CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0CVE-2024-47755 – nvdimm: Fix devs leaks in scan_labels()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-47755
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvdimm: Fix devs leaks in scan_labels() scan_labels() leaks memory when label scanning fails and it falls back to just creating a default "seed" namespace for userspace to configure. Root can force the kernel to leak memory. Allocate the minimum resources unconditionally and release them when unneeded to avoid the memory leak. A kmemleak reports: unreferenced object 0xffff88800dda1980 (size 16): comm "kworker/u10:5", pid 69, jiffies 4294671781 hex dump (first 16 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace (crc 0): [<00000000c5dea560>] __kmalloc+0x32c/0x470 [<000000009ed43c83>] nd_region_register_namespaces+0x6fb/0x1120 [libnvdimm] [<000000000e07a65c>] nd_region_probe+0xfe/0x210 [libnvdimm] [<000000007b79ce5f>] nvdimm_bus_probe+0x7a/0x1e0 [libnvdimm] [<00000000a5f3da2e>] really_probe+0xc6/0x390 [<00000000129e2a69>] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x150 [<000000002dfed28b>] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90 [<00000000e7048de2>] __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110 [<0000000032dca295>] bus_for_each_drv+0x85/0xe0 [<00000000391c5a7d>] __device_attach+0xbe/0x1e0 [<0000000026dabec0>] bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0 [<00000000c590d936>] device_add+0x656/0x870 [<000000003d69bfaa>] nd_async_device_register+0xe/0x50 [libnvdimm] [<000000003f4c52a4>] async_run_entry_fn+0x2e/0x110 [<00000000e201f4b0>] process_one_work+0x1ee/0x600 [<000000006d90d5a9>] worker_thread+0x183/0x350 • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b40e09a1232de537b193fa1b6b3ef16d3a1e397 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45db20bdb5695d06478d35e05fb2550441bed890 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/18a672c62d735744c6340eb3f5e58934a5d34cf2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/939053737edb49ba5bdc5846acb45f11d15b7ab4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cdf0dfb3d183bbe0d0b6a6622c53d105074ad384 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62c2aa6b1f565d2fc1ec11a6e9e8336ce37a6426 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2024-47749 – RDMA/cxgb4: Added NULL check for lookup_atid
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-47749
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/cxgb4: Added NULL check for lookup_atid The lookup_atid() function can return NULL if the ATID is invalid or does not exist in the identifier table, which could lead to dereferencing a null pointer without a check in the `act_establish()` and `act_open_rpl()` functions. Add a NULL check to prevent null pointer dereferencing. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfdda9d764362ab77b11a410bb928400e6520d57 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd598ac57dcae796cb58551074660c39b43fb155 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b11318dc8a1ec565300bb1a9073095af817cc508 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39cb9f39913566ec5865581135f3e8123ad1aee1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d50ae281a1712b9b2ca72830a96b8f11882358d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54aaa3ed40972511e423b604324b881425b9ff1e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9c94c8ba5a713817cffd74c4bacc05187469624 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e766e6a92410ca269161de059fff0843b •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0CVE-2024-47745 – mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-47745
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1]. The PoC: $ cat > test.c int main(void) { size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0); const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0); unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff); syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old); syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0); syscall(SYS_personality, old); // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); unsigned char buf2[1024]; while (1) { int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024); if (ret <= 0) break; write(1, buf2, ret); } close(fd); } $ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted) [PM: subject line tweaks] • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49d3a4ad57c57227c3b0fd6cd4188b2a5ebd6178 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3393fddbfa947c8e1fdcc4509226905ffffd8b89 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce14f38d6ee9e88e37ec28427b4b93a7c33c70d3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2024-47742 – firmware_loader: Block path traversal
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-47742
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware_loader: Block path traversal Most firmware names are hardcoded strings, or are constructed from fairly constrained format strings where the dynamic parts are just some hex numbers or such. However, there are a couple codepaths in the kernel where firmware file names contain string components that are passed through from a device or semi-privileged userspace; the ones I could find (not counting interfaces that require root privileges) are: - lpfc_sli4_request_firmware_update() seems to construct the firmware filename from "ModelName", a string that was previously parsed out of some descriptor ("Vital Product Data") in lpfc_fill_vpd() - nfp_net_fw_find() seems to construct a firmware filename from a model name coming from nfp_hwinfo_lookup(pf->hwinfo, "nffw.partno"), which I think parses some descriptor that was read from the device. (But this case likely isn't exploitable because the format string looks like "netronome/nic_%s", and there shouldn't be any *folders* starting with "netronome/nic_". The previous case was different because there, the "%s" is *at the start* of the format string.) - module_flash_fw_schedule() is reachable from the ETHTOOL_MSG_MODULE_FW_FLASH_ACT netlink command, which is marked as GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM (meaning CAP_NET_ADMIN inside a user namespace is enough to pass the privilege check), and takes a userspace-provided firmware name. (But I think to reach this case, you need to have CAP_NET_ADMIN over a network namespace that a special kind of ethernet device is mapped into, so I think this is not a viable attack path in practice.) Fix it by rejecting any firmware names containing ".." path components. For what it's worth, I went looking and haven't found any USB device drivers that use the firmware loader dangerously. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c30558e6c5c9ad6c86459d9acce1520ceeab9ea6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a77fc4acfd49fc6076e565445b2bc5fdc3244da4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d2411f4edcb649eaf232160db459bb4770b5251 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7420c1bf7fc784e587b87329cc6dfa3dca537aa4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28f1cd94d3f1092728fb775a0fe26c5f1ac2ebeb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c4e13fdfcab34811c3143a0a03c05fec4e870ec https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0e5311aa8022107d63c54e2f03684ec0 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2024-47740 – f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-47740
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller's FSUID matches the inode's UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true. There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways: - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can truncate an inode to size 0 - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert changes another process concurrently made to a file Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break anything. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88b88a66797159949cec32eaab12b4968f6fae2d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/000bab8753ae29a259feb339b99ee759795a48ac https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88ff021e1fea2d9b40b2d5efd9013c89f7be04ac https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32f348ecc149e9ca70a1c424ae8fa9b6919d2713 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e0de753bfe87768ebe6744d869caa92f35e5731 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3bfac2cabf5333506b263bc0c8497c95302f32d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4583290898c13c2c2e5eb8773886d153c2c5121d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4f5a100f87f32cb65d4bb1ad282a08c92 •