum speed is configuration request and can be set only through 'sysfs' write procedure. In this situation value of argument 'state' is above nominal fan speed maximum. Return non-zero code in this case to avoid thermal_cooling_device_stats_update() call, because in this case statistics update violates thermal statistics table range. The issues is observed in case kernel is configured with option CONFIG_THERMAL_STATISTICS. Here is the trace from KASAN: [ 159.506659] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in thermal_cooling_device_stats_update+0x7d/0xb0 [ 159.516016] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888116163840 by task hw-management.s/7444 [ 159.545625] Call Trace: [ 159.548366] dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 [ 159.552084] ? thermal_cooling_device_stats_update+0x7d/0xb0 [ 159.635869] thermal_zone_device_update+0x345/0x780 [ 159.688711] thermal_zone_device_set_mode+0x7d/0xc0 [ 159.694174] mlxsw_thermal_modules_init+0x48f/0x590 [mlxsw_core] [ 159.700972] ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65afb4c8e7e4e7e74b28efa1df62da503ca3e7a6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c6e0bce647d9cb32a17d58ffa669b3421fcc6ca https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6c42ae1530f94724d3c42cf91fe3d3c5e394f8a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76bbb482d33bfcd7e9070ecf594c9ec73e01c930 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa85fb7bde558bb2e364e85976b14b259c8b6fe8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6fab7af6ba1bc77c78713a83876f60ca7a4a064 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2021-47393 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2282345 • CWE-754: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/cma: Ensure rdma_addr_cancel() happens before issuing more requests The FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice on the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the work, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution background request cannot be active twice. CPU 1 CPU 2 rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_IDLE -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) #1 process_one_req(): for #1 addr_handler(): RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); [.. handler still running ..] rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) !! two requests are now on the req_list rdma_destroy_id(): destroy_id_handler_unlock(): _destroy_id(): cma_cancel_operation(): rdma_addr_cancel() // process_one_req() self removes it spin_lock_bh(&lock); cancel_delayed_work(&req->work); if (!list_empty(&req->list)) == true ! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done kfree(id_priv) process_one_req(): for #2 addr_handler(): mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); !! • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e51060f08a61965c4dd91516d82fe90617152590 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a085fa9b7d644a234465091e038c1911e1a4f2a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03d884671572af8bcfbc9e63944c1021efce7589 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/305d568b72f17f674155a2a8275f865f207b3808 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 9EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mac80211: fix use-after-free in CCMP/GCMP RX When PN checking is done in mac80211, for fragmentation we need to copy the PN to the RX struct so we can later use it to do a comparison, since commit bf30ca922a0c ("mac80211: check defrag PN against current frame"). Unfortunately, in that commit I used the 'hdr' variable without it being necessarily valid, so use-after-free could occur if it was necessary to reallocate (parts of) the frame. Fix this by reloading the variable after the code that results in the reallocations, if any. This fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=214401. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: mac80211: corrige el use after free en CCMP/GCMP RX. Cuando se realiza la verificación de PN en mac80211, para la fragmentación necesitamos copiar el PN a la estructura RX para poder usarlo más tarde. para hacer una comparación, desde la confirmación bf30ca922a0c ("mac80211: verifique la desfragmentación PN con el marco actual"). Desafortunadamente, en esa confirmación utilicé la variable 'hdr' sin que fuera necesariamente válida, por lo que podría ocurrir un use after free si fuera necesario reasignar (partes de) el marco. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/608b0a2ae928a74a2f89e02227339dd79cdb63cf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0f613fe6de344dc17ba04a88921a2094c13d3fa https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a9b57952fed41556c950a92123086724eaf11919 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f716b48ed25503e6961f4b5b40ece36f7e4ed26 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8b3a6150dc8ac78d5fdd5fbdfc4806249ef8b2c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e64ea0597050157f926ac2ba9b478a44ee5be945 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf30ca922a0c0176007e074b0acc77ed345e9990 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f0bf30c01d3f4de7d6c5e27b102a808c •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cpufreq: schedutil: Use kobject release() method to free sugov_tunables The struct sugov_tunables is protected by the kobject, so we can't free it directly. Otherwise we would get a call trace like this: ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x30 WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 720 at lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: a.sh Tainted: G W 5.14.0-rc1-next-20210715-yocto-standard+ #507 Hardware name: Marvell OcteonTX CN96XX