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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: nullify cq->dbg pointer in mlx5_debug_cq_remove() Prior to this patch in case mlx5_core_destroy_cq() failed it proceeds to rest of destroy operations. mlx5_core_destroy_cq() could be called again by user and cause additional call of mlx5_debug_cq_remove(). cq->dbg was not nullify in previous call and cause the crash. Fix it by nullify cq->dbg pointer after removal. Also proceed to destroy operations only if FW return 0 for MLX5_CMD_OP_DESTROY_CQ command. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x2000300004058: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 5 PID: 1228 Comm: python Not tainted 5.15.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2021_10_14_11_06 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:lockref_get+0x1/0x60 Code: 5d e9 53 ff ff ff 48 8d 7f 70 e8 0a 2e 48 00 c7 85 d0 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 c6 45 70 00 fb 5d c3 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 53 <48> 8b 17 48 89 fb 85 d2 75 3d 48 89 d0 bf 64 00 00 00 48 89 c1 48 RSP: 0018:ffff888137dd7a38 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888107d5f458 RCX: 00000000fffffffe RDX: 000000000002c2b0 RSI: ffffffff8155e2e0 RDI: 0002000300004058 RBP: ffff888137dd7a88 R08: 0002000300004058 R09: ffff8881144a9f88 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881141d4000 R13: ffff888137dd7c68 R14: ffff888137dd7d58 R15: ffff888137dd7cc0 FS: 00007f4644f2a4c0(0000) GS:ffff8887a2d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055b4500f4380 CR3: 0000000114f7a003 CR4: 0000000000170ea0 Call Trace: simple_recursive_removal+0x33/0x2e0 ? debugfs_remove+0x60/0x60 debugfs_remove+0x40/0x60 mlx5_debug_cq_remove+0x32/0x70 [mlx5_core] mlx5_core_destroy_cq+0x41/0x1d0 [mlx5_core] devx_obj_cleanup+0x151/0x330 [mlx5_ib] ? __pollwait+0xd0/0xd0 ? xas_load+0x5/0x70 ? xa_load+0x62/0xa0 destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x20/0x80 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x3b/0x360 [ib_uverbs] uobj_destroy+0x54/0xa0 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xaf2/0x1160 [ib_uverbs] ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4f7bddf8c5c01cac74373443b13a68e1c6723a94 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94b960b9deffc02fc0747afc01f72cc62ab099e3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed8aafea4fec9c654e63445236e0b505e27ed3a7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/471c492890557bd58f73314bb4ad85d5a8fd5026 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ae38157080616a13a9fe3f0b4b6ec0070aa408a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76ded29d3fcda4928da8849ffc446ea46871c1c2 •

CVSS: 7.8EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cfg80211: call cfg80211_stop_ap when switch from P2P_GO type If the userspace tools switch from NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO to NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC via send_msg(NL80211_CMD_SET_INTERFACE), it does not call the cleanup cfg80211_stop_ap(), this leads to the initialization of in-use data. For example, this path re-init the sdata->assigned_chanctx_list while it is still an element of assigned_vifs list, and makes that linked list corrupt. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: cfg80211: llame a cfg80211_stop_ap cuando cambie del tipo P2P_GO. Si las herramientas del espacio de usuario cambian de NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO a NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC mediante send_msg(NL80211_CMD_SET_INTERFACE), no llama a la limpieza cfg80211_ stop_ap(), esto lleva a la inicialización de datos en uso. Por ejemplo, esta ruta reinicia sdata-&gt;assigned_chanctx_list mientras todavía es un elemento de la lista asignada_vifs y corrompe esa lista vinculada. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac800140c20e7ae51117e71289065bedd4930fc2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f06bb8c216bcd172394f61e557727e691b4cb24 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0738cdb636c21ab552eaecf905efa4a6070e3ebc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e458abbb4a523f1413bfe15c079cf4e24c15b21 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8a045e2a9b234cfbc06cf36923886164358ddec https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52affc201fc22a1ab9a59ef0ed641a9adfcb8d13 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b97b5776daa0b39dbdadfea176f9cc0646d4a66 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a9b671c8d74a3e1b999e7a0c7f366079 • CWE-665: Improper Initialization •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: pm80xx: Fix memory leak during rmmod Driver failed to release all memory allocated. This would lead to memory leak during driver removal. Properly free memory when the module is removed. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: scsi: pm80xx: se corrigió la pérdida de memoria durante rmmod, el controlador no pudo liberar toda la memoria asignada. Esto puede provocar una pérdida de memoria durante la eliminación del controlador. Se debe liberar correctamente la memoria cuando se retire el módulo. