CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0CVE-2022-48998 – powerpc/bpf/32: Fix Oops on tail call tests
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2022-48998
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/bpf/32: Fix Oops on tail call tests test_bpf tail call tests end up as: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 85 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 111 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 145 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 170 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 190 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xf1b4e000 Faulting instruction address: 0xbe86b710 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash PowerMac Modules linked in: test_bpf(+) CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ #195 Hardware name: PowerMac3,1 750CL 0x87210 PowerMac NIP: be86b710 LR: be857e88 CTR: be86b704 REGS: f1b4df20 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.1.0-rc4+) MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28008242 XER: 00000000 DAR: f1b4e000 DSISR: 42000000 GPR00: 00000001 f1b4dfe0 c11d2280 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 GPR08: f1b4e000 be86b704 f1b4e000 00000000 00000000 100d816a f2440000 fe73baa8 GPR16: f2458000 00000000 c1941ae4 f1fe2248 00000045 c0de0000 f2458030 00000000 GPR24: 000003e8 0000000f f2458000 f1b4dc90 3e584b46 00000000 f24466a0 c1941a00 NIP [be86b710] 0xbe86b710 LR [be857e88] __run_one+0xec/0x264 [test_bpf] Call Trace: [f1b4dfe0] [00000002] 0x2 (unreliable) Instruction dump: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is a tentative to write above the stack. The problem is encoutered with tests added by commit 38608ee7b690 ("bpf, tests: Add load store test case for tail call") This happens because tail call is done to a BPF prog with a different stack_depth. At the time being, the stack is kept as is when the caller tail calls its callee. But at exit, the callee restores the stack based on its own properties. Therefore here, at each run, r1 is erroneously increased by 32 - 16 = 16 bytes. This was done that way in order to pass the tail call count from caller to callee through the stack. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51c66ad849a703d9bbfd7704c941827aed0fd9fd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/747a6e547240baaaf41874d27333b87b87cfd24c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89d21e259a94f7d5582ec675aa445f5a79f347e4 •
CVSS: 4.7EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0CVE-2022-48997 – char: tpm: Protect tpm_pm_suspend with locks
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2022-48997
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: char: tpm: Protect tpm_pm_suspend with locks Currently tpm transactions are executed unconditionally in tpm_pm_suspend() function, which may lead to races with other tpm accessors in the system. Specifically, the hw_random tpm driver makes use of tpm_get_random(), and this function is called in a loop from a kthread, which means it's not frozen alongside userspace, and so can race with the work done during system suspend: tpm tpm0: tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error -52 tpm tpm0: invalid TPM_STS.x 0xff, dumping stack for forensics CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5+ #135 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-20220807_005459-localhost 04/01/2014 Call Trace: tpm_tis_status.cold+0x19/0x20 tpm_transmit+0x13b/0x390 tpm_transmit_cmd+0x20/0x80 tpm1_pm_suspend+0xa6/0x110 tpm_pm_suspend+0x53/0x80 __pnp_bus_suspend+0x35/0xe0 __device_suspend+0x10f/0x350 Fix this by calling tpm_try_get_ops(), which itself is a wrapper around tpm_chip_start(), but takes the appropriate mutex. [Jason: reworked commit message, added metadata] • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e891db1a18bf11e02533ec2386b796cfd8d60666 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d699373ac5f3545243d3c73a1ccab77fdef8cec6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e0d6c687c925e27fd4bc78a2721d10acf5614d6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/571b6bbbf54d835ea6120f65575cb55cd767e603 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25b78bf98b07ff5aceb9b1e24f72ec0236c5c053 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23393c6461422df5bf8084a086ada9a7e17dc2ba https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-48997 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2320774 • CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0CVE-2022-48995 – Input: raydium_ts_i2c - fix memory leak in raydium_i2c_send()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2022-48995
