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CVSS: 5.6EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

Racy interactions between dirty vram tracking and paging log dirty hypercalls Activation of log dirty mode done by XEN_DMOP_track_dirty_vram (was named HVMOP_track_dirty_vram before Xen 4.9) is racy with ongoing log dirty hypercalls. A suitably timed call to XEN_DMOP_track_dirty_vram can enable log dirty while another CPU is still in the process of tearing down the structures related to a previously enabled log dirty mode (XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_OFF). This is due to lack of mutually exclusive locking between both operations and can lead to entries being added in already freed slots, resulting in a memory leak. Una activación del modo de registro sucio realizada por XEN_DMOP_track_dirty_vram (es llamada HVMOP_track_dirty_vram antes de Xen versión 4.9) es producido con las hiperllamadas de registro sucio en curso. Una llamada a XEN_DMOP_track_dirty_vram con el tiempo apropiado puede habilitar log dirty mientras otra CPU está todavía en el proceso de desmontar las estructuras relacionadas con un modo log dirty previamente habilitado (XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_OFF). • http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/04/05/1 http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-397.html https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/6ETPM2OVZZ6KOS2L7QO7SIW6XWT5OW3F https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/UHFSRVLM2JUCPDC2KGB7ETPQYJLCGBLD https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202402-07 https://www.debian.org/security/2022/dsa-5117 https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-397.txt • CWE-667: Improper Locking •

CVSS: 7.0EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

race in VT-d domain ID cleanup Xen domain IDs are up to 15 bits wide. VT-d hardware may allow for only less than 15 bits to hold a domain ID associating a physical device with a particular domain. Therefore internally Xen domain IDs are mapped to the smaller value range. The cleaning up of the housekeeping structures has a race, allowing for VT-d domain IDs to be leaked and flushes to be bypassed. Una carrera en la limpieza del ID de dominio de VT-d Los ID de dominio de Xen presentan hasta 15 bits de ancho. • http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/04/05/2 http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-399.html https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/6ETPM2OVZZ6KOS2L7QO7SIW6XWT5OW3F https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/UHFSRVLM2JUCPDC2KGB7ETPQYJLCGBLD https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202402-07 https://www.debian.org/security/2022/dsa-5117 https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-399.txt • CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') •

CVSS: 7.0EPSS: 0%CPEs: 1EXPL: 0

grant table v2 status pages may remain accessible after de-allocation (take two) Guest get permitted access to certain Xen-owned pages of memory. The majority of such pages remain allocated / associated with a guest for its entire lifetime. Grant table v2 status pages, however, get de-allocated when a guest switched (back) from v2 to v1. The freeing of such pages requires that the hypervisor know where in the guest these pages were mapped. The hypervisor tracks only one use within guest space, but racing requests from the guest to insert mappings of these pages may result in any of them to become mapped in multiple locations. • https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202402-07 https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-387.txt •

CVSS: 7.8EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

issues with partially successful P2M updates on x86 T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] x86 HVM and PVH guests may be started in populate-on-demand (PoD) mode, to provide a way for them to later easily have more memory assigned. Guests are permitted to control certain P2M aspects of individual pages via hypercalls. These hypercalls may act on ranges of pages specified via page orders (resulting in a power-of-2 number of pages). In some cases the hypervisor carries out the requests by splitting them into smaller chunks. Error handling in certain PoD cases has been insufficient in that in particular partial success of some operations was not properly accounted for. • https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/I7ZGWVVRI4XY2XSTBI3XEMWBXPDVX6OT https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/PXUI4VMD52CH3T7YXAG3J2JW7ZNN3SXF https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202402-07 https://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-5017 https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-389.txt • CWE-755: Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions •

CVSS: 8.8EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

PoD operations on misaligned GFNs T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] x86 HVM and PVH guests may be started in populate-on-demand (PoD) mode, to provide a way for them to later easily have more memory assigned. Guests are permitted to control certain P2M aspects of individual pages via hypercalls. These hypercalls may act on ranges of pages specified via page orders (resulting in a power-of-2 number of pages). The implementation of some of these hypercalls for PoD does not enforce the base page frame number to be suitably aligned for the specified order, yet some code involved in PoD handling actually makes such an assumption. These operations are XENMEM_decrease_reservation (CVE-2021-28704) and XENMEM_populate_physmap (CVE-2021-28707), the latter usable only by domains controlling the guest, i.e. a de-privileged qemu or a stub domain. • https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/I7ZGWVVRI4XY2XSTBI3XEMWBXPDVX6OT https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/PXUI4VMD52CH3T7YXAG3J2JW7ZNN3SXF https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202402-07 https://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-5017 https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-388.txt •