CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0CVE-2024-26691 – KVM: arm64: Fix circular locking dependency
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-26691
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Fix circular locking dependency The rule inside kvm enforces that the vcpu->mutex is taken *inside* kvm->lock. The rule is violated by the pkvm_create_hyp_vm() which acquires the kvm->lock while already holding the vcpu->mutex lock from kvm_vcpu_ioctl(). Avoid the circular locking dependency altogether by protecting the hyp vm handle with the config_lock, much like we already do for other forms of VM-scoped data. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: KVM: arm64: corrige la dependencia de bloqueo circular La regla dentro de kvm exige que vcpu->mutex se tome *dentro* de kvm->lock. La regla es violada por pkvm_create_hyp_vm() que adquiere el bloqueo kvm->mientras ya mantiene el bloqueo vcpu->mutex de kvm_vcpu_ioctl(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d16cebf01127f459dcfeb79ed77bd68b124c228 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ab1c40a1e915e350d9181a4603af393141970cc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10c02aad111df02088d1a81792a709f6a7eca6cc •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2024-26689 – ceph: prevent use-after-free in encode_cap_msg()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-26689
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: prevent use-after-free in encode_cap_msg() In fs/ceph/caps.c, in encode_cap_msg(), "use after free" error was caught by KASAN at this line - 'ceph_buffer_get(arg->xattr_buf);'. This implies before the refcount could be increment here, it was freed. In same file, in "handle_cap_grant()" refcount is decremented by this line - 'ceph_buffer_put(ci->i_xattrs.blob);'. It appears that a race occurred and resource was freed by the latter line before the former line could increment it. encode_cap_msg() is called by __send_cap() and __send_cap() is called by ceph_check_caps() after calling __prep_cap(). __prep_cap() is where arg->xattr_buf is assigned to ci->i_xattrs.blob. This is the spot where the refcount must be increased to prevent "use after free" error. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8180d0c27b93a6eb60da1b08ea079e3926328214 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70e329b440762390258a6fe8c0de93c9fdd56c77 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3f98d7d84b31828004545e29fd7262b9f444139 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae20db45e482303a20e56f2db667a9d9c54ac7e7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7958c1bf5b03c6f1f58e724dbdec93f8f60b96fc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cda4672da1c26835dcbd7aec2bfed954eda9b5ef https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2024-26687 – xen/events: close evtchn after mapping cleanup
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-26687
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen/events: close evtchn after mapping cleanup shutdown_pirq and startup_pirq are not taking the irq_mapping_update_lock because they can't due to lock inversion. Both are called with the irq_desc->lock being taking. The lock order, however, is first irq_mapping_update_lock and then irq_desc->lock. This opens multiple races: - shutdown_pirq can be interrupted by a function that allocates an event channel: CPU0 CPU1 shutdown_pirq { xen_evtchn_close(e) __startup_pirq { EVTCHNOP_bind_pirq -> returns just freed evtchn e set_evtchn_to_irq(e, irq) } xen_irq_info_cleanup() { set_evtchn_to_irq(e, -1) } } Assume here event channel e refers here to the same event channel number. After this race the evtchn_to_irq mapping for e is invalid (-1). - __startup_pirq races with __unbind_from_irq in a similar way. Because __startup_pirq doesn't take irq_mapping_update_lock it can grab the evtchn that __unbind_from_irq is currently freeing and cleaning up. In this case even though the event channel is allocated, its mapping can be unset in evtchn_to_irq. The fix is to first cleanup the mappings and then close the event channel. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d46a78b05c0e37f76ddf4a7a67bf0b6c68bada55 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9470f5b2503cae994098dea9682aee15b313fa44 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fc88aeb2e32b76db3fe6a624b8333dbe621b8fd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea592baf9e41779fe9a0424c03dd2f324feca3b3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/585a344af6bcac222608a158fc2830ff02712af5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20980195ec8d2e41653800c45c8c367fa1b1f2b4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9be71aa12afa91dfe457b3fb4a444c42b1ee036b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa765c4b4aed2d64266b694520ecb025c •
CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0CVE-2024-26686 – fs/proc: do_task_stat: use sig->stats_lock to gather the threads/children stats
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-26686
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/proc: do_task_stat: use sig->stats_lock to gather the threads/children stats lock_task_sighand() can trigger a hard lockup. If NR_CPUS threads call do_task_stat() at the same time and the process has NR_THREADS, it will spin with irqs disabled O(NR_CPUS * NR_THREADS) time. Change do_task_stat() to use sig->stats_lock to gather the statistics outside of ->siglock protected section, in the likely case this code will run lockless. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: fs/proc: do_task_stat: use sig->stats_lock para recopilar las estadísticas de subprocesos/hijos lock_task_sighand() puede desencadenar un bloqueo completo. Si los subprocesos NR_CPUS llaman a do_task_stat() al mismo tiempo y el proceso tiene NR_THREADS, girará con irqs deshabilitados O(NR_CPUS * NR_THREADS) tiempo. Cambie do_task_stat() para usar sig->stats_lock para recopilar las estadísticas fuera de ->sección protegida siglock, en el caso probable de que este código se ejecute sin bloqueo. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf4b8c39b9a0bd81c47afc7ef62914a62dd5ec4d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27978243f165b44e342f28f449b91327944ea071 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7601df8031fd67310af891897ef6cc0df4209305 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-26686 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2273109 • CWE-413: Improper Resource Locking •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 12EXPL: 0CVE-2024-26685 – nilfs2: fix potential bug in end_buffer_async_write
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-26685
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: fix potential bug in end_buffer_async_write According to a syzbot report, end_buffer_async_write(), which handles the completion of block device writes, may detect abnormal condition of the buffer async_write flag and cause a BUG_ON failure when using nilfs2. Nilfs2 itself does not use end_buffer_async_write(). But, the async_write flag is now used as a marker by commit 7f42ec394156 ("nilfs2: fix issue with race condition of competition between segments for dirty blocks") as a means of resolving double list insertion of dirty blocks in nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers() and nilfs_lookup_node_buffers() and the resulting crash. This modification is safe as long as it is used for file data and b-tree node blocks where the page caches are independent. However, it was irrelevant and redundant to also introduce async_write for segment summary and super root blocks that share buffers with the backing device. This led to the possibility that the BUG_ON check in end_buffer_async_write would fail as described above, if independent writebacks of the backing device occurred in parallel. The use of async_write for segment summary buffers has already been removed in a previous change. Fix this issue by removing the manipulation of the async_write flag for the remaining super root block buffer. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: nilfs2: corrige un posible error en end_buffer_async_write Según un informe de syzbot, end_buffer_async_write(), que maneja la finalización de las escrituras del dispositivo de bloque, puede detectar una condición anormal del indicador async_write del búfer y causar un Error BUG_ON al usar nilfs2. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f42ec3941560f0902fe3671e36f2c20ffd3af0a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ccebcc74c81d8399c7b204aea47c1f33b09c2b17 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/831c87640d23ccb253a02e4901bd9a325b5e8c2d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8974c7fe717ee8fb0706e35cc92e0bcdf660ec5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f67918af09fc0ffd426a9b6f87697976d3fbc7b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4a09fdac625e64abe478dcf88bfa20406616928 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d31c8721e816eff5ca6573cc487754f357c093cd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3e4963566f58726d3265a727116a42b5 •