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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethernet:enic: Fix a use after free bug in enic_hard_start_xmit In enic_hard_start_xmit, it calls enic_queue_wq_skb(). Inside enic_queue_wq_skb, if some error happens, the skb will be freed by dev_kfree_skb(skb). But the freed skb is still used in skb_tx_timestamp(skb). My patch makes enic_queue_wq_skb() return error and goto spin_unlock() incase of error. The solution is provided by Govind. See https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/4/30/961. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: ethernet:enic: corrige un error de use after free en enic_hard_start_xmit. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb7516d42478ebc8e2f00efb76ef96f7b68fd8d3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25a87b1f566b5eb2af2857a928f0e2310d900976 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7f6f07774091a6ddd98500b85386c3c6afb30d3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7afdd6aba95c8a526038e7abe283eeac3e4320f1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6892396ebf04ea2c021d80e10f4075e014cd7cc3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d90529392aaf498dafa95d212295d64b2cea4e24 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/643001b47adc844ae33510c4bb93c236667008a3 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nftables: avoid overflows in nft_hash_buckets() Number of buckets being stored in 32bit variables, we have to ensure that no overflows occur in nft_hash_buckets() syzbot injected a size == 0x40000000 and reported: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13 shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' CPU: 1 PID: 29539 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc7-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:327 __roundup_pow_of_two include/linux/log2.h:57 [inline] nft_hash_buckets net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c:411 [inline] nft_hash_estimate.cold+0x19/0x1e net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c:652 nft_select_set_ops net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:3586 [inline] nf_tables_newset+0xe62/0x3110 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:4322 nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xa09/0x24b0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:488 nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:612 [inline] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3af/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:630 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338 netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: netfilter: nftables: evitar desbordamientos en nft_hash_buckets() Número de depósitos almacenados en variables de 32 bits, debemos asegurarnos de que no se produzcan desbordamientos en nft_hash_buckets() syzbot inyectó un tamaño == 0x40000000 e informó: UBSAN: desplazamiento fuera de los límites en ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13 el exponente de desplazamiento 64 es demasiado grande para el tipo de 64 bits 'long unsigned int' CPU: 1 PID: 29539 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc7-syzkaller #0 Nombre del hardware: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Seguimiento de llamadas: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [en línea] dump_stack +0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:327 __roundup_pow_of_two include/linux/log2.h:57 [en línea] nft_hash_buckets net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c:411 [en línea] nft_hash_estimate.cold+0x19/0x1e net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c:652 nft_select_set_ops net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:3586 [en línea] nf_tables_newset+0xe62 /0x3110 net/filtro de red /nf_tables_api.c:4322 nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xa09/0x24b0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:488 nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:612 [en línea] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3af/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:630 netlink_unicast_kernel net/ netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [en línea] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338 netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [en línea] sock_sendmsg +0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433 do_sys llamada_64+0x2d /0x70 arco/x86/entry/common.c:46 • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ed6389c483dc77cdbdd48de0ca7ce41723dd667 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2824cafc6a93792d9ad85939c499161214d84c4b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/efcd730ddd6f25578bd31bfe703e593e2421d708 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c77e2ef18167ad334e27610ced9a7f6af5ec1787 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72b49dd116ca00a46a11d5a4d8d7987f05ed9cd7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e8ab479cfbe5751efccedb95afb9b112a5ba475 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a388d10961ff8578b1a6691945d406c0f33aa71b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a54754ec9891830ba548e2010c889e3c8 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i40e: Fix use-after-free in i40e_client_subtask() Currently the call to i40e_client_del_instance frees the object pf->cinst, however pf->cinst->lan_info is being accessed after the free. Fix this by adding the missing return. Addresses-Coverity: ("Read from pointer after free") En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: i40e: Se corrige use-after-free en i40e_client_subtask() Actualmente la llamada a i40e_client_del_instance libera el objeto pf->cinst, sin embargo se accede a pf->cinst->lan_info después de gratis. Solucione este problema agregando la declaración que falta. Direcciones-Cobertura: ("Leer desde el puntero después de estar libre") • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b0b1a6d0ac983ce1928432285d0222d4fb7c38b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1322eaeb8af0d8985b5cc5fa759140fa0e57b84 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d718c15a2bf9ae082d5ae4d177fb19ef23cb4132 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/829a713450b8fb127cbabfc1244c1d8179ec5107 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ebc10aa7cd17fd9857dedac69600465c9dd16d1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fd5d262e7442192ac7611ff1597a36c5b044323 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38318f23a7ef86a8b1862e5e8078c4de121960c3 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 10EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/64s: Fix crashes when toggling entry flush barrier The entry flush mitigation can be enabled/disabled at runtime via a debugfs file (entry_flush), which causes the kernel to patch itself to enable/disable the relevant mitigations. However depending on which mitigation we're using, it may not be safe to do that patching while other CPUs are active. For example the following crash: sleeper[15639]: segfault (11) at c000000000004c20 nip c000000000004c20 lr c000000000004c20 Shows that we returned to userspace with a corrupted LR that points into the kernel, due to executing the partially patched call to the fallback entry flush (ie. we missed the LR restore). Fix it by doing the patching under stop machine. The CPUs that aren't doing the patching will be spinning in the core of the stop machine logic. That is currently sufficient for our purposes, because none of the patching we do is to that code or anywhere in the vicinity. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: powerpc/64s: soluciona fallas al alternar la barrera de descarga de entrada. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a1e90af718d1489ffcecc8f52486c4f5dc0f7a6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa4bf9f38184ed7ca4916eb64f8c767d1e279c1f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db01cad9efe3c3838a6b3a3f68affd295c4b92d6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f69bb4e51f41973fb7594be1479fa689831efe1a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b65458b6be8032c5179d4f562038575d7b3a6be3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e590b36718d6e740b7b19514f710402a6499164c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8382b15864e5014261b4f36c2aa897236 •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfsplus: prevent corruption in shrinking truncate I believe there are some issues introduced by commit 31651c607151 ("hfsplus: avoid deadlock on file truncation") HFS+ has extent records which always contains 8 extents. In case the first extent record in catalog file gets full, new ones are allocated from extents overflow file. In case shrinking truncate happens to middle of an extent record which locates in extents overflow file, the logic in hfsplus_file_truncate() was changed so that call to hfs_brec_remove() is not guarded any more. Right action would be just freeing the extents that exceed the new size inside extent record by calling hfsplus_free_extents(), and then check if the whole extent record should be removed. However since the guard (blk_cnt > start) is now after the call to hfs_brec_remove(), this has unfortunate effect that the last matching extent record is removed unconditionally. To reproduce this issue, create a file which has at least 10 extents, and then perform shrinking truncate into middle of the last extent record, so that the number of remaining extents is not under or divisible by 8. This causes the last extent record (8 extents) to be removed totally instead of truncating into middle of it. Thus this causes corruption, and lost data. Fix for this is simply checking if the new truncated end is below the start of this extent record, making it safe to remove the full extent record. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31651c607151f1034cfb57e5a78678bea54c362b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52dde855663e5db824af51db39b5757d2ef3e28a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c451a6bafb5f422197d31536f82116aed132b72c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/adbd8a2a8cc05d9e501f93e5c95c59307874cc99 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c477f62db1a0c0ecaa60a29713006ceeeb04b685 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97314e45aa1223a42d60256a62c5d9af54baf446 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c3187cf32216313fb316084efac4dab3a8459b1d •