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: raydium_ts_i2c - fix memory leak in raydium_i2c_send() There is a kmemleak when test the raydium_i2c_ts with bpf mock device: unreferenced object 0xffff88812d3675a0 (size 8): comm "python3", pid 349, jiffies 4294741067 (age 95.695s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 11 0e 10 c0 01 00 04 00 ........ backtrace: [<0000000068427125>] __kmalloc+0x46/0x1b0 [<0000000090180f91>] raydium_i2c_send+0xd4/0x2bf [raydium_i2c_ts] [<000000006e631aee>] raydium_i2c_initialize.cold+0xbc/0x3e4 [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000dc6fcf38>] raydium_i2c_probe+0x3cd/0x6bc [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000a310de16>] i2c_device_probe+0x651/0x680 [<00000000f5a96bf3>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0 [<00000000096ba499>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170 [<00000000c5acb4d9>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 [<00000000264fe082>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150 [<00000000f919423c>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180 [<00000000e067feca>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0 [<0000000054301fc2>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140 [<00000000aad93b22>] device_add+0x810/0x1130 [<00000000c086a53f>] i2c_new_client_device+0x352/0x4e0 [<000000003c2c248c>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110 [<00000000ffec4177>] of_i2c_notify+0x100/0x160 unreferenced object 0xffff88812d3675c8 (size 8): comm "python3", pid 349, jiffies 4294741070 (age 95.692s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 22 00 36 2d 81 88 ff ff ".6-.... backtrace: [<0000000068427125>] __kmalloc+0x46/0x1b0 [<0000000090180f91>] raydium_i2c_send+0xd4/0x2bf [raydium_i2c_ts] [<000000001d5c9620>] raydium_i2c_initialize.cold+0x223/0x3e4 [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000dc6fcf38>] raydium_i2c_probe+0x3cd/0x6bc [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000a310de16>] i2c_device_probe+0x651/0x680 [<00000000f5a96bf3>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0 [<00000000096ba499>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170 [<00000000c5acb4d9>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 [<00000000264fe082>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150 [<00000000f919423c>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180 [<00000000e067feca>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0 [<0000000054301fc2>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140 [<00000000aad93b22>] device_add+0x810/0x1130 [<00000000c086a53f>] i2c_new_client_device+0x352/0x4e0 [<000000003c2c248c>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110 [<00000000ffec4177>] of_i2c_notify+0x100/0x160 After BANK_SWITCH command from i2c BUS, no matter success or error happened, the tx_buf should be freed. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b384bd6c3f2d6d3526c77bfb264dfbaf737bc2a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a82869ac52f3d9db4b2cf8fd41edc2dee7a75a61 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53b9b1201e34ccc895971218559123625c56fbcd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/097c1c7a28e3da8f2811ba532be6e81faab15aab https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c9a59939deb4bfafdc451100c03d1e848b4169b •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2022-48994 – ALSA: seq: Fix function prototype mismatch in snd_seq_expand_var_event
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2022-48994
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: Fix function prototype mismatch in snd_seq_expand_var_event With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. seq_copy_in_user() and seq_copy_in_kernel() did not have prototypes matching snd_seq_dump_func_t. Adjust this and remove the casts. There are not resulting binary output differences. This was found as a result of Clang's new -Wcast-function-type-strict flag, which is more sensitive than the simpler -Wcast-function-type, which only checks for type width mismatches. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b38486e82ecb9f3046e0184205f6b61408fc40c9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e385360705a0b346bdb57ce938249175d0613b8a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f46e95bf344abc4e74f8158901d32a869e0adb6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63badfed200219ca656968725f1a43df293ac936 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15c42ab8d43acb73e2eba361ad05822c0af0ecfa https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fccd454129f6a0739651f7f58307cdb631fd6e89 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13ee8fb5410b740c8dd2867d3557c7662f7dda2d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/05530ef7cf7c7d700f6753f058999b1b5 •
CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2022-48992 – ASoC: soc-pcm: Add NULL check in BE reparenting
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2022-48992
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: soc-pcm: Add NULL check in BE reparenting Add NULL check in dpcm_be_reparent API, to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference error. The issue occurred in fuzzing test. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0760acc2e6598ad4f7bd3662db2d907ef0838139 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4dd21a79dbb862d2ebcf9ed90e646416009ff0d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7166d6821c15f3516bcac8ae3f155924da1908c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2ba66d8738584d124aff4e760ed1337f5f6dfb6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6f45e538328df9ce66aa61bafee1a5717c4b700 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f74b9aa8d58c18927bb9b65dd5ba70a5fd61615 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/34a9796bf0684bfd54e96a142560d560c21c983b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db8f91d424fe0ea6db337aca8bc05908b • CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference •