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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/numa: Fix the potential null pointer dereference in task_numa_work() When running stress-ng-vm-segv test, we found a null pointer dereference error in task_numa_work(). Here is the backtrace: [323676.066985] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020 ...... [323676.067108] CPU: 35 PID: 2694524 Comm: stress-ng-vm-se ...... [323676.067113] pstate: 23401009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) [323676.067115] pc : vma_migratable+0x1c/0xd0 [323676.067122] lr : task_numa_work+0x1ec/0x4e0 [323676.067127] sp : ffff8000ada73d20 [323676.067128] x29: ffff8000ada73d20 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 000000003e89f010 [323676.067130] x26: 0000000000080000 x25: ffff800081b5c0d8 x24: ffff800081b27000 [323676.067133] x23: 0000000000010000 x22: 0000000104d18cc0 x21: ffff0009f7158000 [323676.067135] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffff8000ada73db8 [323676.067138] x17: 0001400000000000 x16: ffff800080df40b0 x15: 0000000000000035 [323676.067140] x14: ffff8000ada73cc8 x13: 1fffe0017cc72001 x12: ffff8000ada73cc8 [323676.067142] x11: ffff80008001160c x10: ffff000be639000c x9 : ffff8000800f4ba4 [323676.067145] x8 : ffff000810375000 x7 : ffff8000ada73974 x6 : 0000000000000001 [323676.067147] x5 : 0068000b33e26707 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff0009f7158000 [323676.067149] x2 : 0000000000000041 x1 : 0000000000004400 x0 : 0000000000000000 [323676.067152] Call trace: [323676.067153] vma_migratable+0x1c/0xd0 [323676.067155] task_numa_work+0x1ec/0x4e0 [323676.067157] task_work_run+0x78/0xd8 [323676.067161] do_notify_resume+0x1ec/0x290 [323676.067163] el0_svc+0x150/0x160 [323676.067167] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf8/0x128 [323676.067170] el0t_64_sync+0x17c/0x180 [323676.067173] Code: d2888001 910003fd f9000bf3 aa0003f3 (f9401000) [323676.067177] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [323676.070184] Starting crashdump kernel... stress-ng-vm-segv in stress-ng is used to stress test the SIGSEGV error handling function of the system, which tries to cause a SIGSEGV error on return from unmapping the whole address space of the child process. Normally this program will not cause kernel crashes. But before the munmap system call returns to user mode, a potential task_numa_work() for numa balancing could be added and executed. In this scenario, since the child process has no vma after munmap, the vma_next() in task_numa_work() will return a null pointer even if the vma iterator restarts from 0. Recheck the vma pointer before dereferencing it in task_numa_work(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/214dbc4281374cbbd833edd502d0ed1fd1b0e243 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ade91f6e9848b370add44d89c976e070ccb492ef https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c60d98ef7078fc3e22b48e98eae7a897d88494ee https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c70b2a33cd2aa6a5a59c5523ef053bd42265209 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iov_iter: fix copy_page_from_iter_atomic() if KMAP_LOCAL_FORCE_MAP generic/077 on x86_32 CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL_FORCE_MAP=y with highmem, on huge=always tmpfs, issues a warning and then hangs (interruptibly): WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 3517 at mm/highmem.c:622 kunmap_local_indexed+0x62/0xc9 CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 3517 Comm: cp Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4 #2 ... copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xa6/0x5ec generic_perform_write+0xf6/0x1b4 shmem_file_write_iter+0x54/0x67 Fix copy_page_from_iter_atomic() by limiting it in that case (include/linux/skbuff.h skb_frag_must_loop() does similar). But going forward, perhaps CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL_FORCE_MAP is too surprising, has outlived its usefulness, and should just be removed? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/908a1ad89466c1febf20bfe0037b84fc66f8a3f8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4f7ffa83fa79dd52efbaef366c850aaaae06a469 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a303409f271dfe0987b8f79595138340497a32d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c749d9b7ebbc5716af7a95f7768634b30d9446ec •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/pm: Vangogh: Fix kernel memory out of bounds write KASAN reports that the GPU metrics table allocated in vangogh_tables_init() is not large enough for the memset done in smu_cmn_init_soft_gpu_metrics(). Condensed report follows: [ 33.861314] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smu_cmn_init_soft_gpu_metrics+0x73/0x200 [amdgpu] [ 33.861799] Write of size 168 at addr ffff888129f59500 by task mangoapp/1067 ... [ 33.861808] CPU: 6 UID: 1000 PID: 1067 Comm: mangoapp Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc4 #356 1a56f59a8b5182eeaf67eb7cb8b13594dd23b544 [ 33.861816] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 33.861818] Hardware name: Valve Galileo/Galileo, BIOS F7G0107 12/01/2023 [ 33.861822] Call Trace: [ 33.861826] <TASK> [ 33.861829] dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0x90 [ 33.861838] print_report+0xce/0x620 [ 33.861853] kasan_report+0xda/0x110 [ 33.862794] kasan_check_range+0xfd/0x1a0 [ 33.862799] __asan_memset+0x23/0x40 [ 33.862803] smu_cmn_init_soft_gpu_metrics+0x73/0x200 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779] [ 33.863306] vangogh_get_gpu_metrics_v2_4+0x123/0xad0 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779] [ 33.864257] vangogh_common_get_gpu_metrics+0xb0c/0xbc0 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779] [ 