CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0CVE-2024-35981 – virtio_net: Do not send RSS key if it is not supported
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-35981
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio_net: Do not send RSS key if it is not supported There is a bug when setting the RSS options in virtio_net that can break the whole machine, getting the kernel into an infinite loop. Running the following command in any QEMU virtual machine with virtionet will reproduce this problem: # ethtool -X eth0 hfunc toeplitz This is how the problem happens: 1) ethtool_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_set_rxfh() 2) virtnet_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_commit_rss_command() 3) virtnet_commit_rss_command() populates 4 entries for the rss scatter-gather 4) Since the command above does not have a key, then the last scatter-gatter entry will be zeroed, since rss_key_size == 0. sg_buf_size = vi->rss_key_size; 5) This buffer is passed to qemu, but qemu is not happy with a buffer with zero length, and do the following in virtqueue_map_desc() (QEMU function): if (!sz) { virtio_error(vdev, "virtio: zero sized buffers are not allowed"); 6) virtio_error() (also QEMU function) set the device as broken vdev->broken = true; 7) Qemu bails out, and do not repond this crazy kernel. 8) The kernel is waiting for the response to come back (function virtnet_send_command()) 9) The kernel is waiting doing the following : while (!virtqueue_get_buf(vi->cvq, &tmp) && !virtqueue_is_broken(vi->cvq)) cpu_relax(); 10) None of the following functions above is true, thus, the kernel loops here forever. Keeping in mind that virtqueue_is_broken() does not look at the qemu `vdev->broken`, so, it never realizes that the vitio is broken at QEMU side. Fix it by not sending RSS commands if the feature is not available in the device. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7114b1249fa3b5f3a434606ba4cc89c4a27d618 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/539a2b995a4ed93125cb0efae0f793b00ab2158b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43a71c1b4b3a6d4db857b1435d271540279fc7de https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28e9a64638cd16bc1ecac9ff74ffeacb9fb652de https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/059a49aa2e25c58f90b50151f109dd3c4cdb3a47 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0CVE-2024-35980 – arm64: tlb: Fix TLBI RANGE operand
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-35980
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: tlb: Fix TLBI RANGE operand KVM/arm64 relies on TLBI RANGE feature to flush TLBs when the dirty pages are collected by VMM and the page table entries become write protected during live migration. Unfortunately, the operand passed to the TLBI RANGE instruction isn't correctly sorted out due to the commit 117940aa6e5f ("KVM: arm64: Define kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range()"). It leads to crash on the destination VM after live migration because TLBs aren't flushed completely and some of the dirty pages are missed. For example, I have a VM where 8GB memory is assigned, starting from 0x40000000 (1GB). Note that the host has 4KB as the base page size. In the middile of migration, kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range() is executed to flush TLBs. It passes MAX_TLBI_RANGE_PAGES as the argument to __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range() and __flush_s2_tlb_range_op(). SCALE#3 and NUM#31, corresponding to MAX_TLBI_RANGE_PAGES, isn't supported by __TLBI_RANGE_NUM(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/117940aa6e5f8308f1529e1313660980f1dae771 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac4ad513de4fba18b4ac0ace132777d0910e8cfa https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/944db7b536baaf49d7e576af36a94f4719552b07 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3ba51ab24fddef79fc212f9840de54db8fd1685 •
CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0CVE-2024-35979 – raid1: fix use-after-free for original bio in raid1_write_request()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-35979
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: raid1: fix use-after-free for original bio in raid1_write_request() r1_bio->bios[] is used to record new bios that will be issued to underlying disks, however, in raid1_write_request(), r1_bio->bios[] will set to the original bio temporarily. Meanwhile, if blocked rdev is set, free_r1bio() will be called causing that all r1_bio->bios[] to be freed: raid1_write_request() r1_bio = alloc_r1bio(mddev, bio); -> r1_bio->bios[] is NULL for (i = 0; i < disks; i++) -> for each rdev in conf // first rdev is normal r1_bio->bios[0] = bio; -> set to original bio // second rdev is blocked if (test_bit(Blocked, &rdev->flags)) break if (blocked_rdev) free_r1bio() put_all_bios() bio_put(r1_bio->bios[0]) -> original bio is freed Test scripts: mdadm -CR /dev/md0 -l1 -n4 /dev/sd[abcd] --assume-clean fio -filename=/dev/md0 -ioengine=libaio -rw=write -bs=4k -numjobs=1 \ -iodepth=128 -name=test -direct=1 echo blocked > /sys/block/md0/md/rd2/state Test result: BUG bio-264 (Not tainted): Object already free ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Allocated in mempool_alloc_slab+0x24/0x50 age=1 cpu=1 pid=869 kmem_cache_alloc+0x324/0x480 mempool_alloc_slab+0x24/0x50 mempool_alloc+0x6e/0x220 bio_alloc_bioset+0x1af/0x4d0 blkdev_direct_IO+0x164/0x8a0 blkdev_write_iter+0x309/0x440 aio_write+0x139/0x2f0 io_submit_one+0x5ca/0xb70 __do_sys_io_submit+0x86/0x270 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x22/0x30 do_syscall_64+0xb1/0x210 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 Freed in mempool_free_slab+0x1f/0x30 age=1 cpu=1 pid=869 kmem_cache_free+0x28c/0x550 mempool_free_slab+0x1f/0x30 mempool_free+0x40/0x100 bio_free+0x59/0x80 bio_put+0xf0/0x220 free_r1bio+0x74/0xb0 raid1_make_request+0xadf/0x1150 md_handle_request+0xc7/0x3b0 md_submit_bio+0x76/0x130 __submit_bio+0xd8/0x1d0 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1eb/0x5c0 submit_bio_noacct+0x169/0xd40 submit_bio+0xee/0x1d0 blkdev_direct_IO+0x322/0x8a0 blkdev_write_iter+0x309/0x440 aio_write+0x139/0x2f0 Since that bios for underlying disks are not allocated yet, fix this problem by using mempool_free() directly to free the r1_bio. