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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/vt-d: Fix PCI device refcount leak in dmar_dev_scope_init() for_each_pci_dev() is implemented by pci_get_device(). The comment of pci_get_device() says that it will increase the reference count for the returned pci_dev and also decrease the reference count for the input pci_dev @from if it is not NULL. If we break for_each_pci_dev() loop with pdev not NULL, we need to call pci_dev_put() to decrease the reference count. Add the missing pci_dev_put() for the error path to avoid reference count leak. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e45528930388658603ea24d49cf52867b928d3e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d47bc9d7bcdbb9adc9703513d964b514fee5b0bf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71c4a621985fc051ab86d3a86c749069a993fcb2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/876d7bfb89273997056220029ff12b1c2cc4691d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbdd83bd2fd67142b03ce9dbdd1eab322ff7321f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5c65cd56aed027f8a97fda8b691caaeb66d115e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bdb613ef179ad4bb9d56a2533e9b30e434f1dfb7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a8f7b90681472948de172dbbf5a54cd3 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: fix race when vmap stack overflow Currently, when detecting vmap stack overflow, riscv firstly switches to the so called shadow stack, then use this shadow stack to call the get_overflow_stack() to get the overflow stack. However, there's a race here if two or more harts use the same shadow stack at the same time. To solve this race, we introduce spin_shadow_stack atomic var, which will be swap between its own address and 0 in atomic way, when the var is set, it means the shadow_stack is being used; when the var is cleared, it means the shadow_stack isn't being used. [Palmer: Add AQ to the swap, and also some comments.] • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31da94c25aea835ceac00575a9fd206c5a833fed https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac00301adb19df54f2eae1efc4bad7447c0156ce https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/879fabc5a95401d9bce357e4b1d24ae4a360a81f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e1864332fbc1b993659eab7974da9fe8bf8c128 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/vt-d: Fix PCI device refcount leak in has_external_pci() for_each_pci_dev() is implemented by pci_get_device(). The comment of pci_get_device() says that it will increase the reference count for the returned pci_dev and also decrease the reference count for the input pci_dev @from if it is not NULL. If we break for_each_pci_dev() loop with pdev not NULL, we need to call pci_dev_put() to decrease the reference count. Add the missing pci_dev_put() before 'return true' to avoid reference count leak. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89a6079df791aeace2044ea93be1b397195824ec https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10ed7655a17f6a3eaecd1293830488259ccd5723 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6eea8b2e858a20ad58ac62dc2de90fea2413f94 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17f67414718e6aba123335a33b7d15aa594fff34 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/afca9e19cc720bfafc75dc5ce429c185ca93f31d •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: Handle attempt to delete multipath route when fib_info contains an nh reference Gwangun Jung reported a slab-out-of-bounds access in fib_nh_match: fib_nh_match+0xf98/0x1130 linux-6.0-rc7/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:961 fib_table_delete+0x5f3/0xa40 linux-6.0-rc7/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1753 inet_rtm_delroute+0x2b3/0x380 linux-6.0-rc7/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:874 Separate nexthop objects are mutually exclusive with the legacy multipath spec. Fix fib_nh_match to return if the config for the to be deleted route contains a multipath spec while the fib_info is using a nexthop object. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/493ced1ac47c48bb86d9d4e8e87df8592be85a0e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc3cd130ecfb8b0ae52e235e487bae3f16a24a32 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b5394229ebae09afc07aabccb5ffd705ffd250e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25174d91e4a32a24204060d283bd5fa6d0ddf133 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb20a2ae241be846bc3c11ea4b3a3c69e41d51f2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61b91eb33a69c3be11b259c5ea484505cd79f883 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/bpf/32: Fix Oops on tail call tests test_bpf tail call tests end up as: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 85 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 111 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 145 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 170 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 190 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xf1b4e000 Faulting instruction address: 0xbe86b710 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash PowerMac Modules linked in: test_bpf(+) CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ #195 Hardware name: PowerMac3,1 750CL 0x87210 PowerMac NIP: be86b710 LR: be857e88 CTR: be86b704 REGS: f1b4df20 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.1.0-rc4+) MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28008242 XER: 00000000 DAR: f1b4e000 DSISR: 42000000 GPR00: 00000001 f1b4dfe0 c11d2280 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 GPR08: f1b4e000 be86b704 f1b4e000 00000000 00000000 100d816a f2440000 fe73baa8 GPR16: f2458000 00000000 c1941ae4 f1fe2248 00000045 c0de0000 f2458030 00000000 GPR24: 000003e8 0000000f f2458000 f1b4dc90 3e584b46 00000000 f24466a0 c1941a00 NIP [be86b710] 0xbe86b710 LR [be857e88] __run_one+0xec/0x264 [test_bpf] Call Trace: [f1b4dfe0] [00000002] 0x2 (unreliable) Instruction dump: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is a tentative to write above the stack. The problem is encoutered with tests added by commit 38608ee7b690 ("bpf, tests: Add load store test case for tail call") This happens because tail call is done to a BPF prog with a different stack_depth. At the time being, the stack is kept as is when the caller tail calls its callee. But at exit, the callee restores the stack based on its own properties. Therefore here, at each run, r1 is erroneously increased by 32 - 16 = 16 bytes. This was done that way in order to pass the tail call count from caller to callee through the stack. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51c66ad849a703d9bbfd7704c941827aed0fd9fd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/747a6e547240baaaf41874d27333b87b87cfd24c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89d21e259a94f7d5582ec675aa445f5a79f347e4 •