33.865682] amdgpu_dpm_get_gpu_metrics+0xcc/0x110 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779] [ 33.866160] amdgpu_get_gpu_metrics+0x154/0x2d0 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779] [ 33.867135] dev_attr_show+0x43/0xc0 [ 33.867147] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x1f1/0x3b0 [ 33.867155] seq_read_iter+0x3f8/0x1140 [ 33.867173] vfs_read+0x76c/0xc50 [ 33.867198] ksys_read+0xfb/0x1d0 [ 33.867214] do_syscall_64+0x90/0x160 ... [ 33.867353] Allocated by task 378 on cpu 7 at 22.794876s: [ 33.867358] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 [ 33.867364] kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60 [ 33.867367] __kasan_kmalloc+0x87/0x90 [ 33.867371] vangogh_init_smc_tables+0x3f9/0x840 [amdgpu] [ 33.867835] smu_sw_init+0xa32/0x1850 [amdgpu] [ 33.868299] amdgpu_device_init+0x467b/0x8d90 [amdgpu] [ 33.868733] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x19/0xf0 [amdgpu] [ 33.869167] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x2d6/0xcd0 [amdgpu] [ 33.869608] local_pci_probe+0xda/0x180 [ 33.869614] pci_device_probe+0x43f/0x6b0 Empirically we can confirm that the former allocates 152 bytes for the table, while the latter memsets the 168 large block. Root cause appears that when GPU metrics tables for v2_4 parts were added it was not considered to enlarge the table to fit. The fix in this patch is rather "brute force" and perhaps later should be done in a smarter way, by extracting and consolidating the part version to size logic to a common helper, instead of brute forcing the largest possible allocation. Nevertheless, for now this works and fixes the out of bounds write. v2: * Drop impossible v3_0 case. (Mario) (cherry picked from commit 0880f58f9609f0200483a49429af0f050d281703) • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41cec40bc9baba83d36a0718ea94bfe63189274a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8fd9f0d57af4f8f48b383ec28287af85b47cb9f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4aa923a6e6406b43566ef6ac35a3d9a3197fa3e8 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fork: do not invoke uffd on fork if error occurs Patch series "fork: do not expose incomplete mm on fork". During fork we may place the virtual memory address space into an inconsistent state before the fork operation is complete. In addition, we may encounter an error during the fork operation that indicates that the virtual memory address space is invalidated. As a result, we should not be exposing it in any way to external machinery that might interact with the mm or VMAs, machinery that is not designed to deal with incomplete state. We specifically update the fork logic to defer khugepaged and ksm to the end of the operation and only to be invoked if no error arose, and disallow uffd from observing fork events should an error have occurred. This patch (of 2): Currently on fork we expose the virtual address space of a process to userland unconditionally if uffd is registered in VMAs, regardless of whether an error arose in the fork. This is performed in dup_userfaultfd_complete() which is invoked unconditionally, and performs two duties - invoking registered handlers for the UFFD_EVENT_FORK event via dup_fctx(), and clearing down userfaultfd_fork_ctx objects established in dup_userfaultfd(). This is problematic, because the virtual address space may not yet be correctly initialised if an error arose. The change in commit d24062914837 ("fork: use __mt_dup() to duplicate maple tree in dup_mmap()") makes this more pertinent as we may be in a state where entries in the maple tree are not yet consistent. We address this by, on fork error, ensuring that we roll back state that we would otherwise expect to clean up through the event being handled by userland and perform the memory freeing duty otherwise performed by dup_userfaultfd_complete(). We do this by implementing a new function, dup_userfaultfd_fail(), which performs the same loop, only decrementing reference counts. Note that we perform mmgrab() on the parent and child mm's, however userfaultfd_ctx_put() will mmdrop() this once the reference count drops to zero, so we will avoid memory leaks correctly here. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2406291483775ecddaee929231a39c70c08fda2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92b472945dbf8abc020e9259c0088026f7027dfc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f64e67e5d3a45a4a04286c47afade4b518acd47b •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: pass u64 to ocfs2_truncate_inline maybe overflow Syzbot reported a kernel BUG in ocfs2_truncate_inline. There are two reasons for this: first, the parameter value passed is greater than ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr, second, the start and end parameters of ocfs2_truncate_inline are "unsigned int". So, we need to add a sanity check for byte_start and byte_len right before ocfs2_truncate_inline() in ocfs2_remove_inode_range(), if they are greater than ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr return -EINVAL. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1afc32b952335f665327a1a9001ba1b44bb76fd9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27d95867bee806cdc448d122bd99f1d8b0544035 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95fbed8ae8c32c0977e6be1721c190d8fea23f2f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70767689ec6ee5f05fb0a2c17d7ec1927946e486 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ecd62f684386fa64f9c0cea92eea361f4e6444c2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2fe5d62e122b040ce7fc4d31aa7fa96ae328cefc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88f97a4b5843ce21c1286e082c02a5fb4d8eb473 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b6b8c2055784261de3fb641c5d0d6396 •