CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0CVE-2021-47196 – RDMA/core: Set send and receive CQ before forwarding to the driver
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2021-47196
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/core: Set send and receive CQ before forwarding to the driver Preset both receive and send CQ pointers prior to call to the drivers and overwrite it later again till the mlx4 is going to be changed do not overwrite ibqp properties. This change is needed for mlx5, because in case of QP creation failure, it will go to the path of QP destroy which relies on proper CQ pointers. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in create_qp.cold+0x164/0x16e [mlx5_ib] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880064c55c0 by task a.out/246 CPU: 0 PID: 246 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.15.0+ #291 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140 kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf create_qp.cold+0x164/0x16e [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_create_qp+0x358/0x28a0 [mlx5_ib] create_qp.part.0+0x45b/0x6a0 [ib_core] ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core] ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Allocated by task 246: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa4/0xd0 create_qp.part.0+0x92/0x6a0 [ib_core] ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core] ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Freed by task 246: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x150 slab_free_freelist_hook+0xb4/0x1b0 kfree+0xe7/0x2a0 create_qp.part.0+0x52b/0x6a0 [ib_core] ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core] ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/514aee660df493cd673154a6ba6bab745ec47b8c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b70e072feffa0ba5c41a99b9524b9878dee7748e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6cd7397d01c4a3e09757840299e4f114f0aa5fa0 •
CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0CVE-2021-47195 – spi: fix use-after-free of the add_lock mutex
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2021-47195
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: fix use-after-free of the add_lock mutex Commit 6098475d4cb4 ("spi: Fix deadlock when adding SPI controllers on SPI buses") introduced a per-controller mutex. But mutex_unlock() of said lock is called after the controller is already freed: spi_unregister_controller(ctlr) -> put_device(&ctlr->dev) -> spi_controller_release(dev) -> mutex_unlock(&ctrl->add_lock) Move the put_device() after the mutex_unlock(). En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: spi: corrige el use-after-free del mutex add_lock. El commit 6098475d4cb4 ("spi: corrige el punto muerto al agregar controladores SPI en buses SPI") introdujo un mutex por controlador. Pero mutex_unlock() de dicho bloqueo se llama después de que el controlador ya está liberado: spi_unregister_controller(ctlr) -> put_device(&ctlr->dev) -> spi_controller_release(dev) -> mutex_unlock(&ctrl->add_lock) Mueva put_device() después el mutex_unlock(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6098475d4cb48d821bdf453c61118c56e26294f0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/722ef19a161ce3fffb3d1b01ce2301c306639bdd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37330f37f6666c7739a44b2b6b95b047ccdbed2d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c53b45c71b4920b5e62f0ea8079a1da382b9434 • CWE-416: Use After Free •
CVSS: 7.8EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2021-47194 – cfg80211: call cfg80211_stop_ap when switch from P2P_GO type
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2021-47194
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cfg80211: call cfg80211_stop_ap when switch from P2P_GO type If the userspace tools switch from NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO to NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC via send_msg(NL80211_CMD_SET_INTERFACE), it does not call the cleanup cfg80211_stop_ap(), this leads to the initialization of in-use data. For example, this path re-init the sdata->assigned_chanctx_list while it is still an element of assigned_vifs list, and makes that linked list corrupt. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: cfg80211: llame a cfg80211_stop_ap cuando cambie del tipo P2P_GO. Si las herramientas del espacio de usuario cambian de NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO a NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC mediante send_msg(NL80211_CMD_SET_INTERFACE), no llama a la limpieza cfg80211_ stop_ap(), esto lleva a la inicialización de datos en uso. Por ejemplo, esta ruta reinicia sdata->assigned_chanctx_list mientras todavía es un elemento de la lista asignada_vifs y corrompe esa lista vinculada. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac800140c20e7ae51117e71289065bedd4930fc2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f06bb8c216bcd172394f61e557727e691b4cb24 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0738cdb636c21ab552eaecf905efa4a6070e3ebc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e458abbb4a523f1413bfe15c079cf4e24c15b21 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8a045e2a9b234cfbc06cf36923886164358ddec https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52affc201fc22a1ab9a59ef0ed641a9adfcb8d13 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b97b5776daa0b39dbdadfea176f9cc0646d4a66 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a9b671c8d74a3e1b999e7a0c7f366079 • CWE-665: Improper Initialization •
CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0CVE-2021-47193 – scsi: pm80xx: Fix memory leak during rmmod
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2021-47193
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: pm80xx: Fix memory leak during rmmod Driver failed to release all memory allocated. This would lead to memory leak during driver removal. Properly free memory when the module is removed. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: scsi: pm80xx: se corrigió la pérdida de memoria durante rmmod, el controlador no pudo liberar toda la memoria asignada. Esto puede provocar una pérdida de memoria durante la eliminación del controlador. Se debe liberar correctamente la memoria cuando se retire el módulo. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/269a4311b15f68d24e816f43f123888f241ed13d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51e6ed83bb4ade7c360551fa4ae55c4eacea354b • CWE-401: Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0CVE-2021-47192 – scsi: core: sysfs: Fix hang when device state is set via sysfs
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2021-47192
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: core: sysfs: Fix hang when device state is set via sysfs This fixes a regression added with: commit f0f82e2476f6 ("scsi: core: Fix capacity set to zero after offlinining device") The problem is that after iSCSI recovery, iscsid will call into the kernel to set the dev's state to running, and with that patch we now call scsi_rescan_device() with the state_mutex held. If the SCSI error handler thread is just starting to test the device in scsi_send_eh_cmnd() then it's going to try to grab the state_mutex. We are then stuck, because when scsi_rescan_device() tries to send its I/O scsi_queue_rq() calls -> scsi_host_queue_ready() -> scsi_host_in_recovery() which will return true (the host state is still in recovery) and I/O will just be requeued. scsi_send_eh_cmnd() will then never be able to grab the state_mutex to finish error handling. To prevent the deadlock move the rescan-related code to after we drop the state_mutex. This also adds a check for if we are already in the running state. This prevents extra scans and helps the iscsid case where if the transport class has already onlined the device during its recovery process then we don't need userspace to do it again plus possibly block that daemon. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69aa1a1a569f5c6d554b59352130ef363342ed4c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/711459514e297d748f15ba1f5292a3276c3d1dd0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0f82e2476f6adb9c7a0135cfab8091456990c99 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6751ce1a2a415a78e4f5b621628da03196b804c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edd783162bf2385b43de6764f2d4c6e9f4f6be27 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a792e0128d232251edb5fdf42fb0f9fbb0b44a73 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bcc0e3175a976b7fa9a353960808adb0bb49ead8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4edd8cd4e86dd3047e5294bbefcc0a08f •