CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0CVE-2023-52659 – x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-52659
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type On 64-bit platforms, the pfn_to_kaddr() macro requires that the input value is 64 bits in order to ensure that valid address bits don't get lost when shifting that input by PAGE_SHIFT to calculate the physical address to provide a virtual address for. One such example is in pvalidate_pages() (used by SEV-SNP guests), where the GFN in the struct used for page-state change requests is a 40-bit bit-field, so attempts to pass this GFN field directly into pfn_to_kaddr() ends up causing guest crashes when dealing with addresses above the 1TB range due to the above. Fix this issue with SEV-SNP guests, as well as any similar cases that might cause issues in current/future code, by using an inline function, instead of a macro, so that the input is implicitly cast to the expected 64-bit input type prior to performing the shift operation. While it might be argued that the issue is on the caller side, other archs/macros have taken similar approaches to deal with instances like this, such as ARM explicitly casting the input to phys_addr_t: e48866647b48 ("ARM: 8396/1: use phys_addr_t in pfn_to_kaddr()") A C inline function is even better though. [ mingo: Refined the changelog some more & added __always_inline. ] En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: x86/mm: garantiza que la entrada a pfn_to_kaddr() se trate como un tipo de 64 bits. En plataformas de 64 bits, la macro pfn_to_kaddr() requiere que el valor de entrada sea de 64 bits en para garantizar que los bits de dirección válidos no se pierdan al cambiar esa entrada mediante PAGE_SHIFT para calcular la dirección física para la que proporcionar una dirección virtual. Un ejemplo de ello es pvalidate_pages() (utilizado por invitados SEV-SNP), donde el GFN en la estructura utilizada para las solicitudes de cambio de estado de página es un campo de bits de 40 bits, por lo que se intenta pasar este campo GFN directamente a pfn_to_kaddr( ) termina causando fallas en los invitados cuando se trata de direcciones por encima del rango de 1 TB debido a lo anterior. Solucione este problema con los invitados SEV-SNP, así como cualquier caso similar que pueda causar problemas en el código actual/futuro, utilizando una función en línea, en lugar de una macro, de modo que la entrada se convierta implícitamente a la entrada esperada de 64 bits. tipo antes de realizar la operación de cambio. Si bien se podría argumentar que el problema está en el lado de la persona que llama, otros arcos/macros han adoptado enfoques similares para lidiar con casos como este, como ARM que envía explícitamente la entrada a phys_addr_t: e48866647b48 ("ARM: 8396/1: use phys_addr_t in pfn_to_kaddr()") La función en línea AC es aún mejor. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c3211796326a9d35618b866826ca556c8f008a8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/325956b0173f11e98f90462be4829a8b8b0682ce https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e1471888a5e6e846e9b4d306e5327db2b58e64e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/814305b5c23cb815ada68d43019f39050472b25f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e5647a723c49d73b9f108a8bb38e8c29d3948ea •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-27401 – firewire: nosy: ensure user_length is taken into account when fetching packet contents
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-27401
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firewire: nosy: ensure user_length is taken into account when fetching packet contents Ensure that packet_buffer_get respects the user_length provided. If the length of the head packet exceeds the user_length, packet_buffer_get will now return 0 to signify to the user that no data were read and a larger buffer size is required. Helps prevent user space overflows. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: firewire: nosy: asegúrese de que se tenga en cuenta la longitud de usuario al recuperar el contenido del paquete. Asegúrese de que paquete_buffer_get respete la longitud de usuario proporcionada. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67f34f093c0f7bf33f5b4ae64d3d695a3b978285 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b8c7bd2296e95b38a6ff346242356a2e7190239 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cca330c59c54207567a648357835f59df9a286bb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/79f988d3ffc1aa778fc5181bdfab312e57956c6b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ee0941da10e8fdcdb34756b877efd3282594c1f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fe60ee709436550f8cfbab01295936b868d5baa https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/539d51ac48bcfcfa1b3d4a85f8df92fa22c1d41c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38762a0763c10c24a4915feee722d7aa6 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2024-27400 – drm/amdgpu: once more fix the call oder in amdgpu_ttm_move() v2
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-27400
