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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: multidev: fix to recognize valid zero block address As reported by Yi Zhang in mailing list [1], kernel warning was catched during zbd/010 test as below: ./check zbd/010 zbd/010 (test gap zone support with F2FS) [failed] runtime ... 3.752s something found in dmesg: [ 4378.146781] run blktests zbd/010 at 2024-02-18 11:31:13 [ 4378.192349] null_blk: module loaded [ 4378.209860] null_blk: disk nullb0 created [ 4378.413285] scsi_debug:sdebug_driver_probe: scsi_debug: trim poll_queues to 0. poll_q/nr_hw = (0/1) [ 4378.422334] scsi host15: scsi_debug: version 0191 [20210520] dev_size_mb=1024, opts=0x0, submit_queues=1, statistics=0 [ 4378.434922] scsi 15:0:0:0: Direct-Access-ZBC Linux scsi_debug 0191 PQ: 0 ANSI: 7 [ 4378.443343] scsi 15:0:0:0: Power-on or device reset occurred [ 4378.449371] sd 15:0:0:0: Attached scsi generic sg5 type 20 [ 4378.449418] sd 15:0:0:0: [sdf] Host-managed zoned block device ... (See '/mnt/tests/gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/19168116/repository/archive.zip/storage/blktests/blk/blktests/results/nodev/zbd/010.dmesg' WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 44011 at fs/iomap/iter.c:51 CPU: 22 PID: 44011 Comm: fio Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3+ #1 RIP: 0010:iomap_iter+0x32b/0x350 Call Trace: <TASK> __iomap_dio_rw+0x1df/0x830 f2fs_file_read_iter+0x156/0x3d0 [f2fs] aio_read+0x138/0x210 io_submit_one+0x188/0x8c0 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x8c/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x86/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 Shinichiro Kawasaki helps to analyse this issue and proposes a potential fixing patch in [2]. Quoted from reply of Shinichiro Kawasaki: "I confirmed that the trigger commit is dbf8e63f48af as Yi reported. I took a look in the commit, but it looks fine to me. So I thought the cause is not in the commit diff. I found the WARN is printed when the f2fs is set up with multiple devices, and read requests are mapped to the very first block of the second device in the direct read path. In this case, f2fs_map_blocks() and f2fs_map_blocks_cached() modify map->m_pblk as the physical block address from each block device. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1517c1a7a4456f080fabc4ac9853930e4b880d14 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a9225fdd0ec95fcf32936bcea9ceef0cf1512dc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b2611a42462c6c685d40b5f3aedcd8d21c27065 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8b485e39b4d17afa9a2821fc778d5a67abfc03a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33e62cd7b4c281cd737c62e5d8c4f0e602a8c5c5 •

CVSS: 4.4EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: soundwire: cadence: fix invalid PDI offset For some reason, we add an offset to the PDI, presumably to skip the PDI0 and PDI1 which are reserved for BPT. This code is however completely wrong and leads to an out-of-bounds access. We were just lucky so far since we used only a couple of PDIs and remained within the PDI array bounds. A Fixes: tag is not provided since there are no known platforms where the out-of-bounds would be accessed, and the initial code had problems as well. A follow-up patch completely removes this useless offset. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/002364b2d594a9afc0385c09e00994c510b1d089 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd4bcb991ebaf0d1813d81d9983cfa99f9ef5328 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/902f6d656441a511ac25c6cffce74496db10a078 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ebcaa0e5db9b6044bb487ae1cf41bc601761567 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7eeef1e935d23db5265233d92395bd5c648a4021 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e99103f757cdf636c6ee860994a19a346a11785 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ee1b439b1540ae543149b15a2a61b9dff937d91 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-38635 • CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: serial: max3100: Lock port->lock when calling uart_handle_cts_change() uart_handle_cts_change() has to be called with port lock taken, Since we run it in a separate work, the lock may not be taken at the time of running. Make sure that it's taken by explicitly doing that. Without it we got a splat: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10 at drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:3491 uart_handle_cts_change+0xa6/0xb0 ... Workqueue: max3100-0 max3100_work [max3100] RIP: 0010:uart_handle_cts_change+0xa6/0xb0 ... max3100_handlerx+0xc5/0x110 [max3100] max3100_work+0x12a/0x340 [max3100] En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: serial: max3100: Bloquear puerto-&gt;bloquear al llamar a uart_handle_cts_change() uart_handle_cts_change() debe llamarse con el bloqueo de puerto tomado. Dado que lo ejecutamos en un trabajo separado, el bloqueo puede No se tomará en el momento de correr. Asegúrese de que se tome haciéndolo explícitamente. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7831d56b0a3544cbb6f82f76c34ca95e24d5b676 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44b38924135d2093e2ec1812969464845dd66dc9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea9b35372b58ac2931bfc1d5bc25e839d1221e30 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc121e3722a0a2c8f716ef991e5425b180a5fb94 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78dbda51bb4241b88a52d71620f06231a341f9ba https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8296bb9e5925b6634259c5d4daee88f0cc0884ec https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93df2fba6c7dfa9a2f08546ea9a5ca4728758458 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/865b30c8661924ee9145f442bf32cea54 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: serial: max3100: Update uart_driver_registered on driver removal The removal of the last MAX3100 device triggers the removal of the driver. However, code doesn't update the respective global variable and after insmod — rmmod — insmod cycle the kernel oopses: max3100 spi-PRP0001:01: max3100_probe: adding port 0 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000408 ... RIP: 0010:serial_core_register_port+0xa0/0x840 ... max3100_probe+0x1b6/0x280 [max3100] spi_probe+0x8d/0xb0 Update the actual state so next time UART driver will be registered again. Hugo also noticed, that the error path in the probe also affected by having the variable set, and not cleared. Instead of clearing it move the assignment after the successfull uart_register_driver() call. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: serial: max3100: actualización uart_driver_registered al eliminar el controlador La eliminación del último dispositivo MAX3100 desencadena la eliminación del controlador. Sin embargo, el código no actualiza la variable global respectiva y después del ciclo insmod — rmmod — insmod, el kernel falla: max3100 spi-PRP0001:01: max3100_probe: agregando el puerto 0 ERROR: desreferencia del puntero NULL del kernel, dirección: 0000000000000408... • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7831d56b0a3544cbb6f82f76c34ca95e24d5b676 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21a61a7fbcfdd3493cede43ebc7c4dfae2147a8b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9db4222ed8cd3e50b81c8b910ae74c26427a4003 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8e2a4339decad7e59425b594a98613402652d72 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/361a92c9038e8c8c3996f8eeaa14522a8ad90752 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6eb7aff23e05f362e8c9b560f6ac5e727b70e00 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8a10089eddba40d4b2080c9d3fc2d2b2488f762 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa84ca78b048dfb00df0ef446f5c35e0a •

CVSS: 5.1EPSS: 0%CPEs: 9EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/pci: fix potential memory leak in vfio_intx_enable() If vfio_irq_ctx_alloc() failed will lead to 'name' memory leak. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cb0d7532126d23145329826c38054b4e9a05e7c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d29d4c72c1e196cce6969c98072a272d1a703b3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69276a555c740acfbff13fb5769ee9c92e1c828e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/18c198c96a815c962adc2b9b77909eec0be7df4d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b18fa894d615c8527e15d96b76c7448800e13899 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27d40bf72dd9a6600b76ad05859176ea9a1b4897 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c089cefe30924fbe20dd1ee92774ea1f5eca834 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e09cf81959d9f12b75ad5c6dd53d2374 • CWE-402: Transmission of Private Resources into a New Sphere ('Resource Leak') •