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/269a4311b15f68d24e816f43f123888f241ed13d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51e6ed83bb4ade7c360551fa4ae55c4eacea354b • CWE-401: Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: core: sysfs: Fix hang when device state is set via sysfs This fixes a regression added with: commit f0f82e2476f6 ("scsi: core: Fix capacity set to zero after offlinining device") The problem is that after iSCSI recovery, iscsid will call into the kernel to set the dev's state to running, and with that patch we now call scsi_rescan_device() with the state_mutex held. If the SCSI error handler thread is just starting to test the device in scsi_send_eh_cmnd() then it's going to try to grab the state_mutex. We are then stuck, because when scsi_rescan_device() tries to send its I/O scsi_queue_rq() calls -> scsi_host_queue_ready() -> scsi_host_in_recovery() which will return true (the host state is still in recovery) and I/O will just be requeued. scsi_send_eh_cmnd() will then never be able to grab the state_mutex to finish error handling. To prevent the deadlock move the rescan-related code to after we drop the state_mutex. This also adds a check for if we are already in the running state. This prevents extra scans and helps the iscsid case where if the transport class has already onlined the device during its recovery process then we don't need userspace to do it again plus possibly block that daemon. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69aa1a1a569f5c6d554b59352130ef363342ed4c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/711459514e297d748f15ba1f5292a3276c3d1dd0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0f82e2476f6adb9c7a0135cfab8091456990c99 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6751ce1a2a415a78e4f5b621628da03196b804c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edd783162bf2385b43de6764f2d4c6e9f4f6be27 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a792e0128d232251edb5fdf42fb0f9fbb0b44a73 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bcc0e3175a976b7fa9a353960808adb0bb49ead8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4edd8cd4e86dd3047e5294bbefcc0a08f •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_debug: Fix out-of-bound read in resp_readcap16() The following warning was observed running syzkaller: [ 3813.830724] sg_write: data in/out 65466/242 bytes for SCSI command 0x9e-- guessing data in; [ 3813.830724] program syz-executor not setting count and/or reply_len properly [ 3813.836956] ================================================================== [ 3813.839465] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x157/0x1e0 [ 3813.841773] Read of size 4096 at addr ffff8883cf80f540 by task syz-executor/1549 [ 3813.846612] Call Trace: [ 3813.846995] dump_stack+0x108/0x15f [ 3813.847524] print_address_description+0xa5/0x372 [ 3813.848243] kasan_report.cold+0x236/0x2a8 [ 3813.849439] check_memory_region+0x240/0x270 [ 3813.850094] memcpy+0x30/0x80 [ 3813.850553] sg_copy_buffer+0x157/0x1e0 [ 3813.853032] sg_copy_from_buffer+0x13/0x20 [ 3813.853660] fill_from_dev_buffer+0x135/0x370 [ 3813.854329] resp_readcap16+0x1ac/0x280 [ 3813.856917] schedule_resp+0x41f/0x1630 [ 3813.858203] scsi_debug_queuecommand+0xb32/0x17e0 [ 3813.862699] scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x330/0x950 [ 3813.863329] scsi_request_fn+0xd8e/0x1710 [ 3813.863946] __blk_run_queue+0x10b/0x230 [ 3813.864544] blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x1d8/0x400 [ 3813.865220] sg_common_write.isra.0+0xe61/0x2420 [ 3813.871637] sg_write+0x6c8/0xef0 [ 3813.878853] __vfs_write+0xe4/0x800 [ 3813.883487] vfs_write+0x17b/0x530 [ 3813.884008] ksys_write+0x103/0x270 [ 3813.886268] __x64_sys_write+0x77/0xc0 [ 3813.886841] do_syscall_64+0x106/0x360 [ 3813.887415] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This issue can be reproduced with the following syzkaller log: r0 = openat(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000040)='./file0\x00', 0x26e1, 0x0) r1 = syz_open_procfs(0xffffffffffffffff, &(0x7f0000000000)='fd/3\x00') open_by_handle_at(r1, &(0x7f00000003c0)=ANY=[@ANYRESHEX], 0x602000) r2 = syz_open_dev$sg(&(0x7f0000000000), 0x0, 0x40782) write$binfmt_aout(r2, &(0x7f0000000340)=ANY=[@ANYBLOB="00000000deff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000047f007af9e107a41ec395f1bded7be24277a1501ff6196a83366f4e6362bc0ff2b247f68a972989b094b2da4fb3607fcf611a22dd04310d28c75039d"], 0x126) In resp_readcap16() we get "int alloc_len" value -1104926854, and then pass the huge arr_len to fill_from_dev_buffer(), but arr is only 32 bytes. This leads to OOB in sg_copy_buffer(). To solve this issue, define alloc_len as u32. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e20cb072679bdb47747ccc8bee3233a4cf0765a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b8bed6464ad6653586e30df046185fd816ad999 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e3ace0051e7e504b55d239daab8789dd89b863c •