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: raid1: corrige el uso después de liberar la biografía original en raid1_write_request() r1_bio->bios[] se usa para registrar nuevas biografías que se emitirán a los discos subyacentes; sin embargo, en raid1_write_request(), r1_bio->bios[] se configurará temporalmente en la biografía original. Mientras tanto, si se establece rdev bloqueado, se llamará a free_r1bio() causando que todos los r1_bio->bios[] sean liberados: raid1_write_request() r1_bio = alloc_r1bio(mddev, bio); -> r1_bio->bios[] es NULL para (i = 0; i < discos; i++) -> para cada rdev en conf // el primer rdev es normal r1_bio->bios[0] = bio; -> establecer en biografía original // el segundo rdev está bloqueado si (test_bit(Blocked, &rdev->flags)) break if (blocked_rdev) free_r1bio() put_all_bios() bio_put(r1_bio->bios[0]) -> biografía original es Scripts de prueba liberados: mdadm -CR /dev/md0 -l1 -n4 /dev/sd[abcd] --assume-clean fio -filename=/dev/md0 -ioengine=libaio -rw=write -bs=4k -numjobs= 1 \ -io Depth=128 -name=test -direct=1 eco bloqueado > /sys/block/md0/md/rd2/state Resultado de la prueba: ERROR bio-264 (No contaminado): Objeto ya libre ------ -------------------------------------------------- --------------------- Asignado en mempool_alloc_slab+0x24/0x50 age=1 cpu=1 pid=869 kmem_cache_alloc+0x324/0x480 mempool_alloc_slab+0x24/0x50 mempool_alloc+0x6e /0x220 bio_alloc_bioset+0x1af/0x4d0 blkdev_direct_IO+0x164/0x8a0 blkdev_write_iter+0x309/0x440 aio_write+0x139/0x2f0 io_submit_one+0x5ca/0xb70 __do_sys_io_submit+0x86/0x270 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x22/0x30 do_syscall_64+0xb1/0x210 Entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 Liberado en mempool_free_slab +0x1f/0x30 edad=1 cpu=1 pid=869 kmem_cache_free+0x28c/0x550 mempool_free_slab+0x1f/0x30 mempool_free+0x40/0x100 bio_free+0x59/0x80 bio_put+0xf0/0x220 free_r1bio+0x74/0xb0 raid1_make_ request+0xadf/0x1150 md_handle_request+ 0xc7/0x3b0 md_submit_bio+0x76/0x130 __submit_bio+0xd8/0x1d0 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1eb/0x5c0 submit_bio_noacct+0x169/0xd40 submit_bio+0xee/0x1d0 blkdev_direct_IO+0x322/0x8a0 _write_iter+0x309/0x440 aio_write+0x139/0x2f0 Dado que las BIOS para los discos subyacentes son aún no asignado, solucione este problema usando mempool_free() directamente para liberar r1_bio. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/992db13a4aee766c8bfbf046ad15c2db5fa7cab8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f28d49a328fe20926995d5fbdc92da665596268 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f423f41b7679c09abb26d2bd54be5cbef23c9446 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fcf3f7e2fc8a53a6140beee46ec782a4c88e4744 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-35979 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2281872 •
CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-35978 – Bluetooth: Fix memory leak in hci_req_sync_complete()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-35978
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: Fix memory leak in hci_req_sync_complete() In 'hci_req_sync_complete()', always free the previous sync request state before assigning reference to a new one. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: Bluetooth: corrija la pérdida de memoria en hci_req_sync_complete() En 'hci_req_sync_complete()', libere siempre el estado de solicitud de sincronización anterior antes de asignar una referencia a una nueva. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f60cb30579d3401cab1ed36b42df5c0568ae0ba7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89a32741f4217856066c198a4a7267bcdd1edd67 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4beab84fbb50df3be1d8f8a976e6fe882ca65cb2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8478394f76c748862ef179a16f651f752bdafaf0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75193678cce993aa959e7764b6df2f599886dd06 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66fab1e120b39f8f47a94186ddee36006fc02ca8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ab5e44b9bac946bd49fd63264a08cd1ea494e76 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e4cb8382fff6706436b66eafd9c0ee857 • CWE-401: Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0CVE-2024-35977 – platform/chrome: cros_ec_uart: properly fix race condition
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-35977
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/chrome: cros_ec_uart: properly fix race condition The cros_ec_uart_probe() function calls devm_serdev_device_open() before it calls serdev_device_set_client_ops(). This can trigger a NULL pointer dereference: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ... ? ttyport_receive_buf A simplified version of crashing code is as follows: static inline size_t serdev_controller_receive_buf(struct serdev_controller *ctrl, const u8 *data, size_t count) { struct serdev_device *serdev = ctrl->serdev; if (!serdev || !serdev->ops->receive_buf) // CRASH! • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01f95d42b8f4e88f20d68791b0a85dbb9e3d1ac9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfd758041d8b79aa8c3f811b6bd6105379f2f702 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e9bb74a93b7daa32313ccaefd0edc529d40daf8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e700b384ec13f5bcac9855cb28fcc674f1d3593 •