board (DT) pstate: 40400009 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100 lr : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100 sp : ffff80001ecaf910 x29: ffff80001ecaf910 x28: ffff00011b10b8d0 x27: ffff800011043d80 x26: ffff00011a8f0000 x25: ffff800013cb3ff0 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: ffff80001142aa68 x22: ffff800011043d80 x21: ffff00010de46f20 x20: ffff800013c0c520 x19: ffff800011d8f5b0 x18: 0000000000000010 x17: 6e6968207473696c x16: 5f72656d6974203a x15: 6570797420746365 x14: 6a626f2029302065 x13: 303378302f307830 x12: 2b6e665f72656d69 x11: ffff8000124b1560 x10: ffff800012331520 x9 : ffff8000100ca6b0 x8 : 000000000017ffe8 x7 : c0000000fffeffff x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff800011d8c000 x4 : ffff800011d8c740 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff0001108301c0 x1 : ab3c90eedf9c0f00 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100 __debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x1c0/0x230 debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x20/0x88 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x154/0x1c8 kfree+0x114/0x5d0 sugov_exit+0xbc/0xc0 cpufreq_exit_governor+0x44/0x90 cpufreq_set_policy+0x268/0x4a8 store_scaling_governor+0xe0/0x128 store+0xc0/0xf0 sysfs_kf_write+0x54/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x1c0 new_sync_write+0xf0/0x190 vfs_write+0x2d4/0x478 ksys_write+0x74/0x100 __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x158 el0_svc+0x2c/0xb0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c irq event stamp: 5518 hardirqs last enabled at (5517): [<ffff8000100cbd7c>] console_unlock+0x554/0x6c8 hardirqs last disabled at (5518): [<ffff800010fc0638>] el1_dbg+0x28/0xa0 softirqs last enabled at (5504): [<ffff8000100106e0>] __do_softirq+0x4d0/0x6c0 softirqs last disabled at (5483): [<ffff800010049548>] irq_exit+0x1b0/0x1b8 So split the original sugov_tunables_free() into two functions, sugov_clear_global_tunables() is just used to clear the global_tunables and the new sugov_tunables_free() is used as kobj_type::release to release the sugov_tunables safely. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: cpufreq: schedutil: utilice el método kobject release() para liberar sugov_tunables. La estructura sugov_tunables está protegida por kobject, por lo que no podemos liberarla directamente. De lo contrario, obtendríamos un seguimiento de llamada como este: ODEBUG: activo libre (estado activo 0) tipo de objeto: timer_list sugerencia: delay_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x30 ADVERTENCIA: CPU: 3 PID: 720 en lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0xb8/ 0x100 Módulos vinculados en: CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: a.sh Contaminado: GW 5.14.0-rc1-next-20210715-yocto-standard+ #507 Nombre del hardware: Placa Marvell OcteonTX CN96XX (DT) pstate: 40400009 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc: debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100 lr: debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100 sp: ffff80001ecaf910 x29: ffff80001ecaf910 x28: ffff00011b10b8d0 x27: d80 x26: ffff00011a8f0000 x25: ffff800013cb3ff0 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: ffff80001142aa68 x22 : ffff800011043d80 x21: ffff00010de46f20 x20: ffff800013c0c520 x19: ffff800011d8f5b0 x18: 0000000000000010 x17: 6e6968207473696c x16: 656d6974203a x15: 6570797420746365 x14: 6a626f2029302065 x13: 303378302f307830 x12: 2b6e665f72656d69 x11: ffff8000124b1560 x10: 0012331520 x9: ffff8000100ca6b0 x8: 000000000017ffe8 x7: c0000000fffeffff x6: 0000000000000001 x5: ffff800011d8c000 x4: ffff800011d8c740 x3: 0000000000000000 x2: ffff0001108301c0 x1: ab3c90eedf9c0f00 x0: 0000000000000000 Rastreo de llamadas: xb8/0x100 __debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x1c0/0x230 debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x20/0x88 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x154/0x1c8 kfree+0x114/0x5d0 sugov_exit+0xbc/ 0xc0 cpufreq_exit_governor+0x44/0x90 cpufreq_set_policy+0x268/0x4a8 store_scaling_governor+0xe0/0x128 store+0xc0/0xf0 sysfs_kf_write+0x54/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x1c0 nuevo _sync_write+0xf0/0x190 vfs_write+0x2d4/0x478 ksys_write+0x74/0x100 __arm64_sys_write+0x24/ 0x30 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x158 el0_svc+0x2c/0xb0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c sello de evento irq: 5518 hardirqs habilitado por última vez en ( 5517): [] consola_unlock+ 0x554/0x6c8 hardirqs deshabilitado por última vez en (5518): [] el1_dbg+0x28/0xa0 softirqs habilitado por última vez en (5504): [] __do_softirq+0x4d0/0x6c0 softirqs deshabilitado por última vez en (5483): ff800010049548 &gt;] irq_exit+0x1b0/0x1b8 Entonces divida el sugov_tunables_free() original en dos funciones, sugov_clear_global_tunables() solo se usa para borrar los global_tunables y el nuevo sugov_tunables_free() se usa como kobj_type::release para liberar los sugov_tunables de forma segura. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9bdcb44e391da5c41b98573bf0305a0e0b1c9569 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb4a53ba37532c861a5f3f22803391018a41849a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/463c46705f321201090b69c4ad5da0cd2ce614c9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30d57cf2c4116ca6d34ecd1cac94ad84f8bc446c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67c98e023135ff81b8d52998a6fdb8ca0c518d82 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7d4fc84404d45d72f4490417e8cc3efa4af93f1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d62aec52a8c5b1d25a2364b243fcc5098a2ede9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5c6b312ce3cc97e90ea159446e6bfa06 •