CVE-2023-52653 – SUNRPC: fix a memleak in gss_import_v2_context
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-52653
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: fix a memleak in gss_import_v2_context The ctx->mech_used.data allocated by kmemdup is not freed in neither gss_import_v2_context nor it only caller gss_krb5_import_sec_context, which frees ctx on error. Thus, this patch reform the last call of gss_import_v2_context to the gss_krb5_import_ctx_v2, preventing the memleak while keepping the return formation. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: SUNRPC: corrige una fuga de memport en gss_import_v2_context El ctx->mech_used.data asignado por kmemdup no se libera ni en gss_import_v2_context ni solo en el llamador gss_krb5_import_sec_context, lo que libera a ctx en caso de error. Por lo tanto, este parche reforma la última llamada de gss_import_v2_context a gss_krb5_import_ctx_v2, evitando la fuga de memoria y manteniendo la formación de retorno. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47d84807762966c3611c38adecec6ea703ddda7a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99044c01ed5329e73651c054d8a4baacdbb1a27c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47ac11db93e74ac49cd6c3fc69bcbc5964c4a8b4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d111e30d9cd846bb368faf3637dc0f71fcbcf822 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e67b652d8e8591d3b1e569dbcdfcee15993e91fa https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-52653 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2278515 •
CVE-2023-52652 – NTB: fix possible name leak in ntb_register_device()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-52652
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NTB: fix possible name leak in ntb_register_device() If device_register() fails in ntb_register_device(), the device name allocated by dev_set_name() should be freed. As per the comment in device_register(), callers should use put_device() to give up the reference in the error path. So fix this by calling put_device() in the error path so that the name can be freed in kobject_cleanup(). As a result of this, put_device() in the error path of ntb_register_device() is removed and the actual error is returned. [mani: reworded commit message] En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: NTB: corrige una posible fuga de nombre en ntb_register_device() Si device_register() falla en ntb_register_device(), se debe liberar el nombre del dispositivo asignado por dev_set_name(). Según el comentario en device_register(), las personas que llaman deben usar put_device() para abandonar la referencia en la ruta de error. Así que solucione este problema llamando a put_device() en la ruta del error para que el nombre pueda liberarse en kobject_cleanup(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1bd3baeb2f18b2b3d0f98ce5fdaa725149b950b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a62b9f3d7bbfac874cc0c638bc1776dcf1f8ec06 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6632a54ac8057cc0b0d789c6f73883e871bcd25c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a039690d323221eb5865f1f31db3ec264e7a14b6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8025439ef8e16029dc313d78a351ef192469b7b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/913421f9f7fd8324dcc41753d0f28b52e177ef04 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aebfdfe39b9327a3077d0df8db3beb3160c9bdd0 •
CVE-2022-48669 – powerpc/pseries: Fix potential memleak in papr_get_attr()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2022-48669
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/pseries: Fix potential memleak in papr_get_attr() `buf` is allocated in papr_get_attr(), and krealloc() of `buf` could fail. We need to free the original `buf` in the case of failure. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: powerpc/pseries: corrija una posible fuga de mem en papr_get_attr() `buf` está asignado en papr_get_attr(), y krealloc() de `buf` podría fallar. Necesitamos liberar el "buf" original en caso de falla. A flaw was found in the Linux kernel. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c14b73454cf9f6e2146443fdfbdfb912c0efed3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3f22feb2220a945d1c3282e34199e8bcdc5afc4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1699fb915b9f61794d559b55114c09a390aaf234 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f7d39fe3d80d6143404940b2413010cf6527029 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0647c3e81eff62b66d46fd4e475318cb8cb3610 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cda9c0d556283e2d4adaa9960b2dc19b16156bae https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-48669 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2278537 •
CVE-2024-27062 – nouveau: lock the client object tree.
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-27062
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nouveau: lock the client object tree. It appears the client object tree has no locking unless I've missed something else. Fix races around adding/removing client objects, mostly vram bar mappings. 4562.099306] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6677ed422bceb80c: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 4562.099314] CPU: 2 PID: 23171 Comm: deqp-vk Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6+ #27 [ 4562.099324] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI/Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI-CF, BIOS F8 11/05/2021 [ 4562.099330] RIP: 0010:nvkm_object_search+0x1d/0x70 [nouveau] [ 4562.099503] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 85 f6 74 39 48 8b 87 a0 00 00 00 48 85 c0 74 12 <48> 8b 48 f8 48 39 ce 73 15 48 8b 40 10 48 85 c0 75 ee 48 c7 c0 fe [ 4562.099506] RSP: 0000:ffffa94cc420bbf8 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 4562.099512] RAX: 6677ed422bceb814 RBX: ffff98108791f400 RCX: ffff9810f26b8f58 [ 4562.099517] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9810f26b9158 RDI: ffff98108791f400 [ 4562.099519] RBP: ffff9810f26b9158 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 4562.099521] R10: ffffa94cc420bc48 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9810f02a7cc0 [ 4562.099526] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000000ff R15: 0000000000000007 [ 4562.099528] FS: 00007f629c5017c0(0000) GS:ffff98142c700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 4562.099534] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 4562.099536] CR2: 00007f629a882000 CR3: 000000017019e004 CR4: 00000000003706f0 [ 4562.099541] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 4562.099542] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 4562.099544] Call Trace: [ 4562.099555] <TASK> [ 4562.099573] ? die_addr+0x36/0x90 [ 4562.099583] ? exc_general_protection+0x246/0x4a0 [ 4562.099593] ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6887314f5356389fc219b8152e951ac084a10ef7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96c8751844171af4b3898fee3857ee180586f589 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7cc4ff787a572edf2c55caeffaa88cd801eb135 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-27062 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2278387 • CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') •
CVE-2024-27059 – USB: usb-storage: Prevent divide-by-0 error in isd200_ata_command
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-27059
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: usb-storage: Prevent divide-by-0 error in isd200_ata_command The isd200 sub-driver in usb-storage uses the HEADS and SECTORS values in the ATA ID information to calculate cylinder and head values when creating a CDB for READ or WRITE commands. The calculation involves division and modulus operations, which will cause a crash if either of these values is 0. While this never happens with a genuine device, it could happen with a flawed or subversive emulation, as reported by the syzbot fuzzer. Protect against this possibility by refusing to bind to the device if either the ATA_ID_HEADS or ATA_ID_SECTORS value in the device's ID information is 0. This requires isd200_Initialization() to return a negative error code when initialization fails; currently it always returns 0 (even when there is an error). En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: USB: almacenamiento-usb: evita el error de división por 0 en isd200_ata_command El subcontrolador isd200 en almacenamiento-usb utiliza los valores HEADS y SECTORES en la información de ID de ATA para calcular el cilindro y valores principales al crear un CDB para comandos LEER o ESCRIBIR. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9968c701cba7eda42e5f0052b040349d6222ae34 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb7b01ca778170654e1c76950024270ba74b121f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/284fb1003d5da111019b9e0bf99b084fd71ac133 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c1f36d92c0a8799569055012665d2bb066fb964 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f42ba916689f5c7b1642092266d2f53cf527aaaa https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/871fd7b10b56d280990b7e754f43d888382ca325 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a67d4ab9e730361d183086dfb0ddd8c6 •