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: once more fix the call oder in amdgpu_ttm_move() v2 This reverts drm/amdgpu: fix ftrace event amdgpu_bo_move always move on same heap. The basic problem here is that after the move the old location is simply not available any more. Some fixes were suggested, but essentially we should call the move notification before actually moving things because only this way we have the correct order for DMA-buf and VM move notifications as well. Also rework the statistic handling so that we don't update the eviction counter before the move. v2: add missing NULL check En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: drm/amdgpu: una vez más corrige la llamada oder en amdgpu_ttm_move() v2. Esto revierte drm/amdgpu: corrige el evento ftrace amdgpu_bo_move siempre se mueve en el mismo montón. El problema básico aquí es que después de la mudanza, la antigua ubicación simplemente ya no está disponible. Se sugirieron algunas correcciones, pero esencialmente deberíamos llamar a la notificación de movimiento antes de mover cosas porque solo así tenemos el orden correcto para las notificaciones de movimiento de DMA-buf y VM también. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d443fb67ca5ab04760449d21ddea66f6728e5b00 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7a0ee45c653784edda5e36bae6ae3c75fd5e7a8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94aeb4117343d072e3a35b9595bcbfc0058ee724 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77bcd4ab446fa35ad135b1c7404415ed9a129296 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1cd2b612474c07b17a21e27f2eed8dff75cb5057 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c25b169f9a0b34ee410891a96bc9d7b9ed6f9be https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c7ed3ed35eec9138b88d42217b5a6b9a62bda4d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a4f6e138720b6e9adf7b82a71d0292f3 •
CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-27399 – Bluetooth: l2cap: fix null-ptr-deref in l2cap_chan_timeout
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-27399
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: l2cap: fix null-ptr-deref in l2cap_chan_timeout There is a race condition between l2cap_chan_timeout() and l2cap_chan_del(). When we use l2cap_chan_del() to delete the channel, the chan->conn will be set to null. But the conn could be dereferenced again in the mutex_lock() of l2cap_chan_timeout(). As a result the null pointer dereference bug will happen. The KASAN report triggered by POC is shown below: [ 472.074580] ================================================================== [ 472.075284] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.075308] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000158 by task kworker/0:0/7 [ 472.075308] [ 472.075308] CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-00356-g78c0094a146b #36 [ 472.075308] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu4 [ 472.075308] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout [ 472.075308] Call Trace: [ 472.075308] <TASK> [ 472.075308] dump_stack_lvl+0x137/0x1a0 [ 472.075308] print_report+0x101/0x250 [ 472.075308] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x77/0x160 [ 472.075308] ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3df91ea20e744344100b10ae69a17211fcf5b207 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e137e2ba96e51902dc2878131823a96bf8e638ae https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6466ee65e5b27161c846c73ef407f49dfa1bd1d9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/06acb75e7ed600d0bbf7bff5628aa8f24a97978c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e97e16433eb4533083b096a3824b93a5ca3aee79 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8960ff650aec70485b40771cd8e6e8c4cb467d33 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/955b5b6c54d95b5e7444dfc81c95c8e013f27ac0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb86f955488c39526534211f2610e48a5 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 11EXPL: 0CVE-2024-27398 – Bluetooth: Fix use-after-free bugs caused by sco_sock_timeout
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-27398
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: Fix use-after-free bugs caused by sco_sock_timeout When the sco connection is established and then, the sco socket is releasing, timeout_work will be scheduled to judge whether the sco disconnection is timeout. The sock will be deallocated later, but it is dereferenced again in sco_sock_timeout. As a result, the use-after-free bugs will happen. The root cause is shown below: Cleanup Thread | Worker Thread sco_sock_release | sco_sock_close | __sco_sock_close | sco_sock_set_timer | schedule_delayed_work | sco_sock_kill | (wait a time) sock_put(sk) //FREE | sco_sock_timeout | sock_hold(sk) //USE The KASAN report triggered by POC is shown below: [ 95.890016] ================================================================== [ 95.890496] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_sock_timeout+0x5e/0x1c0 [ 95.890755] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800c388080 by task kworker/0:0/7 ... [ 95.890755] Workqueue: events sco_sock_timeout [ 95.890755] Call Trace: [ 95.890755] <TASK> [ 95.890755] dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x110 [ 95.890755] print_address_description+0x78/0x390 [ 95.890755] print_report+0x11b/0x250 [ 95.890755] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xbe/0xf0 [ 95.890755] ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/48669c81a65628ef234cbdd91b9395952c7c27fe https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37d7ae2b0578f2373674a755402ee722e96edc08 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1073aad497d0d071a71f61b721966a176d50c08 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba316be1b6a00db7126ed9a39f9bee434a508043 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fea63ccd928c01573306983346588b26cffb5572 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec1f74319bb35c1c90c25014ec0f6ea6c3ca2134 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b657bba82ff6a007d84fd076bd73b11131726a2b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b33d55fb7355e27f8c82cd4ecd560f16 •