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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/efistub: Call mixed mode boot services on the firmware's stack Normally, the EFI stub calls into the EFI boot services using the stack that was live when the stub was entered. According to the UEFI spec, this stack needs to be at least 128k in size - this might seem large but all asynchronous processing and event handling in EFI runs from the same stack and so quite a lot of space may be used in practice. In mixed mode, the situation is a bit different: the bootloader calls the 32-bit EFI stub entry point, which calls the decompressor's 32-bit entry point, where the boot stack is set up, using a fixed allocation of 16k. This stack is still in use when the EFI stub is started in 64-bit mode, and so all calls back into the EFI firmware will be using the decompressor's limited boot stack. Due to the placement of the boot stack right after the boot heap, any stack overruns have gone unnoticed. However, commit 5c4feadb0011983b ("x86/decompressor: Move global symbol references to C code") moved the definition of the boot heap into C code, and now the boot stack is placed right at the base of BSS, where any overruns will corrupt the end of the .data section. While it would be possible to work around this by increasing the size of the boot stack, doing so would affect all x86 systems, and mixed mode systems are a tiny (and shrinking) fraction of the x86 installed base. So instead, record the firmware stack pointer value when entering from the 32-bit firmware, and switch to this stack every time a EFI boot service call is made. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: x86/efistub: llame a los servicios de arranque en modo mixto en la pila del firmware. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2149f8a56e2ed345c7a4d022a79f6b8fc53ae926 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/930775060ca348b8665f60eef14b204172d14f31 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fba7ee7187581b5bc222003e73e2592b398bb06d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/725351c036452b7db5771a7bed783564bc4b99cc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cefcd4fe2e3aaf792c14c9e56dab89e3d7a65d02 •

CVSS: 6.2EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Prevent crash when disable stream [Why] Disabling stream encoder invokes a function that no longer exists. [How] Check if the function declaration is NULL in disable stream encoder. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: drm/amd/display: evita fallos al deshabilitar la transmisión [Por qué] Al deshabilitar el codificador de transmisión se invoca una función que ya no existe. [Cómo] Compruebe si la declaración de función es NULL al desactivar el codificador de flujo. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4356a2c3f296503c8b420ae8adece053960a9f06 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59772327d439874095516673b4b30c48bd83ca38 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b17133a0a2e0e111803124dad09e803718d4a48 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72d72e8fddbcd6c98e1b02d32cf6f2b04e10bd1c • CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-raid: really frozen sync_thread during suspend 1) commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread") remove MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN from __md_stop_writes() and doesn't realize that dm-raid relies on __md_stop_writes() to frozen sync_thread indirectly. Fix this problem by adding MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN in md_stop_writes(), and since stop_sync_thread() is only used for dm-raid in this case, also move stop_sync_thread() to md_stop_writes(). 2) The flag MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN doesn't mean that sync thread is frozen, it only prevent new sync_thread to start, and it can't stop the running sync thread; In order to frozen sync_thread, after seting the flag, stop_sync_thread() should be used. 3) The flag MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN doesn't mean that writes are stopped, use it as condition for md_stop_writes() in raid_postsuspend() doesn't look correct. Consider that reentrant stop_sync_thread() do nothing, always call md_stop_writes() in raid_postsuspend(). 4) raid_message can set/clear the flag MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN at anytime, and if MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN is cleared while the array is suspended, new sync_thread can start unexpected. Fix this by disallow raid_message() to change sync_thread status during suspend. Note that after commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread"), the test shell/lvconvert-raid-reshape.sh start to hang in stop_sync_thread(), and with previous fixes, the test won't hang there anymore, however, the test will still fail and complain that ext4 is corrupted. And with this patch, the test won't hang due to stop_sync_thread() or fail due to ext4 is corrupted anymore. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9dbd1aa3a81c6166608fec87994b6c464701f73a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af916cb66a80597f3523bc85812e790bcdcfd62b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eaa8fc9b092837cf2c754bde1a15d784ce9a85ab https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16c4770c75b1223998adbeb7286f9a15c65fba73 •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 9EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: check/clear fast rx for non-4addr sta VLAN changes When moving a station out of a VLAN and deleting the VLAN afterwards, the fast_rx entry still holds a pointer to the VLAN's netdev, which can cause use-after-free bugs. Fix this by immediately calling ieee80211_check_fast_rx after the VLAN change. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: wifi: mac80211: comprobar/borrar fast rx para cambios de VLAN que no sean 4addr sta Al mover una estación fuera de una VLAN y eliminar la VLAN después, la entrada fast_rx todavía contiene un puntero a netdev de la VLAN, lo que puede causar errores de uso después de la liberación. Solucione este problema llamando inmediatamente a ieee80211_check_fast_rx después del cambio de VLAN. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea9a0cfc07a7d3601cc680718d9cff0d6927a921 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be1dd9254fc115321d6fbee042026d42afc8d931 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8b067c4058c0121ac8ca71559df8e2e08ff1a7e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8bddbd91bc8e42c961a5e2cec20ab879f21100f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7eeabcea79b67cc29563e6a9a5c81f9e2c664d5b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b948b54c8bd620725e0c906e44b10c0b13087a7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2884a50f52313a7a911de3afcad065ddbb3d78fc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8678551c0243f799b4859448781cbec1 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix deadlock with fiemap and extent locking While working on the patchset to remove extent locking I got a lockdep splat with fiemap and pagefaulting with my new extent lock replacement lock. This deadlock exists with our normal code, we just don't have lockdep annotations with the extent locking so we've never noticed it. Since we're copying the fiemap extent to user space on every iteration we have the chance of pagefaulting. Because we hold the extent lock for the entire range we could mkwrite into a range in the file that we have mmap'ed. This would deadlock with the following stack trace [<0>] lock_extent+0x28d/0x2f0 [<0>] btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x273/0x8a0 [<0>] do_page_mkwrite+0x50/0xb0 [<0>] do_fault+0xc1/0x7b0 [<0>] __handle_mm_fault+0x2fa/0x460 [<0>] handle_mm_fault+0xa4/0x330 [<0>] do_user_addr_fault+0x1f4/0x800 [<0>] exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x1e0 [<0>] asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [<0>] rep_movs_alternative+0x33/0x70 [<0>] _copy_to_user+0x49/0x70 [<0>] fiemap_fill_next_extent+0xc8/0x120 [<0>] emit_fiemap_extent+0x4d/0xa0 [<0>] extent_fiemap+0x7f8/0xad0 [<0>] btrfs_fiemap+0x49/0x80 [<0>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x3e1/0xb50 [<0>] do_syscall_64+0x94/0x1a0 [<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 I wrote an fstest to reproduce this deadlock without my replacement lock and verified that the deadlock exists with our existing locking. To fix this simply don't take the extent lock for the entire duration of the fiemap. This is safe in general because we keep track of where we are when we're searching the tree, so if an ordered extent updates in the middle of our fiemap call we'll still emit the correct extents because we know what offset we were on before. The only place we maintain the lock is searching delalloc. Since the delalloc stuff can change during writeback we want to lock the extent range so we have a consistent view of delalloc at the time we're checking to see if we need to set the delalloc flag. With this patch applied we no longer deadlock with my testcase. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ded566b4637f1b6b4c9ba74e7d0b8493e93f19cf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89bca7fe6382d61e88c67a0b0e7bce315986fb8b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0ad381fa7690244802aed119b478b4bdafc31dd •