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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: posix-clock: Fix missing timespec64 check in pc_clock_settime() As Andrew pointed out, it will make sense that the PTP core checked timespec64 struct's tv_sec and tv_nsec range before calling ptp->info->settime64(). As the man manual of clock_settime() said, if tp.tv_sec is negative or tp.tv_nsec is outside the range [0..999,999,999], it should return EINVAL, which include dynamic clocks which handles PTP clock, and the condition is consistent with timespec64_valid(). As Thomas suggested, timespec64_valid() only check the timespec is valid, but not ensure that the time is in a valid range, so check it ahead using timespec64_valid_strict() in pc_clock_settime() and return -EINVAL if not valid. There are some drivers that use tp->tv_sec and tp->tv_nsec directly to write registers without validity checks and assume that the higher layer has checked it, which is dangerous and will benefit from this, such as hclge_ptp_settime(), igb_ptp_settime_i210(), _rcar_gen4_ptp_settime(), and some drivers can remove the checks of itself. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0606f422b453f76c31ab2b1bd52943ff06a2dcf2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/29f085345cde24566efb751f39e5d367c381c584 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e0c966bd3e31911b57ef76cec4c5796ebd88e512 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/673a1c5a2998acbd429d6286e6cad10f17f4f073 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8789fbe2bbf75845e45302cba6ffa44e1884d01 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27abbde44b6e71ee3891de13e1a228aa7ce95bfe https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3f169e398215e71361774d13bf91a0101283ac2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ff7247101af723731ea42ed565d54fb8 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: probes: Fix uprobes for big-endian kernels The arm64 uprobes code is broken for big-endian kernels as it doesn't convert the in-memory instruction encoding (which is always little-endian) into the kernel's native endianness before analyzing and simulating instructions. This may result in a few distinct problems: * The kernel may may erroneously reject probing an instruction which can safely be probed. * The kernel may erroneously erroneously permit stepping an instruction out-of-line when that instruction cannot be stepped out-of-line safely. * The kernel may erroneously simulate instruction incorrectly dur to interpretting the byte-swapped encoding. The endianness mismatch isn't caught by the compiler or sparse because: * The arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields are encoded as arrays of u8, so the compiler and sparse have no idea these contain a little-endian 32-bit value. The core uprobes code populates these with a memcpy() which similarly does not handle endianness. * While the uprobe_opcode_t type is an alias for __le32, both arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() and arch_uprobe_skip_sstep() cast from u8[] to the similarly-named probe_opcode_t, which is an alias for u32. Hence there is no endianness conversion warning. Fix this by changing the arch_uprobe::{insn,ixol} fields to __le32 and adding the appropriate __le32_to_cpu() conversions prior to consuming the instruction encoding. The core uprobes copies these fields as opaque ranges of bytes, and so is unaffected by this change. At the same time, remove MAX_UINSN_BYTES and consistently use AARCH64_INSN_SIZE for clarity. Tested with the following: | #include <stdio.h> | #include <stdbool.h> | | #define noinline __attribute__((noinline)) | | static noinline void *adrp_self(void) | { | void *addr; | | asm volatile( | " adrp %x0, adrp_self\n" | " add %x0, %x0, :lo12:adrp_self\n" | : "=r" (addr)); | } | | | int main(int argc, char *argv) | { | void *ptr = adrp_self(); | bool equal = (ptr == adrp_self); | | printf("adrp_self => %p\n" | "adrp_self() => %p\n" | "%s\n", | adrp_self, ptr, equal ? "EQUAL" : "NOT EQUAL"); | | return 0; | } .... where the adrp_self() function was compiled to: | 00000000004007e0 <adrp_self>: | 4007e0: 90000000 adrp x0, 400000 <__ehdr_start> | 4007e4: 911f8000 add x0, x0, #0x7e0 | 4007e8: d65f03c0 ret Before this patch, the ADRP is not recognized, and is assumed to be steppable, resulting in corruption of the result: | # . • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9842ceae9fa8deae141533d52a6ead7666962c09 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6a638cb600e13f94b5464724eaa6ab7f3349ca2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6ab336213918575124d6db43dc5d3554526242e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf9ddf9ed94c15564a05bbf6e9f18dffa0c7df80 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf60d19d40184e43d9a624e55a0da73be09e938d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14841bb7a531b96e2dde37423a3b33e75147c60d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8165bf83b8a64be801d59cd2532b0d1ffed74d00 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d2530c65be04e93720e30f191a7cf1a3 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/entry_32: Clear CPU buffers after register restore in NMI return CPU buffers are currently cleared after call to exc_nmi, but before register state is restored. This may be okay for MDS mitigation but not for RDFS. Because RDFS mitigation requires CPU buffers to be cleared when registers don't have any sensitive data. Move CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS after RESTORE_ALL_NMI. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/50f021f0b985629accf10481a6e89af8b9700583 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d54de9f2a127090f2017184e8257795b487d5312 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e3087505ddb8ba2d3d4c81306cca11e868fcdb9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca13d8cd8dac25558da4ee8df4dc70e8e7f9d762 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a0e2dab44d22b913b4c228c8b52b2a104434b0b3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51eca9f1fd047b500137d021f882d93f03280118 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f44a5fc15b5cece0785bc07453db77d99b0a6de https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6400eb0b347821efc57760221f8fb6d6 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: irqchip/gic-v4: Don't allow a VMOVP on a dying VPE Kunkun Jiang reported that there is a small window of opportunity for userspace to force a change of affinity for a VPE while the VPE has already been unmapped, but the corresponding doorbell interrupt still visible in /proc/irq/. Plug the race by checking the value of vmapp_count, which tracks whether the VPE is mapped ot not, and returning an error in this case. This involves making vmapp_count common to both GICv4.1 and its v4.0 ancestor. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/64edfaa9a2342a3ce34f8cb982c2c2df84db4de3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7d7b7fc876f836f40bf48a87e07ea18756ba196 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/755b9532c885b8761fb135fedcd705e21e61cccb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/64b12b061c5488e2d69e67c4eaae5da64fd30bfe https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01282ab5182f85e42234df2ff42f0ce790f465ff https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d960505a869e66184fff97fb334980a5b797c7c6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1442ee0011983f0c5c4b92380e6853afb513841a •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors When the filesystem is mounted with errors=remount-ro, we were setting SB_RDONLY flag to stop all filesystem modifications. We knew this misses proper locking (sb->s_umount) and does not go through proper filesystem remount procedure but it has been the way this worked since early ext2 days and it was good enough for catastrophic situation damage mitigation. Recently, syzbot has found a way (see link) to trigger warnings in filesystem freezing because the code got confused by SB_RDONLY changing under its hands. Since these days we set EXT4_FLAGS_SHUTDOWN on the superblock which is enough to stop all filesystem modifications, modifying SB_RDONLY shouldn't be needed. So stop doing that. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbb177bc1d6487cd3e9b50ae0be2781b7297980d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4061e07f040a091f694f461b86a26cf95ae66439 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58c0648e4c773f5b54f0cb63bc8c7c6bf52719a9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee77c388469116565e009eaa704a60bc78489e09 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3476f3dad4ad68ae5f6b008ea6591d1520da5d8 •